Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KUWAIT626
2003-02-19 18:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

(C) GOK SAYS ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL WAS TOUGH ON

Tags:  PREL MARR IZ KU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000626 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR IZ KU
SUBJECT: (C) GOK SAYS ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL WAS TOUGH ON
SADDAM


Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON: 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000626

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR IZ KU
SUBJECT: (C) GOK SAYS ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL WAS TOUGH ON
SADDAM


Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON: 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA MinState Dr. Mohammed al-Sabah told
Ambassador February 19 that the February 15-16 Arab League
Ministerial in Cairo was very tough on Iraq and will not have
given any comfort to Saddam. The Saudi FM in particular
stated forcefully that the Europeans and Americans really had
the same goal, regime change in Iraq, and the quicker
American approach was arguably kinder. Dr. Mohammed asserted
that the Ministers did not agree to any statement, nor to an
extraordinary summit as called for by Egypt: as of March 1,
Bahrain will take over as chairman of the Arab League; an
extraordinary summit before then would be chaired by Lebanon,
which performed unacceptably in Cairo, under Syrian pressure.
The alleged communiqu published by Lebanon after the
meeting had not even been discussed, because of widespread
opposition to issuing any statement at all. The Ambassador
stressed Washington's strong commitment to action on Iraq.
END SUMMARY.


2. (U) The Ambassador met February 19 with Shaykh Dr.
Mohammed Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs. DCM sat in along with PolChief (Notetaker);
Dr. Mohammed was accompanied by his Office Director Shaykh
Dr. Ahmed Nasser Mohammed al-Sabah, Amb. Khaled al-Babtain,
Director of the Americas Department, and Babtain's Deputy
Ayham al-Omar.


3. (C) Iraq virtually monopolized the discussion (other
topics septels). The Ambassador reported that the message he
came away with from the NEA Chiefs of Mission Conference
earlier this month was that the USG is fully committed to
action on Iraq, preferably with a second UNSCR, but without
one if necessary.


4. (C) Dr. Mohammed asked about the USG's view of the
position of various countries in the region. The Ambassador
stressed our appreciation for the support of Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, the GCC as a whole with its
Peninsula Shield Force, and King Abdullah of Jordan. (He
said we appreciate that Turkey is moving forward, but are
frustrated at its slow pace.) At the other end of the
spectrum was Syria, where we continued to receive credible

troubling reports of operational support for Iraq -- though
this has not affected our cooperation against al-Qaeda
terrorism. In response to another question, he added that we
appear to have reached an understanding with Egypt, which
continues to provide access to the Suez canal, a very real
contribution to our preparations for Iraq contingencies.


5. (C) Dr. Mohammed raised France and Germany, noting that
he had received the French ambassador during the Eid holidays
and told him the absence of a timeline renders unacceptable
France's proposal for strengthening inspections: "Saddam has
been in material breach for twelve years." Responding to Dr.
Mohammed's concern about a possible French veto of a second
UNSCR, the Ambassador recalled the KOSOVO precedent, in which
NATO took military action despite a threatened Russian veto,
but still obtained a UNSCR for managing matters after the
fighting ended. The Ambassador shared his impression that
Washington wanted to make a strategic decision on how to
proceed before the end of February -- without necessarily
acting on it right away.

(U) ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL
--------------

6. (C) Turning to the February 15-16 Arab League Ministerial
in Cairo chaired by Lebanon, Dr. Mohammed (who represented
Kuwait at the event),said there was a long closed meeting
(i.e. Ministers only) at which speaker after speaker told
Iraq there is no way to avoid war short of total cooperation.
Saudi FM Prince Saud al-Faisal, briefing on his recent
meetings with Presidents Bush and Chirac, stated that both
the European and American approaches lead to the same result:
regime change in Iraq. The US approach would chop off the
head, while the European approach would strangle the body
until it collapsed. Perhaps the quicker option would be more
merciful. Prince Saud had no doubt the US was determined to
go to war. Recognizing this, he had advised the U.S. not to
target administrative and security (i.e. police)
installations, which would be needed to hold the country
together and prevent a bloodbath of revenge killings. The
slim chance of averting war is 100% compliance on four
issues: missiles, VX, anthrax, and scientists.


7. (C) Iraqi FM Naji Sabri responded not with a defense of
Saddam and his regime but with numerous references to the
Baath party's closeness to the people -- an obvious pitch to
Syria, per Dr. Mohammed. Sabri reiterated Baghdad's standard
claim that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its WMD and
documentary proof of the destruction. He drew derisive
laughter when he said "we threw it (the VX) into the river."
For the next four and a half hours, one Minister after
another told Sabri there is no way out except 100%
compliance, and Iraq needs to prove its peaceful intentions
to its neighbors, Kuwait but also others including Iran. He
was told that Saddam's December 7 speech, allegedly an
apology to Kuwait, had harmed his own cause.


8. (C) Syrian FM Sharaa was "odd man out", claiming Iraq was
already cooperating fully; he opposed Egypt's call for an
extraordinary Arab League summit on grounds that if it was to
put pressure on Iraq, it was "US inspired" and thus
unacceptable. Lebanon chaired the meeting but did not speak.

(C) STATEMENT DEBACLE
--------------

9. (C) Dr. Mohammed said Kuwait considers the statement
issued by Lebanon after the meeting to be a "forgery."
Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, and the Palestinians supported
issuing a statement, and a draft was circulated half an hour
before the meeting broke up, but it was never discussed
because of widespread opposition to issuing any statement.
Egypt moved for a vote on the concept of whether to issue any
statement at all, Saudi Arabia seconded, and Algeria did
likewise on behalf of the Maghreb. Rather than calling for a
vote, the chair ended the meeting, then went out and gave the
statement to the press, saying the Ministers had agreed to it.

(C) EMERGENCY SUMMIT?
--------------


10. (C) Regarding Egypt's call for an extraordinary Arab
League summit, Dr. Mohammed said Kuwait is not keen on the
idea even though "we trust Mubarak." However, in light of
Lebanon's performance in Cairo, he said there is widespread
opposition to letting it chair a summit, especially given
that Bahrain will assume the chairmanship as of March 1.
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the
GCC states and the Maghreb countries all oppose the idea of
an extraordinary summit, he said, though for varying reasons.
He thought only three countries had responded favorably to
Egypt's call: Oman, Djibouti and Somalia.


11. (C) COMMENT: Dr. Mohammed seemed confident that,
despite the negative press play, the substance of the
discussion in Cairo Ministerial was positive for Kuwait, and
"cannot have reassured Saddam."
JONES