Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03OTTAWA35
2003-01-06 20:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

U.S./CANADA/U.K. TRILATERAL PEACEKEEPING MEETING

Tags:  KPKO PREL MASS CA UK UN 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 000035 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

JCS FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPKO PREL MASS CA UK UN
SUBJECT: U.S./CANADA/U.K. TRILATERAL PEACEKEEPING MEETING


-------
Summary
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 000035

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

JCS FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPKO PREL MASS CA UK UN
SUBJECT: U.S./CANADA/U.K. TRILATERAL PEACEKEEPING MEETING


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Summary
--------------


1. (U) The U.S. participated in annual talks on peacekeeping
with Canada and U.K. in Ottawa on December 10-11, 2002 in
which a broad range of peacekeeping issues were addressed.
Canada's Director General of International Security,
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT),Jill Sinclair, welcomed U.S. and U.K. participants
and made opening remarks. Canada's chairperson for the
talks, Barbara Martin, Director, Regional Security and
Peacekeeping Division, DFAIT/IDC, made additional welcoming
comments and kicked off the discussions. The discussions
addressed several ongoing UN peacekeeping missions and a
number of other topics related to current peacekeeping
issues. End Summary.

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Civil-Military Cooperation
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2. (U) Participants agreed that impartial civil-military
cooperation is essential to bringing peacekeeping operations
to a successful conclusion. Military operations achieve
little beyond temporary ceasefires. Creating the conditions
for a more durable peace and the exit of military
participants requires the involvement of a wide range of
civilian actors from the UN, NGOs, and civil society.


3. (U) Civilian players should be involved in early planning
along with military planners. Civilian liaison personnel
should be co-located with military units, both at
headquarters and in the field. Civilian-military operation
centers should be established. Civilian-military cooperation
at the highest levels is essential to ensure unity of purpose
and to ensure that headquarters and field operations
implement civilian-military cooperation.


4. (U) Participants agreed that cooperation between the UN
Secretariat and other UN agencies through the Administration

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Coordination Committee (ACC) should be encouraged and that
the use of Integrated Management Task Forces (IMTF) at UN
headquarters in New York be complemented by the formulation
of parallel structures in UN field operations.

--------------
Responsibility to Protect
--------------


5. (U) Canada summarized the Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which

examined the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for
states to use force against another state simply to protect
at-risk inhabitants of that other state. U.S. head of
delegation Will Imbrie noted that the report raises important
issues for authorization for intervention in humanitarian
crises. He said the challenge is to make the link between
theory and practice, thus closing the gap between think-tank
types and operators.

-------------- --
Overview of Selected UN Peacekeeping Operations
-------------- --


6. (U) Participants discussed the current state of affairs
and way forward for three UN peacekeeping operations: the UN
Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC),
the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL),and the
UN Mission in East Timor (UNMISET).


7. (SBU) MONUC: Participants acknowledged the unique
opportunity at hand, but noted several significant challenges
ahead. The redeployment of forces from surrounding nations
is a very positive development which the international
community should take advantage of. The Security Council
decision to increase the troop ceiling to 8,700 was
appropriate, as were the safeguards imposed to ensure the
second task force is not deployed before it is actually
needed. Several challenges remain: the issue of third
country settlement; addressing the remaining hardcore
fighters that do not want to disarm; selection of a new SRSG
and appointment of capable assistants; and review of the UN
policy on HIV-AIDS to reduce the threat of spreading the
virus through UN peacekeepers.

8. (SBU) UNAMSIL: The U.K. reviewed progress since the
elections and believes that UNAMSIL can end in mid-2004.
Further work is needed to develop Sierra Leone police forces
and the Sierra Leone Army, establish control over the diamond
producing areas, and reintegrate former fighters into the
economy. The U.K. continues to conduct military training
under the International Military Assistance Training Team
(IMATT) program and exercise its over-the-horizon force with
regular joint exercises, a practice to be continued after
UNAMSIL's exit. The U.K. also continues to provide police
training. The U.K. noted the need to strengthen security
measures when the Special Court issues indictments.


