Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03RANGOON1117
2003-09-12 10:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

INDIA'S AMBASSADOR TO BURMA: FINDING A BALANCE

Tags:  PREL PGOV BM IN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001117 

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM IN
SUBJECT: INDIA'S AMBASSADOR TO BURMA: FINDING A BALANCE
BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SUPPORT

REF: BEIJING 12297

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001117

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OASIA JEFF NEIL
USPACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM IN
SUBJECT: INDIA'S AMBASSADOR TO BURMA: FINDING A BALANCE
BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SUPPORT

REF: BEIJING 12297

Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a September 10 meeting with COM,
Indian Ambassador to Burma Rajiv Kumar Bhatia described
India's Burma policy as having two pillars: engagement with
the regime and support for democracy. India will continue to
move forward on both fronts simultaneously, he said, striking
what it considers to be an appropriate balance between the
two objectives based on India's strategic interests. Bhatia
expressed concern about a recent public statement by
Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda urging the SPDC to
release Aung San Suu Kyi prior to the upcoming ASEAN Summit
in Bali, remarking that it would only incite a nationalistic
and contrary response from the regime. Further high-level
statements certainly would derail prospects for her immediate
release, he said. Bhatia views the appointment of General
Khin Nyunt as Prime Minister and moves to reconvene the
National Convention as positive, stressing that we should not
mechanically assume these actions are "more of the same" but
rather interpret them as possible indicators of greater
flexibility by the SPDC and the start of a phased succession.
End summary.

A Two-Pillar Policy
--------------


2. (C) The two pillars that form the basis of India's Burma
policy are engagement with the regime and support for
democracy, said Bhatia. India continues to show its
sensitivity to democratic sentiments by pushing privately at
the highest levels of the Burmese government for the
immediate release of ASSK, dialogue with the NLD, and
transition to democracy. Bhatia pointedly noted, however,
that what constituted an appropriate balance between the two
pillars had to be decided by India according to its strategic
interests. Noting that recent high-level Indian civilian and
military visits to Burma had been in the pipeline for 1-2
years, Bhatia rhetorically questioned whether they should
have been postponed after the 30 May incident and answered
"no," as one pillar of India's policy is engagement,
afterall. In fact, he said U.S. strategic interests

vis--vis Burma, including HIV/AIDS, terrorism, and narcotics
trafficking demand continuous engagement with Burma, not
alienation. Bhatia described Burma as a country looking for
a model, commenting that any path to democracy must be
adapted to local circumstances and that India is looking for
signs that Burma is committed to its own path, rather than
one imposed from outside.

Remarks by Indonesian Foreign Minister "ill-timed"
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Bhatia characterized the recent statement by
Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda on the need to release
ASSK prior to the upcoming ASEAN Summit in Bali as "not
especially helpful," arguing that it would incite a
nationalistic response from the Burmese government at odds
with the objective of securing ASSK's immediate release.
Bhatia later commented that the statement "unnerved" him and
assessed that any further similar statements by other
governments, what he labeled "high-level chatter," would
derail any prospect for a good outcome on this issue. In
response, COM remarked that continued international pressure
was both necessary and effective, noting the regime has taken
concrete action in response to international pressure and
that during periods of no such pressure, there was no
movement at all. Bhatia agreed that pressure on the regime
does result in a response, but that it must be calibrated
properly, implying both the statement by Foreign Minister
Wirajuda and recent U.S. actions had not been (read:
sanctions and attention drawn to ASSK's hunger strike).

The National Convention
--------------

4. (C) With regard to the seven-point roadmap outlined by
Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt on August 30 and recent
announcements on reconvening the National Convention, Bhatia
said that if the National Convention really is reconvening,
the matter should be straightforward. However, there was no
real continuity in the make-up of the Convening Commission
and he was hearing a hard-line view from his contacts on the
question of whether or not the NLD would be allowed to
participate. Nonetheless, Bhatia believed the regime was
making an attempt to get the NLD back into the process and
that in contrast to the situation 10 years ago, the
possibility for flexibility on the part of the SPDC existed.
"We should not mechanically assume it will only be more of
the same," he exhorted. In Bhatia's assessment, the recent
changes are not purely cosmetic and should be viewed with
limited optimism, although not interpreted as a signal that
democracy is on the way. Bhatia also offered that Khin Nyunt
has shown tremendous resilience, moving from the "umbrella
boy" of former dictator Ne Win to a "linchpin" in the SPDC.

Engagement "Pillar" appreciated by MOFA
--------------


5. (C) During an introductory courtesy call on 15 August,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Director responsible for
South Asia U Ye Mying told Pol/Econoffs that India and Burma
have a "fine tradition of friendship" and that close
relations with its neighbors are the priority for Burma. Ye
Mying also noted that in addition to high-level bilateral
visits, sectoral exchanges were increasingly
institutionalized and of benefit to both sides. In separate
conversations with other Indian Embassy officials in
late-August and early September, Pol/Econoffs were told that
Burma attaches greater importance to the relationship with
India than does India, as trade with Burma is only a small
part of overall Indian trade and that while bilateral
mechanisms for cooperation have had some successes, they
generally have provided forums for discussion and building
trust rather than resolving key issues.

Comment: No Desire to Tip the Boat
--------------


6. (C) While the Indian Ambassador remarked several times
during the 10 September exchange that India remains focused
on the immediate release of ASSK and other political
prisoners as well as the quick resumption of dialogue on
transition to democracy, he made it clear that India will
continue to engage actively with the current government. A
spate of recent high-level civilian and military visits
reinforces this message and suggests that like China, India
does not intend to back away from the current regime and
views as counterproductive what it considers to be increased
international pressure and attempts to isolate the regime.
Our interlocutors at the Indian Embassy tell us that the
insurgency issue on the Indo-Burmese border is the most
difficult bilateral issue now confronting the two countries,
and India does not want to take any action on Burma's
domestic political situation that could derail progress on
this border problem. While India's two pillar approach may
serve U.S. interests in terms of providing a counterbalance
to China's increasing influence in Burma, we recommend that
we enter into a dialogue on Burma with New Delhi that
parallels our dialogue with Beijing (reftel). End comment.
Martinez