Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KUWAIT613
2003-02-19 17:10:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:
INPUT TO MANPADS NEA BILATERAL PLANS
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T KUWAIT 000613
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013
TAGS: ETTC MOPS MARR PARM PREL PTER KU
SUBJECT: INPUT TO MANPADS NEA BILATERAL PLANS
REF: SECSTATE 36950
Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; FOR REASON 1.5 (B, D)
S E C R E T KUWAIT 000613
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013
TAGS: ETTC MOPS MARR PARM PREL PTER KU
SUBJECT: INPUT TO MANPADS NEA BILATERAL PLANS
REF: SECSTATE 36950
Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; FOR REASON 1.5 (B, D)
1. (S) Prior to the Iraqi invasion in 1990, the Kuwaiti Armed
Forces (KAF) owned SA-7, SA-8, and SA-14 missile systems.
Since 1991, the Kuwait Ministry of Defense (MOD) has claimed
that all of their missile inventory was stolen by the Iraqi
military. In 1995, the Kuwaiti MOD purchased 48 Starburst
MANPADS from the United Kingdom. While Kuwait still
possesses this inventory, all the missiles are past the
certification date. Despite these missiles not performing
well during the last exercise in March 2002, they are still
considered capable of bringing down slow moving aircraft.
2. (S) According to Embassy-Kuwait's DIALO, Kuwait has
evidenced good control of its Starburst inventories which are
stored in tightly guarded government and/or military
warehouses. At the present time, Kuwait does not export or
allow the transfer of these weapons systems. There is a very
small "black-market" for illicit small and/or light arms in
Kuwait, but there is no evidence of illicit traffic in the
larger weapon systems. Currently, there is no known excess
inventory of the Starburst MANPADS.
3. (S) The GOK has, and continues to take, pro-active
measures against the possibility of a terrorist attack, by
conventional or non-conventional means, against one of its
civilian aircraft.
4. (S) Financial or other incentives are not presently
necessary to induce the GOK to alter its present command and
control of its Starburst MANPADS. As cited previously, the
GOK is currently handling its advanced weapons systems in a
safe and secure manner.
5. (S) Presently, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense, and
primary point of contact regarding this issue, is Shaykh
Jaber Mubarak Al-Sabah. MOD and other government ministries
in Kuwait have a long history of providing strong support to
the USG regarding military matters.
JONES
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2013
TAGS: ETTC MOPS MARR PARM PREL PTER KU
SUBJECT: INPUT TO MANPADS NEA BILATERAL PLANS
REF: SECSTATE 36950
Classified By: (U) AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; FOR REASON 1.5 (B, D)
1. (S) Prior to the Iraqi invasion in 1990, the Kuwaiti Armed
Forces (KAF) owned SA-7, SA-8, and SA-14 missile systems.
Since 1991, the Kuwait Ministry of Defense (MOD) has claimed
that all of their missile inventory was stolen by the Iraqi
military. In 1995, the Kuwaiti MOD purchased 48 Starburst
MANPADS from the United Kingdom. While Kuwait still
possesses this inventory, all the missiles are past the
certification date. Despite these missiles not performing
well during the last exercise in March 2002, they are still
considered capable of bringing down slow moving aircraft.
2. (S) According to Embassy-Kuwait's DIALO, Kuwait has
evidenced good control of its Starburst inventories which are
stored in tightly guarded government and/or military
warehouses. At the present time, Kuwait does not export or
allow the transfer of these weapons systems. There is a very
small "black-market" for illicit small and/or light arms in
Kuwait, but there is no evidence of illicit traffic in the
larger weapon systems. Currently, there is no known excess
inventory of the Starburst MANPADS.
3. (S) The GOK has, and continues to take, pro-active
measures against the possibility of a terrorist attack, by
conventional or non-conventional means, against one of its
civilian aircraft.
4. (S) Financial or other incentives are not presently
necessary to induce the GOK to alter its present command and
control of its Starburst MANPADS. As cited previously, the
GOK is currently handling its advanced weapons systems in a
safe and secure manner.
5. (S) Presently, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense, and
primary point of contact regarding this issue, is Shaykh
Jaber Mubarak Al-Sabah. MOD and other government ministries
in Kuwait have a long history of providing strong support to
the USG regarding military matters.
JONES