ARTICLE 98 -- A NON-ISSUE FOR CARICOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000925

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2013
TAGS: PREL BF PGOV CARICOM
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 98 -- A NON-ISSUE FOR CARICOM


Classified By: DCM ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI

Summary
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1. Bahamian Ambassador to CARICOM Archer infers that CARICOM
will not support Article 98 and clears post confusion based
on mixed signals from the Prime Minster (positive) and the
Foreign Ministry (negative). In relation to Cuba, he states
that CARICOM will not support discussion on the country in
the OAS forum where Cuba is unable to defend itself. End
Summary


Article 98: Dead in the Water?
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2. (U) Deputy Chief of Mission, accompanied by Econ/Comm
officer, met May 13 with Leonard Archer, Bahamian ambassador
to CARICOM and the senior Foreign Ministry official who
accompanied Foreign Minister Fred Mitchell to the May 8-9,
2003, CARICOM Foreign Ministers meeting held in Kingstown,
St. Vincent.


3. (U) DCM had requested the meeting earlier in the week in
order to obtain clarification and the Bahamian interpretation
of the CARICOM communiqus dealing with Article 98 and Cuba.


4. (C) Ambassador Archer was candid. In response to DCM,s
request for clarification of CARICOM's stance, he stated
categorically that the fifteen CARICOM member states were
agreed that they could not sign an Article 98 bilateral
agreement with the United States because to do so "would
negate the Rome Treaty" establishing the International
Criminal Court. He reminded the Embassy that the CARICOM
member-states had been "instrumental in initiating and
resuscitating" the concept of the international criminal
court. Ambassador Archer insisted that the CARICOM members
felt that to sign an Article 98 agreement with the United
States now would "neutralize or neuter" the Rome Treaty.
"The (Rome) Treaty and an Article 98 agreement simply can,t
legally co-exist in our opinion," he insisted.


5. (C) Asked what the particular position of The Bahamas was
in light of the revised, customized texts of a proposed
Article 98 agreement that had been provided to the GCOB,
Ambassador Archer responded that the "many different
versions" of a draft agreement that the United States had
been circulating had been itself a cause of concern within
CARICOM The fact that the United States was circulating "so
many" different drafts to different countries, rather than
one single text was, to him and his colleagues, Archer
insisted, "proof that something was fundamentally wrong with
(this) approach." Reminded that the United States had indeed
initially proposed one single text and had modified it --
reluctantly -- in response to the desires expressed by
individual countries for a text that addressed their
particular circumstances, Ambassador Archer had no response.


6. (C) Asked about next steps, Ambassador Archer said that
while CARICOM will keep the issue "under review" and was
"open to discussion" he saw little, if any possibility of
any movement. CARICOM he stated categorically, would not
itself propose a revised, acceptable single draft Article 98
text to the United States. Asked if this meant the ball was
in the United States, court to propose a new draft, Archer
responded that while the United States could do so, "it was a
very big if that CARICOM would respond... in any event."


Cuba and Natural Justice
--------------


7. (C) Turning to the communiqu on Cuba that the CARICOM
foreign ministers had also issued, Ambassador Archer said
that it was the "unanimous" view of the CARICOM membership
that seeking to pass a resolution condemning Cuba in the OAS
when Cuba was not permitted to defend itself as a member
"violated the rule of natural justice." Pressed if this was
really a unanimous view or simply a strongly-held position by
some member-states, Archer responded that "no one in the room
objected to the communiqu's wording."


8. (C) At the end of the conversation, and following an
extended exchange with DCM on the Castro dictatorship and its
historical record of human rights and other violations,
Ambassador Archer closed the conversation by telling DCM that
"it was illogical" for the United States to continually try
to obtain resolutions condemning Cuba since "the United
States also had blood on its hands there," criticized the
influence of Cuban-American and Cuban exile groups in
Florida, and insisted that it was unlikely that the United
States would ever obtain a sympathetic hearing from CARICOM
members until it altered "its irrational Cuba policy."

Comment
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9. (C) In contrast to other members of the Bahamian Foreign
Ministry, Ambassador Archer was refreshingly candid and
forthcoming in explaining the GCOB position within CARICOM on
these issues -- even if the news he delivered was unpleasant
and tinged with outdated ideology. On Article 98, Archer
confirmed the view that the Foreign Minister and the Foreign
Ministry have no political desire, or ideological
inclination, to conclude an Article 98 agreement and are
pleased to hide behind CARICOM solidarity on this issue.
Further reinforcing their position is the fact that the
Foreign Ministry officials are also well aware that unless
and until they ratify the International Criminal Court
treaty, they can free ride on this since there will be no
consequences to opposing the U.S. When Ambassador Archer was
asked if there was any timetable to submit the treaty to
parliament for ratification, an act that would trigger
sanctions, Archer coyly responded that he "wasn't aware of
any plans to do so." Since the Prime Minister has been much
more positive on this isse than the Foreign Minister, the
only possiblity we see for an Article 98 agreement is if the
PM overrules Foreign Minister Mitchell and gives him a direct
order. We have seen nothing in PM Christie's governing style
and personality to indicate that this is likely. 8
BLANKENSHIP