MISSILE DEFENSE: CANADA ANNOUNCES DECISION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 001539

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR CA
SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE: CANADA ANNOUNCES DECISION TO
ENTER NEGOTIATIONS

REF: OTTAWA 1437 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Brian Flora,
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST - SEE PARA 6.


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Canadian Government announced
on May 29 that it has decided to enter into discussions with
the U.S. on missile defense participation. This decision
represents a dramatic shift in Canadian policy on missile
defense, which was generally viewed in a negative light here
prior to 2002 because of arms control concerns. Over the
past several months, Defense Minister McCallum and Foreign
Minister Graham were able to convince Prime Minister Chretien
and most of the Liberal Party caucus that participation in
missile defense would be in Canada's national interest.
Their strongest argument was that since the U.S. was
proceeding with missile defense deployment, Canada would be
jeopardizing its defense relationship with us, in particular
NORAD, if it did not join. Now that Canada has taken the
plunge, we need to work with them to reach an agreement that
keeps our defense partnership on track. END SUMMARY AND
COMMENT.


2. (U) Canadian Defense Minister McCallum announced on May 29
that the GoC has decided to enter into discussions with the
U.S. on Canadian participation in missile defense. McCallum
said this decision was motivated by a desire to protect
Canadian lives and to preserve NORAD's role in the defense of
North America. He specifically noted that Canada would like
the North American missile defense mission to be assigned to
NORAD, vice NORTHCOM. McCallum also reiterated Canada's
opposition to weaponization of space, and said that any
agreement on Canadian participation in missile defense would
still have to be blessed by Cabinet.


3. (C) Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) and National Defense (DND)
contacts told us that the decision to enter missile defense
negotiations was taken at the May 26 Cabinet meeting, but
that Prime Minister Chretien had planned to announce the
decision during his ongoing visit to Europe. The government
changed plans because the opposition Canadian Alliance Party
introduced a motion in the House of Commons on May 29
affirming its support for NORAD as a counter to ballistic
missile threats. The GoC decided to go ahead and announce
its decision in response to the Canadian Alliance motion.
The announcement was roundly criticized by Bloc Quebecois and
New Democratic Party MPs. (COMMENT: We anticipate sniping
from hardcore Liberal Party opponents as well, including
Heritage Minister and Liberal leadership candidate Sheila
Copps. END COMMENT)


4. (C) Ron Hoffmann, DFAIT Director for Defense and Security
Policy, stressed to us that NORAD's role in missile defense
was the key issue in the Cabinet debate over entering
negotiations. Several Cabinet officials argued that the
future of Canada's role in North American defense would be
determined by NORAD's involvement in the missile defense
system. Other issues included territorial coverage,
industrial cooperation, and weaponization of space. Hoffmann
told us that the GoC recognizes the U.S. is not going to
agree to any limits on future direction of the missile
defense system, and that the GoC would like to "park" the
space weaponization issue and not have it become a sticking
point in negotiations. He likened this issue to Canada's
position on nuclear disarmament, which it supports while also
subscribing to a NATO nuclear strategy.


5. (C) Hoffmann told us that the GoC would like to begin
negotiations as soon as possible. As a preliminary step,
Assistant Deputy Ministers Jim Wright (DFAIT) and Ken Calder
(DND) would like to visit Washington and lay out Canada's
decision and negotiating mandate for senior officials at
State and Defense. Hoffmann proposed this visit taking place
on June 5 or 6. The GoC would then propose to send its full
negotiating team to Washington on June 13 or 17 to begin
discussions. We cautioned that the U.S. side might need more
time before starting talks. Hoffmann urged us to at least
agree to an early visit by Wright and Calder so that they
could lay out the GoC approach.


6. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Please advise on availability of U.S.
officials for meetings with Wright and Calder.
CELLUCCI