Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03OTTAWA1437
2003-05-20 20:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ottawa
Cable title:  

(C/NF) CANADA: A GOVERNMENT ADRIFT

Tags:  PREL PGOV SNAR CA KCRIM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001437 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

NSC PASS TO ONDCP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR CA KCRIM
SUBJECT: (C/NF) CANADA: A GOVERNMENT ADRIFT

REF: (A) OTTAWA 917

Classified By: DCM Stephen R. Kelly. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001437

SIPDIS

NOFORN

NSC PASS TO ONDCP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR CA KCRIM
SUBJECT: (C/NF) CANADA: A GOVERNMENT ADRIFT

REF: (A) OTTAWA 917

Classified By: DCM Stephen R. Kelly. Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Despite guarded optimism that the GOC
might try to "make amends" for its anti-U.S. handling of Iraq
policy, it has become increasingly apparent that the
government's behavior on Iraq was symptomatic of a much
deeper problem: as in Baghdad, the leadership has gone
underground. PM Chretien, once known for his iron-fisted
control of the Liberal Caucus, appears to have "lost his fast
ball." Since announcing his retirement in 2004, Chretien
increasingly has been detached from policymaking and the
business of governing, and more concerned about forcing
through "legacy" projects, regardless of their consequences.
Though this bodes ill for gaining Canadian cooperation on key
issues in the immediate term, we should continue to advance
our broad bilateral agenda through established channels with
an eye to the post-Chretien era. END SUMMARY


2. (C/NF) In a political system that vests so much power in
the office of the Prime Minister, the consequence of the PM's
decision to step down and his early disengagement from his
responsibilities -- a government in disarray -- seems
inevitable. The unraveling of Canadian policymaking and
governance can be traced through a number of events in the
past 8 months. Beginning with reactions to the PM's startling
announcement (his own advisors didn't know),last September,
that Canada would ratify the Kyoto Protocol, to the current
confusion over missile defense and drug policy, GOC
decision-making has reflected the PM's gradual loss of
control--and thus his legendary ability to force policy--over
a restive Liberal House Caucus.


3. (C/NF) Though the Caucus stood in unity with the Chretien
over his anti-war stance, many Members of Parliament voiced
misgivings, on and off the record, over the "handling" of
related Iraq issues and the government's waffling, bumptious
approach toward the U.S. Since then, divisions within the
Caucus have deepened and grown, fueled in part by the kicking
into high gear of the three-way party leadership contest to
succeed Chretien. The SARS crisis in Toronto precipitated

the "unsightly public spectacle" of infighting among Cabinet
ministers when Heritage Minister Sheila Copps and Health
Minister Anne McClellan got into a public spat over handling
of the SARS crisis. McClellan also has taken issue with
Justice Minister Cauchon's marijuana decriminalization bill,
voicing strong concern that the new legislation would
increase marijuana use in Canada.


4. (C/NF) With two-thirds of the House Liberal Caucus already
backing Chretien's political arch-rival, Paul Martin, for
leadership of the party, the Prime Minister's ability to
advance even his own limited agenda is quickly bogging down.
Emboldened MPs are pushing back on key legacy-related
legislation, including a bill to curb corporate and union
donations to political parties, and marijuana
decriminalization. Liberal Party leader Stephen LeDrew, an
acknowledged Martin supporter, has been leading the charge
against political contributions reform, and a number of
backbench MPs have begun to challenge the proposed
legislation publicly as well.


5. (C/NF) With few carrots (the promise of "early summer
recess" doesn't really cut it) and no sticks (beyond the
empty threat of calling early elections) to force his
legislative program through the House of Commons, PM Chretien
is even less likely to take on really sticky issues such as
missile defense. Hence last week's Cabinet non-decision on
whether to enter missile defense negotiations with the U.S.
should come as no surprise. Notwithstanding the earnest--and
even forward-leaning by GOC standards--efforts of Foreign
Affairs and Defense Ministers Graham and McCallum to sell MD
to their peers in the House, the PM's complete lack of
presence on the issue has helped to amplify the voice of the
anti-military opposition and the "left wing" of the Liberal
Party and thus keep alive the debate.

Consequences for the U.S.
--------------

6. (C/NF) Chretien steadfastly maintains that he has no
intention of retiring sooner than his announced date of
February 2004, though his remaining at the helm of government
beyond the November 15 election of his successor will
compound the existing disarray in the GOC. Pressure for him
to step down early may increase as November 15 draws near,
potentially detracting further from the Fall legislative
agenda. A number of pundits have reflected that matters
could "get worse" in September, when 85 percent of delegates
representing the Liberals' 301 ridings are nominated and
declare their voting intentions (thereby "crowning" Paul
Martin ahead of schedule). While we anticipate little
improvement in GOC behavior or decision-making until Chretien
has gone, the extended "interregnum" period is an opportunity
to consolidate contacts with prospective members of the next
government. In the meantime, we should continue to advance
our broad bilateral agenda through established contacts and
institutions.
CELLUCCI