ISLAMIST COMMENTATORS TAKE AIM AT EMBASSY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 003605

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/PPD, INR/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2013
TAGS: KISL PREL PHUM KU
SUBJECT: ISLAMIST COMMENTATORS TAKE AIM AT EMBASSY

Classified By: Acting DCM John G. Moran, for reasons 1.5 b,d

(C) Summary: Criticism by Kuwaiti Islamists of the
US-Kuwait bilateral relationship and of the US Embassy has
increased significantly over the past weeks. In a series of
vitriolic op/eds, a local Islamist (and known al-Qaeda
sympathizer) has harshly criticized the ambassador and the
embassy public affairs section for "interfering" in Kuwaiti
affairs and darkly cautioned the ambassador to keep a low
profile lest he become a victim of terrorist attack.
Commentary by another Islamist also falsely accuses the
Ambassador of inappropriate intervention, while a recently
elected Islamist member of parliament argues that the US has
"marginalized" Kuwait's role in the reconstruction of
post-Saddam Iraq. While Islamist broadsides are nothing new
in Kuwait, the frequency of these pieces and their ad hominem
nature has the air of a media campaign. Also noteworthy has
been the absence of a strong counter-attack in defense of the
embassy by Kuwaiti liberals. While we attribute this largely
to summer leave and post-war/post-election fatigue, we are
monitoring this trend and will report as appropriate. End
summary.


2. (C) In a series of op/eds in leading Kuwaiti Arabic daily
"Al Rai al-Amm," Islamist commentator and occasional
al-Jazeera talking head Mohammed al-Awadi has sharply
criticized Ambassador Jones' presence at diwaniyas (Kuwaiti
social events) and accused the ambassador of the "criminal
project" of seeking Kuwaiti concurrence in a plan to turn
Mecca and Medina into an "international zone like the
Vatican": an absurd canard that some credulous Kuwaitis are
nonetheless likely to accept. Al-Awadi, who is alleged by
one PAS contact to have traveled to Afghanistan to meet with
Osama bin Ladin before September 11, 2001, also cautioned the
ambassador to lower his profile as "Kuwait cannot afford the
(political) cost" if the ambassador were to be attacked by
"someone who lost control" after being angered by the
Ambassador's attempts to influence those opposed to women's
rights. Post has learned that the Kuwaiti Interior Ministry
was incensed by al-Awadi's veiled threat and considered
calling him in for questioning, but apparently concluded that
such a move would only serve to raise his media profile.
Al-Awadi has since published several other op/eds that among
other things criticize the embassy public affairs section for
allegedly attempting to push Islamist students into an
unwanted dialogue. In typical fashion, his version of events
surrounding our Ramadan outreach programs turned the facts on
their head.


3. (U) Other Islamists have also written editorials
criticizing the ambassador and the embassy. In an op/ed in
leading Kuwaiti Arabic daily "Al Rai al-Amm," Islamist writer
Sami Nasser asks rhetorically, "Why is the MFA not doing
anything about the US ambassador's interference and
undesirable presence in every Diwaniya in Kuwait?" (Note:
There has been no change in the ambassador's public profile.
End note.) In a July 19 interview in local Arabic daily "Al
Siyassa," Islamist MP Yousef Zalzalleh argues that American
hubris and interventionist tendencies have led the U.S. to
"marginalize" Kuwait's role in the reconstruction of
post-Saddam Iraq.


4. (C) Although it comes as no surprise that Islamists would
take the offensive once the threat from Saddam was ended, the
evolving dynamic of Kuwaiti domestic politics might be a
factor in this sudden late-summer offensive. While the
recent Kuwaiti National Assembly elections were widely
interpreted by Western journalists as a defeat for liberalism
in Kuwait, the fact remains that the principal Islamist bloc
in Parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood-sponsored Islamic
Constitutional Movement (ICM),suffered devastating setbacks,
losing four of its six seats, including that of its leader.
While newly elected conservatives filled the void, these new
members come chiefly from the tribal and Bedouin areas south
and west of Kuwait City and are not members of the ICM or
Salafis of the Popular Islamic Grouping, the two best
organized Islamist political blocs in Kuwait. In the days
following the elections, Kuwaiti media reported meetings by
ICM and Salafi leaders urgently seeking a strategy to
reconstitute a united Islamist presence in the National
Assembly. While it is unclear to what extent their efforts
will be successful, we conjecture that the ambiguity of the
elections came as something of a surprise for Islamists in
Kuwait, and that the current campaign might be related to a
general strategy to foster unity among widely disparate
conservative constituencies by rallying them against a
supposedly common American foe.


