EAP/BCLTV DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH CHINA'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001362

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV CM BM
SUBJECT: EAP/BCLTV DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH CHINA'S
AMBASSADOR TO BURMA

REF: A. RANGOON 1029


B. RANGOON 1031

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for reasons 1.5 (B/D).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Summary: Chinese Ambassador to Burma Li Jinjun posited
in a late October meeting that current efforts by the
international community on Burma should be aimed at
establishing a platform for stable cooperation between Aung
San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and the SPDC. The U.S. should consider
lifting economic sanctions, at least partially, and work with
China to identify concrete areas for cooperation between ASSK
and the SPDC. ASSK should seek to de-emphasize her role as
leader of the Burmese democratic and human rights movement
and take steps to portray herself as a statesperson willing
to grapple with economic development issues. The May 30th
attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters was an almost
inevitable outcome of a poorly managed process after ASSK's
release in 2002 from house arrest. It is only a matter of
time before ASSK is released from her current detention,
although the SPDC will not take any action that could be
perceived as being the result of outside pressure, the
Chinese Ambassador concluded. End Summary.

What a difference a year makes
--------------


2. (C) In an October 22 meeting with Chinese Ambassador Li
Jinjun, EAP/BCLTV Director Judith Strotz noted that the
situation in Burma had changed significantly and for the
worse since her meeting with Ambassador Li the year before;
that the result had negative implications not only for
stability within Burma but for the region as a whole; and
that the U.S. remained concerned about indications that Burma
was seeking to obtain a nuclear reactor from Russia and
weapons from North Korea.


3. (C) Ambassador Li stated that the international community
sometimes had the view that China was happy with the SPDC;
this was not the case. He continued that he had not been
surprised by the May 30th attack on National League for
Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK),commenting
that the initial response to ASSK's release from house arrest
in May 2002 from all parties, including the international
community, had been overly optimistic and ignored that ASSK
and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) were only
in the initial stages of confidence-building. In addition,
ASSK had insufficient opportunities to engage in dialogue
with the SPDC, a problem that was compounded by the failure
of ASSK, the SPDC, and the international community to
formulate a concrete plan of action. As a result, ASSK's
increased freedom, the activities she and the NLD pursued,
and the SPDC's response to them, rather than building
confidence, created doubt and disappointment on both sides.


4. (C) Continued and increased pressure by the United States,
Japan, the European Union (EU),and ASEAN for ASSK's
immediate release will be counterproductive as the SPDC will
not take any action that could be perceived as being the
result of outside pressure, Ambassador Li said. In addition,
by focusing only on ASSK's release, the international
community runs the risk of creating a situation that will
lead to a repeat of the May 30th attack. ASSK's release
should not be a precondition for lifting sanctions or
returning to dialogue, argued Ambassador Li. Rather ASSK,
the SPDC, and the international community should aim at
establishing a stable platform of cooperation between ASSK
and the SPDC, an approach that UN Special Envoy Razali
supports. Thus, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
other EU countries that support ASSK must not ignore recent
steps taken by the SPDC, including the assignment of General
Khin Nyunt as Prime Minister and the recently announced road
map. Criticism will only shut down prospects for progress,
Ambassador Li stated. A better option is the tack being
taken by ASEAN, which provides Burma with space to come up
with its own solution.

