UNHCR TO CLOSE IN BANGLADESH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000161

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND PRM
CDR USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2013
TAGS: PREF BG BM
SUBJECT: UNHCR TO CLOSE IN BANGLADESH

REF: DHAKA 190

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez, Reason: 1.5 (d).


1. (C) Summary: UNHCR tells us it plans to close down its
refugee operations in Bangladesh at the end of 2003. In
2004, it will look at the possibility of closing its
operations in Burma's northern Rakhine State. Whatever the
merits of the decision in Bangladesh, in Burma, premature
closure of UNHCR's operations will raise the risks of a new
refugee crisis. End Summary.


2. (C) Hitoshi Mise, the Deputy Director for UNHCR's Asia
Division told diplomats on February 4 that UNHCR would end
support for refugee repatriation from Bangladesh on June 30,
2003 and close down UNHCR's operations in Bangladesh entirely
at the end of 2003. It would review UNHCR's operations in
Burma in 2004 and make a decision then whether to close there
as well, probably at the end of 2004.


3. (C) Mise said that this decision had been coming for some
time. UNHCR's operations in Bangladesh and Burma were among
the most UNHCR's protracted. Moreover, most refugees have
already been repatriated. Of the 250,000 refugees that left
Burma for Bangladesh in the early 1990s, 230,000 have already
returned. Only 22,000 remain in Bangladesh and while
approximately 1,000 were still returning each year, that was
less than annual camp births and not enough to reduce the
refugee population. Of the remaining refugees, only about
7,000 had been cleared by Burma for repatriation, but, even
among those, not all were ready to return. Some had
protection problems; others had a variety of family or
economic reasons for refusing repatriation.


4. (C) In any case, UNHCR had tried to work out arrangements
to allow the remaining refugees to establish a new
"self-sustaining capacity" in Bangladesh, pending
repatriation to Burma. They had presented this plan to
Bangladesh's Foreign Secretary in January, but, since the
plan involved refugees working within the local economy, the
Foreign Secretary rejected the program as a cover for local
resettlement of the refugees. This left UNHCR with few
options, according to Mise. Hence the decision to close the
camps.


5. (C) Mise emphasized that at least the June 30 deadline was
not hard and fast. If refugees wanted to return to Burma
after that date, UNHCR would most likely provide some
assistance. It had also opened a dialogue with other UN
agencies to ensure there was support for the refugees who
remained behind in Bangladesh after December 31, 2003.


6. (C) Mise also said that he believed that the Government of
Bangladesh was looking for a way to put the refugee problem
behind them. Burmese contacts had told him that the
Bangladeshis had scarcely raised the refugee issue during
Than Shwe's December visit. Bangladesh's State Minister for
Foreign Affairs had also told him unofficially that
Bangladesh could not grant the remaining refugees asylum, for
fear of becoming a target country for other refugees, but was
looking for another way out -- "a discreet solution to the
problem." In that context, UNHCR's approach, by taking the
burden of decision off the Bangladeshis, could work.

Comment


7. (C) UNHCR may be right in this case. We have heard the
same comments from Burmese sources about fading Bangladesh
government interest in the refugee question. Nevertheless,
the BDG does need a way out and UNHCR, by acting
unilaterally, may allow the BDG to avoid responsibility for
the decision while still accepting the fait accompli.


8. (C) That said, there may be problems. According to
UNHCR's Resident Representative in Rangoon, there are
probably 3,000 to 5,000 refugees still in camps in Bangladesh
that have legitimate protection problems and a legitimate
fear of political persecution, should they return to Burma.
What happens to those individuals if they find themselves
unable to support themselves in Bangladesh? Secondly, the
entire Rohingya Muslim community in Northern Rakhine State
remains under intense military, political, and social
pressure. UNHCR, through its protection services, has been
able to deflect some of these pressures. However, there is
really no one to replace UNHCR, if it pulls out. Efforts to
establish development programs in northern Rakhine State
under the auspices of other UN agencies (e.g., through the
Basic Needs Assessment Program in 2000 and 2001) have made
little progress. More importantly, however, UNHCR is the
only UN agency that has maintained a consistent focus on
human rights in its operations. All others have shied from
the issue. Its exit, consequently, may leave the Rohingya
Muslim population unprotected and raise the risks of a new
exodus. That does not necessarily have to be the result, but
Post strongly suggests the USG discuss with the United
Nations and other interested parties alternate protection
arrangements that could substitute for UNHCR's operations in
northern Rakhine State. End Comment.


9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Dhaka.
Martinez