5. (C) If the current campaign is indeed related to an
effort by Islamists to recoup lost political capital after
the elections, they could not have chosen a better time. A
plateau period in relations usually follows any great
bilateral effort in a joint cause, and Kuwait is no exception
to this rule. In the period since President Bush announced
the end of formal hostilities in Iraq, Kuwaitis have begun to
grumble that they have not received their "fair share" of
contracts for the rebuilding of Iraq or otherwise have not
benefited in a manner that proportionately reflects the
enormous size of their contributions to the war effort.
(Note: Our reminders to them that their guaranteed continued
national existence for the foreseeable future should be
considered a significant benefit has not gained traction, and
we are currently in the process of putting together a list of
more tangible benefits that Kuwait has or will accrue as a
result of OIF. End Note.)


6. (U) There has also been an increase in public concern
over the fate of Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo. National
Assembly Speaker Jassim al-Khorafi recently issued a public
rebuke of the U.S. on this issue, accusing us of violating
international law and arguing that Kuwaiti prisoners at
Guantanamo be either brought to trial immediately or
released, and his remarks have struck a chord here, forcing
the FM to issue a statement referencing "secret meetings"
between Kuwait and the U.S. to urge us to "solve" the
Guantanamo detention issue out of humanitarian
considerations. Reports of alleged mistreatment of Kuwaiti
students who were returned to Kuwait after being turned away
at US ports of entry by the INS have also generated
resentment (Note: Septel report on our consular and public
affairs sections efforts on this issue is in the works. End
note.) An editorial in the August 3 edition of liberal
"al-Qabas" expresses anger over U.S. pressure on Gulf
governments to monitor charities, asking if the U.S. now
views the feeding of orphans and the needy as a threat to
national security.


7. (C) This critical reportage and commentary has not yet
elicited the normally spirited counter-attack by liberal
Kuwaitis, who in the past have usually wasted little time in
taking on the conservatives. Only a handful of op/eds from
well-known stalwarts have stood up for the U.S. Summer leave
plans and post-war/post-election fatigue have undoubtedly
played a part, as well as the calculation that responding to
somebody like al-Awadi would be counter-productive. Yet
there does seem to be something missing in our conversations
with Kuwaiti liberals these days. Our PAS section reports
that meetings with liberal NGO leaders and other progressives
appear to be marked by a general lassitude and lack of
interest in US Speakers, American studies initiatives and
other joint programs. One women's rights leader expanded on
this, telling us that Kuwaiti liberals excel at denouncing
Islamist youth programs and other conservative initiatives,
but never manage to translate their indignation into action
by putting together programs of their own. Again, this is
clearly at least in part the result of collective burnout
after a year that has seen terrorist attacks, Iraqi missile
launches and governmental inaction and gridlock, but this
lack of progressive dynamism, when contrasted with the energy
with which Islamists are framing issues in Kuwaiti society,
is a source of concern.


8. (C) At this point we would agree with our friends at the
MOI that a direct response to obvious fictions by the embassy
would only serve to raise the profile of Islamist windbags
like al-Awadi. Our strategy so far has involved media
interviews with Ambassador Jones and embassy officers
(al-Qabas published last week a two-page interview with the
Ambassador in which he addressed the economic benefits for
Kuwait from OIF, visa issues, the Guantanamo detainees and
other high profile issues),op-eds, receptions for students
and our continued presence on the Diwaniyah circuit. We are
looking to MEPI programs for help with high-profile youth
exchanges, essay contests and support for programs focusing
on women's political empowerment in Kuwait. Over time we
will see the Kuwaitis playing a more active, successful role
in Iraqi reconstruction, and we will look at ways to
publicize US/Kuwaiti cooperation. These initiatives should
help to remind Kuwaitis of the depth of the bilateral
relationship and will hopefully put the histrionics of
conservatives seeking to drive a wedge between the U.S. and
Kuwait into perspective. However, we should continue to
monitor the situation and not hesitate to take more active
measures if circumstances warrant.

Jones
JONES