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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
03KUWAIT5235 2003-11-17 14:23:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

(U) AMBASSADOR AND POLISH PRIME MINISTER DISCUSS

Tags:   PREL MARR PGOV KU PL 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 005235 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/NGA, NEA/ARP, EUR/NB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2013
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV KU PL
SUBJECT: (U) AMBASSADOR AND POLISH PRIME MINISTER DISCUSS
IRAQ

Classified By: CDA Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)



1. (C) Summary and Introduction: The Ambassador met with
Polish PM Leszek Miller on November 10, 2003 at Bayan Palace,
prior to the Prime Minister,s scheduled visit to Iraq.
Discussion centered on coalition efforts in Iraq, including
Ambassador Jones,s new responsibilities in Baghdad. The PM
expressed Poland,s continued interest in reconstruction
efforts in Iraq, but urged the USG to speed up the transition
of authority to the Iraqi people. Also present at the
meeting were Dr. Boguslaw Zaleski, Deputy Minister of the
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Polish Ambassador to
Kuwait, Wojciech Bozek. End Summary and Introduction.



2. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting by offering the PM
his condolences upon the death of a Polish coalition member
in Iraq. He stressed that although the coalition was taking
casualties in Iraq, the situation on the ground was different
from the impression one might get from the international
media. The Ambassador described his new role in Iraq as a
reflection of the fact that the effort in Iraq was entering a
new phase. He said that while the overall goal would be for
the CPA to work itself out of a job, his role would be to try
and increase the responsiveness and transparency of the CPA
by providing outreach to the IGC and the Iraqi people. The
Ambassador noted that Poland, as a country with a wealth of
experience in transitioning from an authoritarian government
with a command economy to a free-market democracy, could have
much to contribute in Iraq.



3. (C) PM Miller thanked the Ambassador for his comments, and
agreed that Poland would have much to offer in Iraq. He said
Poland would always share its knowledge where helpful.



4. (C) Miller, who had met with Kuwaiti PM Shaykh Sabah and
Speaker of the National Assembly, Jassem Al-Khorafi earlier
in the day, said the Kuwaitis had asked him to share with the
USG their concern about the situation in Iraq. Miller said
the Kuwaitis had said they believe &more political
instruments are needed8 in Iraq, and that the establishment
of a constitution and holding of elections, along with the
transfer of authority to an Iraqi governing body, should be
key goals of the CPA. He said PM Sabah and Speaker Khorafi
had both expressed concern that political elements begin to
replace the largely military effort in Iraq. Miller noted
that this was logical, but difficult to do in practice.



5. (C) Miller said Polish troops &should be there until the
Iraqis take responsibility,8 but admitted that not having
any timeline for this was a cause for concern, as maintaining
a military presence in Iraq came at considerable financial
cost to Poland. The Coalition should do everything possible
to speed up the process in Iraq, he said, offering Poland,s
support and expertise in the endeavor. The PM explained that
more than 40,000 Polish workers had worked in Iraq in the
1960,s, 70,s and 80,s building the country,s
infrastructure, and Polish companies with prior experience in
Iraq were waiting for the opportunity to be involved in
reconstruction efforts. Miller said that Poles were
beginning to ask what they are getting in return for having
supported the US politically and militarily. &American
business will always have a presence (in Iraq),8 Miller
said, &but so far for us it has not been fruitful.8



6. (C) Looking at the region from a broader perspective,
Miller said Poland harbors ambitions of becoming more
involved in the Middle East and Asia, as what will happen
here will have &enormous consequences for the world.8
Miller said Poland,s cooperation with the US was its
pleasure, adding that the US could count on Poland to meet
its commitments.



7. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Zaleski said he had traveled
the region extensively, and the message leaders here passed
to him is that they want more &internationalization.8
Specific to Iraq, he said they had suggested the
establishment of a policy board to make policy and
reconstruction decisions. Zaleski noted that the CPA's
Council for International Coordination was headed by a Pole,
Ambassador Marek Belka, and expressed his optimism that the
Ambassador would work with Belka in his new capacity in Iraq.
As for Polish economic involvement in reconstruction, he
reiterated that Polish companies were still waiting for their
turn. &If only US companies are involved in
reconstruction,8 he said, &no one will believe this was
done for the Iraqi people.8



8. (C) On Polish expertise in rebuilding and transforming the
economy, Zaleski said Poland had made many mistakes, but at
least it had an idea of where it was going. He argued that
the situation in Iraq was much different, and the problems
were compounded by sectarianism and a lack of consensus about
what path to take. Zaleski warned that the establishment of a
federation in Iraq would be destabilizing, and urged the
adoption of a constitution similar to Lebanon,s as a
possible option.



9. (C) The PM ended the meeting by wishing the Ambassador
success, noting that the road ahead would be foggy and full
of surprises. He offered Poland,s support wherever helpful
and necessary. The Ambassador thanked the PM, and explained
that while we would rely on our allies to tell us when they
think we are making mistakes, we would most certainly, in the
words of Lincoln, not be able to &please all of the people
all of the time.8



10. (C) Ambassador Jones did not have a chance to clear this
cable before departing for temporary duty in Baghdad.



11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
URBANCIC