Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03OTTAWA629
2003-03-06 21:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

DEFENSE MINISTER MCCALLUM AND THE CANADIAN FORCES

Tags:  MCAP PGOV PREL CA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000629 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013
TAGS: MCAP PGOV PREL CA
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER MCCALLUM AND THE CANADIAN FORCES

REF: OTTAWA 178

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora,
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000629

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013
TAGS: MCAP PGOV PREL CA
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER MCCALLUM AND THE CANADIAN FORCES

REF: OTTAWA 178

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora,
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Nine months into his tenure as Minister, John McCallum
is starting to put his mark on the Department of National
Defense. He was able to get a greater-than-expected increase
in defense spending in the latest GoC budget, and he has
announced a defense review to guide transformation of the
Canadian Forces. McCallum's economics background and
determination to find savings have helped him in Cabinet,
specifically in the budget battle. His limited political and
military experience has shown at times, and has caused some
friction with the Canadian Forces and defense advocates. But
McCallum has greater strategic vision and influence in
Cabinet than his recent predecessors, and he is a consistent
advocate for strengthening the U.S.-Canada defense
relationship. END SUMMARY.

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BUDGET VICTORY
--------------


2. (C) The GoC budget announced on February 18 was a real
victory for McCallum, though he has gotten little credit from
defense advocates here because the needs are so much greater.
The baseline defense budget increased by US$533 million per
year (from US$7.9 billion in the 2002-2003 budget) for three
years, and McCallum has promised US$133 million per year in
administrative savings (e.g., greater efficiency in
procurements). McCallum argues that one-fourth of all
incremental spending in the 2003-2004 GoC budget went to
defense, and that he could not have gotten more given
competing domestic priorities (especially health care).
McCallum asserts that DND got all that he was asking for, and
all that it could use efficiently in 2003-2004. While we
disagree with his argument that more was not justified -
especially given the upcoming deployments to ISAF IV and V -
his point about the limits on defense spending in the
Chretien Government is certainly valid.


3. (C) Under these circumstances, McCallum did well in the
2003-2004 budget, but you would never have known it from his
address to the Conference of Defense Associations (CDA) on
February 27. McCallum grew visibly agitated as he fielded

one critical comment after another about the budget and the
pending deployment to Aghanistan. The audience's mood was
not helped by the disclosure earlier in the week that the new
budget eliminates future funding for the CDA. It is not yet
clear whether this was simply a cost-cutting measure, or
retribution for an organization that has loudly criticized
the GoC's defense program for years.

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OVERSTRETCHED CANADIAN FORCES
--------------


4. (C) While McCallum will not lose any sleep over veterans
organizations, he does have to concern himself with Canadian
Forces' morale. McCallum admitted to the CDA audience that
some in the Army were unhappy over the decision to deploy to
Afghanistan. Many in the Canadian Forces would have prefered
a GoC commitment to contribute land forces in Iraq, and the
size and duration of the ISAF commitment - a battalion and
brigade headquarters for 12 months - will exacerbate the
military's biggest problem, operational tempo. The Canadian
Forces leadership was also upset because it had little or no
advance warning of McCallum's February 12 ISAF announcement.
Chief of Defense Staff GEN Henault told the CDA that the
"content" came as no surprise, though it did lead one senior
officer - MGEN Cam Ross, DND Director General of
International Security Policy - to resign in protest.


5. (C) On the positive side, McCallum has made a concerted
effort to bolster the U.S.-Canada defense relationship, which
is crucial for the Canadian Forces. He pushed through a 2002
agreement for a binational, counterterrorist Planning Group
at NORAD, despite sovereignty concerns in Ottawa, and has
forced missile defense cooperation onto the Cabinet's agenda
(outcome still to be determined).


6. (C) Within a divided Cabinet, McCallum has also advocated
keeping open the option of military participation in Iraq -
i.e., naval or air assets already in theater - without a
second UNSC resolution. McCallum got burned, however, when
he publicly stated that this was GoC policy after his January
9 meeting with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. McCallum had it
right, but Chretien has not wanted to admit publicly that
Canada might act without UN blessing. After Chretien reined
him in (reftel),McCallum overreacted by ordering Canadian
military planners at CENTCOM to not attend a coalition
planning meeting the following week. This unnecessary
action, which did not reflect any change in GoC policy,
damaged Canada's credibility for Iraq planning in Tampa and
in Washington.
--------------
DEFENSE REVIEW
--------------


7. (U) Shortly after becoming Defense Minister, McCallum
directed DND to undertake a "defense update" focused on
immediate needs for the 2003-2004 budget cycle. As GEN
Henault describes it, funding increases in the latest budget
allow the Canadian Forces to shift their focus from
survivability to sustainability. The next step will be
transformation, and McCallum has said that a full-scale
"defense review" will be conducted to guide that process.
McCallum cautions that this may or may not result in
increased funding for the military, but that it should point
the way on bigger procurement decisions.


8. (U) On one of the military's biggest needs, strategic
lift, McCallum has publicly stated that a stand-alone
Canadian purchase of C-17s is not in the cards. His
reasoning is that given limited GoC funding, purchasing C-17s
would gut the defense budget, making it impossible to meet
other needs. Instead, DND is looking into a combined
purchase of C-17s with NATO allies. McCallum has also
expressed doubts over the continued need for tanks, so long
as the Army has some direct-fire capability (e.g., the
planned U.S. combat system/mobile gun system). McCallum did,
in the latest budget, allocate US$467 million in funding over
the next ten years for Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR).

--------------
LIBERAL PARTY LEGACY
--------------


9. (C) One procurement issue that continues to haunt the GoC
is a replacement for its Sea King maritime helicopters, which
entered service in 1963. In the 1993 campaign, Chretien
attacked the Tory Government's plans to purchase EH-101
maritime helicopters as extravagant. After the election
Chretien cancelled the deal, and he has stymied subsequent
DND efforts to let a new contract. Meanwhile, the Sea Kings
continue to diminish the Canadian Navy's effectiveness. The
latest example came on February 27 when the Canadian
Destroyer HMCS Iroquois, headed for a Canadian-led, combined
naval task force in the Persian Gulf, had to return to
Halifax after its Sea King crashed onto the deck. The
Iroquois set sail again on March 5, this time with no
helicopter,


10. (C) The Sea King fiasco is a reminder of the challenges
the Canadian Forces will continue to face in Ottawa. While
Chretien is set to step down in February 2004, we expect the
Liberal Party to remain in power for the foreseeable future.
While Chretien's successor - probably ex-Finance Minister
Paul Martin - may be better disposed toward the Canadian
Forces, he is also unlikely to make dramatic increases to the
defense budget. McCallum and his successors will have to
continue to make incremental moves and plenty of hard
choices. The hope here is that a defense review can be ready
to go soon after Chretien leaves office, and that the next
Prime Minister will be more supportive of the Canadian Forces.
KELLY