CANADIAN CABINET TO DISCUSS MISSILE DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 000492

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2013
TAGS: MARR PARM PREL CA
SUBJECT: CANADIAN CABINET TO DISCUSS MISSILE DEFENSE

REF: 02 OTTAWA 3101

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora,
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Following up on high-level consultations held in
Washington January 28, the Canadian cabinet will be meeting
soon to discuss potential missile defense cooperation with
the United States. Missile defense is currently on the
calendar for the February 25 Cabinet meeting (Cabinet
normally meets each Tuesday),but this may slip to a later
date. Foreign Minister Graham and Defense Minister McCallum,
who decided in October to accelerate dialogue with the U.S.
on this issue (reftel),hope to get some guidance from Prime
Minister Chretien on how to proceed.


2. (C) Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) and Defense (DND) officials
got a clear message in the January 28 meeting that the
missile defense program is progressing rapidly, and that
there are costs to delaying a decision on Canadian
participation. Vincent Rigby, DND Director of Arms and
Proliferation Control Policy, told us that the GoC had always
assumed that we would want to use NORAD as part of the
missile defense command structure. Now that the U.S. has
decided on STRATCOM as overall command and NORTHCOM as
executing command for North America, NORAD appears to be more
of an afterthought. While U.S. officials made it clear that
we were leaving the door open for a NORAD role, Rigby's sense
was that NORTHCOM was the natural choice as executing command
for North America, and that it would be difficult to change
that down the road.


3. (C) Daniel Bon, DND Director General for Policy Planning,
told us that the lack of a definable "need" for Canadian
participation made it more difficult to sell this to Cabinet.
He noted the absence of U.S. plans for NORAD participation
or for missile defense installations in Canada, although
acknowledging that Canada's indecision had kept it on the
sidelines. Bon believed that Chretien did not want missile
defense participation to be part of his "legacy" in his last
year in office, and would punt the decision to his successor.


4. (C) Ron Hoffman, Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) Director for
Defense and Security Relations, told us that the GoC would
have a lot of work to do with Parliament and the Canadian
public in selling Canadian participation. He noted that a
recent Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report, specifically
recommending that the GoC not participate in missile defense,
was unhelpful in this regard. The GoC's increased interest
in missile defense was still largely under the radar, Hoffman
continued, as there was little general awareness of a shift
in Government policy.


5. (C) COMMENT: DFAIT and DND are hoping that they will at
least get a green light from Cabinet to participate in
certain aspects of missile defense. Given near-term
decisions in the U.S. on missile defense industrial projects,
and the Command decisions that have already been taken, DFAIT
and DND would like to move forward on industrial cooperation
and at least leave the door open to NORAD participation.
Beyond that, it is not clear that Prime Minister Chretien
will be ready to make a clear decision on Canadian
participation. Missile defense remains controversial in
Ottawa because of arms control concerns (i.e., weaponization
of space),and the Liberal Party is already divided over
Iraq. Given the likelihood that the GoC will be making a
controversial decision to participate militarily in an Iraq
campaign, Chretien is unlikely to give more than a muffled
response on missile defense.
CELLUCCI