CANADA-U.S SECURITY RELATIONS - GETTING PAST IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001123

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR CA IZ
SUBJECT: CANADA-U.S SECURITY RELATIONS - GETTING PAST IRAQ
TO PURSUE OUR COMMON INTERESTS

REF: (A) OTTAWA 892 (B) OTTAWA 1014

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stephen R. Kelly,
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) With U.S.-Canada relations in flux and the role of the
United Nations in question, Canadian foreign policy is at a
crossroads. The postponement of the President's state visit
to Ottawa, after Canada chose not to participate in Iraq and
senior GoC officials criticized the U.S.-led effort, has been
a harsh but necessary reality check for Canada. We will be
on better footing after the February 2004 departure of Prime
Minister Chretien, who prefers to work within international
institutions even when they prove ineffective, and even when
doing so damages our bilateral relationship. Canada will
still be a strong proponent of multilateralism after
Chretien's departure, but we expect his successor - probably
ex-Finance Minister Paul Martin - to bring greater balance to
Canadian foreign policy.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: In the meantime, we have a broad
security agenda that must not languish while we wait for
Chretien's replacement. From counterterrorist cooperation in
North America to military deployments in Afghanistan to
putting pressure on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear
programs, we need Canada's help. We are also pushing Canada
to go ahead with a decision to participate in missile
defense. While doing so should be a no-brainer, given the
security benefits for North America as a whole, it would
represent a major leap for Canadian foreign policy. If
Foreign Minister Graham and Defense Minister McCallum can
convince Chretien to not pass the buck on this decision to
his successor, then we need to work with the GoC to plug
NORAD into missile defense command and control for North
America. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) After the failure of its efforts to "bridge the
divide" at the UN Security Council and its subsequent
decision not to participate in the military campaign against
Iraq (ref. A),Canada finds itself in a awkward position.
Its "primordial" bilateral relationship with the U.S. is
strained, as was graphically demonstrated by the postponement
of President Bush's May 5 state visit to Ottawa. The GoC is
rightly concerned about getting bilateral relations back on
track, and is looking for ways to do so. At the same time,
Canada remains committed to multilateral institutions such as
the United Nations, and will continue to push for them to
have a role in dealing with international crises.

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CHRETIEN UNREPENTANT ON IRAQ
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4. (C) In the wake of the coalition's sweeping military
victory, public opinion in Canada has swung from majority
opposition to the war to roughly an even split (ref. B).
Prime Minister Chretien, however, has been unrepentant. He
has maintained that Canada was right to not participate in
Iraq without UN blessing, and has reiterated his concern
about military actions aimed at regime change. A few Liberal
Party MPs have publicly stated their opposition to Chretien's
decision on Iraq, and press reports indicate that Deputy
Prime Minister John Manley argued for Canadian participation
within Cabinet. Meanwhile, the frontrunner to become the
next Prime Minister when Chretien steps down in February
2004, ex-Finance Minister Paul Martin, has criticized
anti-American rhetoric within the Liberal Party but also said
that the Prime Minister made the right decision on Iraq.
This position puts him squarely in the middle of the party
that will continue to govern Canada for the foreseeable
future.

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A ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ
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5. (C) On post-conflict Iraq, the GoC wants to see as much UN
involvement as possible but has been careful not to get into
the same box as it did on military action. Manley has
explicitly stated that Canada will not wait for UN approval
to contribute to reconstruction efforts. Thus far Canada has
pledged US$70 million for humanitarian assistance, and is
looking at specific expertise it could offer. The RCMP,
which has international experience in countries such as
Bosnia and Haiti, has been mentioned as a possible source of
assistance on the police front. The GoC wants to make a
significant contribution in Iraq and to get back in our good
graces. We need to work with them to find a useful role.

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WAR ON TERRORISM, ARMS CONTROL
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6. (C) Despite the rift over Iraq, we need to continue
working closely with Canada on our national security agenda.
We have much common ground in the war on terrorism and in
arms control efforts. We have worked extremely closely with
Canada in law enforcement, intelligence and military channels
on preventing future terrorist attacks in North America.
Given the massive flows of people and goods between our
countries, such cooperation is essential. Canada has also
stepped up to the plate internationally in the war on
terrorism. Canada has been one of the biggest contributors
to Operation Enduring Freedom, and will be supplying 1500
personnel to ISAF IV and V beginning in August.


7. (C) On the arms control front, Canada shares our strong
concerns about the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs,
has denounced the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has pushed for censure of Iran
at the IAEA. Canada will continue to be a valuable ally in
multilateral arms control fora, where it has considerable
expertise and can serve as a bridge to other countries.

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MISSILE DEFENSE
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8. (C) The big question now for the bilateral security
relationship is missile defense. Foreign Minister Graham and
Defense Minister McCallum agreed in fall 2002 that Canada
should participate in missile defense, and they are trying to
gain Cabinet blessing to negotiate an agreement on
participation with us. Graham and McCallum are trying to
allay longstanding Canadian concerns that such a system would
damage arms control efforts, particularly the weaponization
of space.


9. (C) The deciding factor, as for all major GoC decisions,
will be Chretien. He has indicated a willingness for Cabinet
to consider the issue, and he usually does not do so unless
he is favorably disposed. DFAIT and DND still expect missile
defense to be taken up by Cabinet in the coming weeks, but do
not yet have a clear sense of how the Prime Minister is
leaning. We know there will be opposition from some of the
more left-leaning members of Cabinet. Chretien can squash
them if he chooses, and push this through. Or he can decide
that he does not want missile defense participation to be
part of his legacy, and put off consideration by Cabinet.


10. (C) Like on the issue of Iraqi reconstruction, we should
engage Canada in a significant way if it chooses to
participate in missile defense. In particular, we should
find a way to plug NORAD into missile defense command and
control for North America. This would be at the top of
Canada's priority list for an agreement with us, as the GoC
fears that NORAD will wither away if it is not involved in
missile defense. We will need to show some flexibility on
this issue, despite the recent assignment of missile defense
regional oversight to NORTHCOM, in order to help our allies
sell a missile defense agreement in Ottawa.
CELLUCCI