9. (SBU) UNMISET - Timor Leste: The U.K. reviewed
developments in Timor-Leste, noting that the police and
justice sectors still require significant work. Recent riots
in Dili signal problems in the security sector and weakness
in the Timor-Leste Police.

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Situation in Burundi
--------------


10. (SBU) Despite the recent signing of a ceasefire agreement
by one faction of the FDD, there was consensus that the
situation in Burundi is not right for a UN peacekeeping
operation. Imbrie stressed that while the ceasefire
signatories have requested a peacekeeping force, the
ceasefire is by no means comprehensive and that the U.S.
could not support a Chapter VII mission, stating that
"deploying a mission under the current circumstances would
put peacekeepers in a live fire situation." He noted that
the U.S. had consulted with the U.K. and France on potential
contingency operations in the event of a mass genocide
scenario, but none are prepared to commit at this point, and
all would prefer an intervention force from African nations
with possible support from developed nations.


11. (SBU) Speaking for the U.K. delegation, Mr. Stephen
Pollard, Head of Overseas Secretariat, MOD, responded that
Britain was reluctant to take on a new mission at this time,
citing manpower and budgetary constraints. He stated that
the UK could provide "small scale" support to a mission in
areas such as logistics or command and control. He noted
that South Africa, Ghana, and Senegal were prepared to
provide forces for a mission, but only under a U.S.-supported
UN mission, after a comprehensive ceasefire had been
achieved, and with assurances that a feasible evacuation plan
was in place.

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SHIRBRIG Update
--------------


12. (U) Colonel Gaston Cote, Director of Peacekeeping Policy,
Canadian Department of National Defense, provided an overview
of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Colonel
Cote noted that SHIRBRIG is the only operationally ready
brigade-sized unit exclusively available for United Nations
deployment. The unit has about 5,000 troops that can deploy
up to six months under a Chapter VI mandate. Brigade
elements are on call, but planning element consisting of the
Commanding General, Chief of Staff, and section heads is
permanently stationed in Denmark. The Brigade participates
in two exercises per year with either the UN or the planning
element developing the scenario. The headquarters has an
objective of deploying within 14 days of notification. The
remaining units of the brigade have an objective of deploying
within 30 days of national approval.


13. (U) Canada will assume presidency of the SHIRBRIG
steering committee in January 2003. Key agenda items for
their presidency will be to: focus on prospective new members
(Chile, Brazil, Senegal),strengthen the rapid reaction
capability of the brigade, foster better communications
between SHIRBRIG, individual states and international
organizations, and include civilian personnel (humanitarian
assistance) in the planning element or incorporate them in
the on-call list. Members also intend to more actively
promote SHIRBRIG as a model for regional organizations.

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Building African Peacekeeping Capacity
--------------


14. (U) Delegations presented update briefings on respective
initiatives to enhance African capacity for supporting peace
operations. The U.S. discussed the African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and
reviewed accomplishments under the African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI) and Operation Focus Relief (OFR). The U.K.
gave an update on the IMATT initiative, and Canada presented
information about ongoing efforts in the G8 to promote
African peacekeeping capacity. Participants agreed on the
need to more closely coordinate respective efforts to ensure
efficiency and avoid giving African countries "confusing
signals."

--------------
Peacekeeping Reform - Brahimi Implementation
--------------


15. (U) The group was unanimous that implementation of
peacekeeping reform measures was not "a done deal" and that
we should work together to keep attention focused on
implementation efforts. The U.K. delegation drove the point
home with an exceptionally detailed statement outlining
numerous areas where much work remains to be done. Key points
included the importance of monitoring the UN Secretariat,
particularly DPKO, to ensure new posts are being used
effectively; continuing to improve the working relationships
between troop contributors, the Security Council, and the
Secretariat; improving the inter-relationships between

SIPDIS
departments/agencies; and improving UN capacity for complex
peacekeeping. The group responded favorably to suggestions
from the U.S. for a mid-term review of DPKO by Logistics
Management Incorporated (LMI) and establishment of a "Friends
of DPKO" group in New York to accomplish these goals.