ASSK: Democracy Fighter or Stateswoman?
--------------


5. (C) According to Li, now that the SPDC has announced the
road map, the ball is in ASSK's court. Her apparent lack of
response to the road map--which Ambassador Li said it is in
her best interest to support--gives the impression that the
SPDC has the upper hand. It is positive, however, that ASSK
has said that she is pleased with Khin Nyunt's selection as
Prime Minister, Ambassador Li noted. ASSK should be wary of
sticking too tightly to her principles, as should the SPDC,
if there is to be progress. ASSK should de-emphasize her
role as leader of the Burmese democratic and human rights
movement and take steps to portray herself as a statesperson
willing to grapple with economic development issues. He
suggested that ASSK could join the SPDC on a commission to
review international aid projects. In response to Strotz's
comment that the SPDC had turned down this suggestion from
Razali, the Ambassador said that initially Razali saw his
mandate as promoting political reform; however, he now
believed that work also needed to be done on economic issues,
implying that a future suggestion might have a more positive
response. SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe regards
ASSK as a member of the military family, but a rebellious one
who has been influenced negatively by external influences,
according to Ambassador Li. Strotz noted that a number of
military family members had met unhappy ends, including
former leaders Tin Oo and Ne Win.

6 (C) Although China has continued to adhere to its policy of
non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign
countries post-May 30th, China has approached the SPDC on
issues such as economic growth, social stability, and the
welfare of the Burmese people in an effort to help the SPDC
deal with those issues more effectively. While China can't
claim to have a great deal of influence with the SPDC, these
measures have had some impact, Ambassador Li assessed. It is
not enough to persuade the SPDC, however. The U.S. might
want to use its influence to persuade ASSK to take some kind
of action, Ambassador Li suggested.

Have you met with Aung San Suu Kyi?
--------------


7. (C) Strotz commented that there are areas of commonality
in the U.S. and Chinese understanding of Burma. She agreed
that the U.S. and the international community need to look
beyond ASSK's release in order to avoid a repeat of the
events of the past year. Strotz also noted that the U.S.
deliberately had not criticized the road map, suggesting only
that it should include ASSK, the NLD, and the ethnics groups
and that it would be useful to have some sort of timeline.


8. (C) Strotz added that the U.S. had a more positive view of
ASSK's role. The release of ASSK was a priority. The USG
could not engage ASSK if we continued to be denied access to
her. ASSK needed information from multiple sources in order
to be able to respond to the current situation. Since this
information was being withheld from her, ASSK likely did not
have sufficient data to assess the current situation.
Responding to Director Strotz's question concerning whether
Ambassador Li would consider meeting ASSK, Ambassador Li
acknowledged that ASSK was an important person and that the
NLD was an important political force in Burma. However, it
would not be prudent for him to meet with ASSK at this time,
as doing so would have a negative impact on his ability to
meet with the "top three" senior SPDC officials, said
Ambassador Li. He added that they share their "inner
thoughts" with him.

Support the Road Map
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador Li indicated he was pleased to learn that
the U.S. has not publicly criticized the road map, although
U.S. comments on the need for a timeline and inclusion of the
NLD were not necessarily helpful. Urging more public U.S.
support of the road map, Ambassador Li suggested that perhaps
the U.S. could go further and show a positive response,
partially lifting sanctions. Then, the SPDC will resume
confidence-building initiatives with ASSK, although not
necessarily dialogue, as both sides still are skeptical of
one another, offered Ambassador Li. The SPDC and ASSK must
engage in concrete, substantive cooperation in specific
fields to establish a firm foundation for further dialogue.
China and the U.S. should work to foster cooperation between
the SPDC and ASSK. China is doing what it should and hopes
that the U.S. will as well, Ambassador Li said in closing.


10. (SBU) Strotz noted that the U.S. believed the SPDC
responded positively to pressure but, when it felt it had
leeway, it took negative actions. The sanctions conveyed a
clear message to the SPDC and we hoped that they would help
bring about positive change.

Comment: Chicken or Egg?
--------------


10. (C) Ambassador Li's approach this time was quite
different from that of a year ago. He continued to urge
engagement with the regime and argue against exerting
pressure on Burmese leaders. However, he was much clearer on
China's displeasure with the SPDC and on the steps China had
taken to influence the situation, while continuing to mouth
support for non-interference in internal affairs. Also, he
was much more forthright on the need for ASSK to play a role
in the future of Burma. End Comment.


11. (U) This cable was cleared by EAP/BCLTV Director Judith
Strotz.
McMullen