RAZALI'S RANGOON MEETINGS DISAPPOINT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001259

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY
TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM BM
SUBJECT: RAZALI'S RANGOON MEETINGS DISAPPOINT

REF: A. RANGOON 1239


B. USUN NEW YORK 2392

C. RANGOON 1207

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: UN Special Envoy Razali departed Rangoon on
October 2nd, calling his trip a "total failure." Though he
did not achieve any tangible results, his visit was important
in assessing the degree of open mindedness on all sides for
the SPDC's recently announced "road map to democracy." All
on the opposition side seemed willing to give the regime's
plan a try, as long as they could freely participate. The
regime, though, would not commit to this yet. Sadly, judging
from the statements of the autocrat Senior General, it may
not ever. End summary.

"Total Failure," But an "Historic Opportunity"


2. (SBU) On the evening of October 2nd, UN Special Envoy
Razali told assembled diplomats that his three day visit to
Rangoon had been necessary, but "a total failure" in getting
tangible results. After initial delays, Razali was able to
meet once with National League for Democracy (NLD) leader
Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) at her house. He also met at length
with Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt, and briefly with
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Chairman Senior
General Than Shwe. Razali also spent several hours meeting
on October 1st with representatives of ethnic minority
political factions.


3. (SBU) Razali said that he got the impression during his
meetings with the opposition groups that the Prime Minister's
recently outlined "road map" for democratization, beginning
with a reconvening of the National Convention was being
viewed as an "historic opportunity." However, for this
opportunity to bear fruit, all sides had to participate
actively and freely both in establishing the modalities for
the Convention, and in drafting the actual constitution.

ASSK Ready to Rejoin Battle


4. (SBU) Unfortunately, the Prime Minister could not (or
would not) commit to including the eager opposition groups in
this way. Though General Khin Nyunt did not "reject out of
hand" Razali's notion that the NLD and other groups be
included in the National Convention Convening Commission, the
Prime Minister said it was too early to agree to such a step.
Razali opined, and ASSK later agreed, that the Prime
Minister did not have the "mandate" to agree to such an
initiative -- hinting that the final say on this matter lay
with the Senior General.


5. (SBU) According to the Special Envoy, ASSK looked healthy,
was in good spirits, and said she expected to be fully
recovered "in a few weeks." He noted that she shared the
cautious optimism of the ethnic opposition groups, and said
she was willing "under certain circumstances" to work with
the new Prime Minister and his road map proposals. However,
ASSK was adamant that she, the detained members of the NLD
Central Executive Committee, and those jailed during the
Depeyin attacks, be released before she would cooperate in
any way. She insisted, further, that she would not accept
release unless these others were released with her. ASSK was
also concerned that NLD offices, shuttered after the May 30th
attack, be re-opened. However, she apparently did not make
this a condition for cooperation with Khin Nyunt.


6. (C) Razali indicated that ASSK was still "incensed" over
the May 30th Depeyin ambush. However, he said in their
conversation she put the need for an investigation of the
attack into "perspective," saying that such an inquiry was
essential "someday."

They're Coming to Take Me Away, Ha, Ha!


7. (C) Perhaps the most sobering moment of the briefing was
Razali's description of his session with Senior General Than
Shwe. Though the Senior General was in an "affable mood,"
and had "lost weight," he came after Razali right away asking
if "one person was more important than the state, than 52
million people?" Razali responded that one person was not,
but that this one person represented the welfare of the other
51,999,999. Than Shwe also insisted that there was no need
for political parties to represent the will of the people,
pointing out that the recent "mass rallies" (totally stage
managed by the regime; see ref C) in favor of the road map
showed that the people already support the government and its
policies. This statement verifies in our mind the fact that
the Senior General has completely lost touch with reality --
whether willfully or because of his sycophantic advisors is
unknown.

Comment: Not Much Hope, For Now


8. (C) The mood of Razali's briefing was resigned, but not
pessimistic. Clearly the opposition groups, including ASSK,
are willing to keep an open mind on the SPDC's road map.
Furthermore, the Special Envoy said that he was "impressed"
by the Prime Minister's determination "to do something." A
pall, though, was cast by the acceptance, spoken and
unspoken, that the less flexible Senior General was still
pulling all the strings. Than Shwe's clear hatred of ASSK,
and his complete removal from reality, are major impediments
to prospects for genuine progress under the regime's new
initiative. Nonetheless, Razali indicated that he'd try to
come back in a couple of months -- apparently quashing rumors
that this visit would be his last if there were no success --
to see if there was more room for compromise or dialogue.
Martinez