-------------- ---
Security Sector Reform - Case Study: Afghanistan
-------------- ---


16. (SBU) Col. Baltazar of OSD/SOLIC/Stability Operations led
the discussion, focusing on development of the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Ministry of Defense. He gave the
current U.S. thinking that about eight years would be needed
to develop a civilian-controlled military capable of securing
Afghanistan's borders and ensuring government control of all
the territory within those borders. He stated that the most
immediate challenge is funding. Current estimates hold that
$1.84 billion is required to establish the envisioned
70,000-strong ANA and Border Control forces. Baltazar noted
that only $50 million is available now, and pledges from
other countries have not been forthcoming. Recruiting and
retention to achieve an ethnically-balanced force and
ultimately displace the warlord system was noted as an even
longer term challenge.


17. (SBU) UKUN delegate Glyn Berry said upcoming elections
could be problematic if, as expected, they result in a
majority Tajik and fundamentalist government which would be
difficult for the Pashtun population to accept. He
underscored the importance of ensuring ethnic balance in the
force, and of ANA ability to "outbid" competing employers
(warlords and drug traffickers) for soldiers. He also raised
the issue of DDR, noting that viable employment opportunities
were required for those mujahideen not selected for the ANA
to keep them from returning to their old ways.


18. (SBU) The U.K.'s Pollard resumed the discussion, stating
U.K. willingness to assist by providing niche skills and
other capabilities not resident in the U.S. plan. As an
example, the U.K. will provide an officer to the UN
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) to advise Brahimi
on security sector reform and assist in development of a
National Security Council to integrate the various aspects of
reform. On the issue of funding, he noted that the U.K. had
set aside 10 million pounds to support ANA salary payments,
but that release of the funds was conditioned on the size,
shape and ethnic balance of the ANA, as well as other
reforms.

--------------
Future of Complex Peacekeeping
--------------


19. (U) Major General Cam Ross, Director General of
International Security Policy for the Canadian Department of
National Defense, presented Canada's view on the issue of
whether future complex peacekeeping operations would be
conducted by the UN or multinational coalitions. General
Ross contrasted pre- and post-cold war trends of
peacekeeping, noting the shift from fewer interstate and more
intrastate conflicts. He highlighted the UN's important and
unique role in both scenarios and concluded that UN
peacekeeping would continue to perform a key role in future
peacekeeping requirements.

--------------
CIVPOL - Transition to Local Police Forces
--------------


20. (U) The U.S. noted that along with the exit of UN
Civilian Police (CIVPOL),there will often be a need for a
follow-on mechanism to complete improvements initiated by the
UN. As an example, the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)
is on track to assume the IPTF mission in January 2003; a
similar mechanism will be needed in Timor-Leste after
UNMISET's exit. CIVPOL only addresses one portion of the
justice system. Other parts, such as laws, courts, judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and jails, will likely need
continuing development in post-conflict situations.
Peacekeeping operations are ill-suited to address such
long-term development tasks.

-------------- --------------
Role of the UNSC Working Group/Consultations with TCCs
-------------- --------------


21. (U) Participants noted that a positive and effective
relationship between Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs),the
Secretariat and the Security Council is a worthwhile

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objective and agreed to continue working toward improvements.

--------------
Conclusion
--------------


22. (U) In closing, Canada suggested the possibility of
expanding the trilateral forum to include other countries.
AUSTRALIA was specifically mentioned as a potential prospect.
Participants agreed to consider the proposal and discuss
this further at a later date. Delegates from respective
missions to the UN were encouraged to conduct a "trial" of
this concept in New York. The U.S. announced its intention
to host the talks in early December 2003 and said a proposed
agenda would be on the table for review by mid-October 2003.
GALLAGHER