Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KUWAIT4683
2003-10-14 12:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

(C) IRAN: GOK PESSIMISTIC, BUT REMAINS ENGAGED

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP IR KU IAEA 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 004683 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2013
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR KU IAEA
SUBJECT: (C) IRAN: GOK PESSIMISTIC, BUT REMAINS ENGAGED

REF: KUWAIT 4078 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 004683

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/NGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2013
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IR KU IAEA
SUBJECT: (C) IRAN: GOK PESSIMISTIC, BUT REMAINS ENGAGED

REF: KUWAIT 4078 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMB. RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The GOK sees no short-term hope that
Iranian reformists will be able to challenge the conservative
mullahs effectively, but intends to remain engaged with
Tehran. It claims to have told Iran the international
community is united on the need for it to comply with IAEA
conditions. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) NEA PDAS Larocco called on Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid
al-Hamad al-Sabah, Chairman of Kuwait's National Security
Bureau, October 13, during a brief visit to Kuwait. This
message reports what Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid (protect
throughout) had to say about Iran (other topics septels).


3. (C) Sabah al-Khalid related that Iranian FM Kharrazi had
made a quick visit here September 8 at his own request, to
meet with Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber
al-Sabah in advance of an IAEA Board of Governors meeting
chaired by Kuwait's Ambassador Nabila al-Mulla. Kharrazi had
warned that unless al-Mulla steered the IAEA meeting in the
right direction, the bilateral relationship would be affected
significantly. The Prime Minister shot back that as Chair,
al-Mulla was in no position to exert such influence; she had
to reflect the will of the members, which was clear: Iran
must comply with IAEA conditions.


4. (C) The Prime Minister went on that it was unthinkable
for Kuwait to condone Iranian development of nuclear weapons
or other WMD. Kuwait was relieved that the Iraqi threat had
been removed; Iran should be too. Now it was Iran's turn.
Kuwait as a small, weak country was committed to a region
free of WMD. Iran should recognize this as a natural
position. The GOK wanted to continue its excellent relations
with Iran, and hoped that Kharrazi would take this message
back. But Sabah al-Ahmed wanted to be clear: it appeared to
Kuwait that the international community was united that Iran
should comply with the IAEA.


5. (C) Sabah al-Khalid told PDAS Larocco that
Kuwaiti-Iranian relations continued to be excellent despite
the threat conveyed by Kharrazi. The GOK was seriously
concerned, even pessimistic, however: 60% or more of
Iranians who had been aggressively pro-reform were now
dispirited and dormant. The GOK saw no hope in the
short-term that reformists would be able to challenge the
conservative mullahs effectively, because the reformers have
no one to turn to.


6. (U) Ambassador Larocco was the source of this message,
but did not have time to clear the cable itself.


7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
JONES