Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON1431
2003-11-07 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

AN EVENING WITH PINHEIRO: NO PROGRESS IN BURMA

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM BM ASSK NLD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001431 

SIPDIS

USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: AN EVENING WITH PINHEIRO: NO PROGRESS IN BURMA

REF: A. RANGOON 1429


B. RANGOON 1410

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001431

SIPDIS

USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM BM ASSK NLD
SUBJECT: AN EVENING WITH PINHEIRO: NO PROGRESS IN BURMA

REF: A. RANGOON 1429


B. RANGOON 1410

Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Pinheiro summarized to COM on November 6
that his present visit was a bust and he sees regression in
the human rights situation since his last trip to Burma. The
SPDC did not concede to him any of the outcomes he'd hoped
for during this visit, including releasing the May 30
prisoners, reopening political offices, allowing an
assessment of the Shan State rapes, and agreeing to an
assessment of the May 30 attack. Though he found ASSK in
good health and in a very good mood when he met her earlier
on November 6, he also found her isolated and out of touch
with the political situation. He felt that the NLD "uncles"
are under "illusions" of having influence they don't possess
with their assessment that the roadmap is a "fake" and will
be overturned at the UNSC. ASSK is open to having visitors,
but will not herself initiate any requests for such to the
SPDC. She feels the regime treats her courteously; however,
before any dialogue or compromise she still insists the GOB
or the UN must conduct a credible assessment of the May 30
attack. In a meeting with PM Gen Khin Nyunt, Pinheiro heard
a clear intent by the regime to unilaterally execute their
roadmap for democracy. Pinheiro is leaving for Bangkok on
Saturday, November 8 after briefing the Rangoon press and
diplomatic corps. He will fly to New York on November 11 to
make his report to the United Nations on the 12th. END
SUMMARY.

AN ISOLATED ASSK


2. (C) On the evening of November 6, UN Special Rapporteur
for Human Rights, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, joined UNDP Res Rep
Charles Petrie, former ICRC head Leon de Reidmatten, and the
British Ambassador at the COM's residence to review a newly
acquired videotape of ASSK's last few days on the road before
the Depeyin attack (reftel A). After the viewing, Pinheiro
recounted his meeting with ASSK a few hours earlier in the
afternoon, and said he found her to be in good health,
lively, and full of humor. He said it is "scary" that ASSK
is so isolated and he believes her confinement is not good

for her grasp of political realities.


3. (C) When Pinheiro asked her if she would initiate
requests to have visitors, ASSK specifically stated that she
will not do so. According to UNDP's Petrie, who joined
Pinheiro in his meeting with ASSK, the NLD leader wants to
avoid any special treatment not afforded to her detained NLD
colleagues. Though she will meet with anyone who requests
and succeeds in getting SPDC authorization for a visit, she
will not initiate any requests on her own. ASSK added that
she would be angry with Pinheiro if he does not comply with
her wishes on this issue, a position with which the Special
Rapporteur told COM he disagreed.


4. (C) At the request of U Tin Oo's wife, Pinheiro had asked
the Minister of Home Affairs to move U Tin Oo from his
isolated prison in northern Burma and bring him back to
Rangoon and under house arrest where he would be safer.
However, ASSK rejected this too, saying that there should be
no special treatment for NLD prisoners until all were
released.


5. (C) Pinheiro related how ASSK portrayed firm control and
conviction in her political position. She said she had won
several important "victories" since Depeyin, including her
dictating to the SPDC the decision and the timing for her
recent surgery, and her telling the SPDC she would not return
to Insein Prison but would go into house arrest instead. She
told Pinheiro she is very pleased with the recently expanded
U.S. sanctions on the regime. She also feels that the SPDC
treats her courteously, singling out Brig Gen Than Tun for
special praise as being a gentleman and easy to negotiate
with. She admitted that she had made a "mutually agreed
security arrangement" with the SPDC, as stated recently in
the press by Brig Gen Than Tun, but asked Pinheiro not to
question the regime about it as it might prove embarrassing
to them.

6. (C) When asked what she thought about the SPDC roadmap,
ASSK simply said that "it doesn't exist" and that the SPDC
has no right to develop a roadmap. She said the only
possible roadmap is one that is negotiated between the SPDC
and NLD. Regarding Depeyin, ASSK still insists the GOB or
the UN conduct a credible investigation or assessment.
According to Pinheiro, she said she doesn't want a pound of
flesh, she just wants people held accountable for the deaths.
ASSK pointed out that there are hard-liners and there are
the less-hardliners, but that the international community
doesn't want to weaken the hand of the moderates by pressing
too hard on the investigation. She also said she is ready
for dialogue and compromise, but not until the regime tells
everything about what happened at Depeyin.

"UNCLES UNDER ILLUSION"


7. (C) Pinheiro met with NLD Central Executive Committee
members Aung Shwe, Nyunt Wei, and with the oldest of the
"uncles," Lun Tin. He characterized the uncles as being
completely isolated. Though they have no visitors and no
phones, they do receive some newspapers and are somewhat
informed about the current political situation. However,
they are under an "illusion" that they are very powerful
within Burma, and that pressure will come from the UNSC, or
in the form of a "Foreign Ministers' Troika." As further
proof of their isolation, Pinheiro cited how they told him
the SPDC roadmap was a "fake," that it will be discussed in
the Security Council, and then will finally be decided by
negotiation between the SPDC and the NLD.

SPDC REGRESSION


8. (C) From his meetings with the Minister of Home Affairs,
the Foreign and Deputy Foreign Ministers, and the Prime
Minister, Pinheiro concluded the SPDC showed no signs of
interest in consultation or dialogue with ASSK, but will
consult with the ethnic groups. Pinheiro advised the regime
leaders that the Depeyin attack presented both a "regression
and an opportunity," and that this can be the moment of
healing and forward movement. Khin Nyunt pointed to the
extensive mass rallies around the country as proof that the
people support the roadmap. The Minister of Home Affairs
told Pinheiro he didn't like Pinheiro's proposed methodology
for the Shan State rape investigation. Brig Gen Than Tun
told Pinheiro a Shan rapes assessment would be very
"intrusive."


9. (C) COMMENT: Pinheiro, as his latest visit drew near to
a close, seemed dissatisfied and displeased with the lack of
progress on his mandate. He was also concerned about the
growing isolation of ASSK and the CEC. While the SPDC moves
forward with its forced-march down the road to its version of
democracy, there are fears that ASSK will still be under
house arrest and the NLD totally neutralized when the forced
march is completed. END COMMENT.
Martinez