"COME BACK TO REALITY"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001433

SIPDIS

USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2013
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: "COME BACK TO REALITY"

REF: A. RANGOON 1431


B. RANGOON 1432

C. BANGKOK 7280

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Former ICRC Head and assistant to UN
Special Envoy Razali, Leon de Reidmatten, briefed COM on his
November 7 Bangkok meeting with Thai Foreign Minister
Surakiat. De Reidmatten said that from the discussion that
took place between SE Razali and FM Surakiat, it is clear the
SPDC aim is to have an elected government in place by 2006,
the year of the ASEAN summit in Rangoon. SE Razali's
position is that sanctions don't work, engagement doesn't
work, so now it is time for the UN to be more active by
putting forward a "plan" similar to the SPDC road map. It is
becoming ever more clear that the SPDC had an end state, and
an end date, in mind when they announced the road map back in
August - the end state is a sitting "elected" government, and
the end date is the ASEAN Summit 2006. De Reidmatten
expressed alarm at ASSK's continued isolation - coupled with
the regime's increasing confidence in the aftermath of the
Bali summit. Observations from both de Reidmatten and UNSR
Pinheiro (Ref A) underscore the need for more pressure on the
regime to include the opposition in the road map - pressure
that must be exerted by ASEAN countries (Thailand, Indonesia,
Malysia),India, China, and Japan, in conjunction with
ongoing UN efforts. END SUMMARY.

Special Envoy Razali meets with FM Surakiat


2. (C) Leon de Reidmatten, former ICRC Head of Delegation to
Burma and currently the Assistant to UN Special Envoy Razali,
told the COM that in the November 7 meeting with SE Razali
and the Thai Foreign Minister, SE Razali was told that the
Thais are concerned that Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD will be
left out of the whole political process now unfolding in
Burma. De Reidmatten said the Thais have discussed the
Burmese roadmap with Khin Nyunt, but that the Thais are not
very clear on "what the road map really means," that Than
Shwe wants to pursue the road map without any detours, and
that PM Khin Nyunt and General Maung Aye think it is
important to include the opposition in the process, but "not
at any cost." De Reidmatten said that from the discussion
that took place between SE Razali and FM Surakiat, it is
clear the SPDC aim is to have an elected government in place
by 2006, the year of the ASEAN summit in Rangoon. De
Reidmatten said that SE Razali's position is that sanctions
don't work, engagement doesn't work, so now it is time for
the UN to be more active by putting forward a "plan" similar
to the SPDC road map.


3. (C) Reidmatten said that Thai DepPermSec Virasakdi
Futakul told him during the meeting (and later at dinner on
November 7) that at the December 10-11 ASEAN summit in Tokyo,
PM Khin Nyunt will answer ASEAN's questions on the SPDC's
road map and will explain the implementation plan. De
Reidmatten said Futrakul thinks the SPDC will then relax
their restrictions on the NLD and will release Aung San Suu
Kyi from confinement.


Pinheiro Visit to Rangoon


4. (C) De Reidmatten described Pinheiro's latest visit to
Rangoon (Nov. 3-8) as a chance for the SPDC to test the
waters and find out how much it can get away with by not
improving human rights and keeping the NLD locked up and out
of the political process. In de Reidmatten's opinion, the
SPDC didn't give Pinheiro anything on this visit (refs A and
B),and the SPDC is waiting for the world's reaction to
Pinheiro's speech to the UN on November 12 to see if it can
keep plowing straight ahead with their road map. De
Reidmatten thinks the SPDC hasn't quite decided how to go
about taking the next step in the road map, but it is
definitely getting bolder about moving forward without the
NLD.

ASSK in Isolation


5. (C) Echoing SR Pinheiro's observations (see ref A)
Reidmatten expressed great concern at how ASSK is being
"isolated" and increasingly left out of the political process
in Burma. Reidmatten commented that "the NLD has to come
back to reality" and realize the SPDC is moving ahead without
it. He was concerned, just like SR Pinheiro, that ASSK and
the NLD "uncles" were being unrealistic in thinking that
their refusal to accept the possibility of participating in a
road map developed by the SPDC was a show of strength that
would be supported by UNSC action. De Reidmatten pointed out
to COM that in order to have an elected government in place
in 2006, the SPDC will have to hold elections in 2005. That
requires a referendum on the constitution in 2004. So there
will have to be a constitutional convention in early 2004,
probably January. De Reidmatten said he was so worried about
the momentum the SPDC was gathering that he would try to
convince ASSK to write a letter directly to Gen. Than Shwe
stating that the NLD was willing, and should be allowed to
participate in the road map. De Reidmatten said that unless
ASSK and the NLD are more realistic re the need for
participation in the political process NOW, he feared ASSK
and the "uncles" would be released to face an new
constitution and an elected government that excluded them
completely.


6. C) COMMENT: It is becoming ever more clear that the SPDC
had an end state, and an end date, in mind when they
announced the road map back in August - the end state is a
sitting "elected" government, and the end date is the ASEAN
Summit 2006. Pinheiro and de Reidmatten's emphasis on ASSK
and the NLD's increasing isolation, coupled with the regime's
increasing confidence in the aftermath of the Bali summit,
underscores the need for continuing pressure on the regime to
include the opposition - pressure that must be exerted by
ASEAN countries (Thailand, Indonesia) and India, China, and
Japan in conjunction with ongoing UN efforts.
Martinez