Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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03KUWAIT3358 | 2003-07-27 12:19:00 | SECRET | Embassy Kuwait |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 003358 |
1. (C) Kuwait and the United States have been full partners in the defense of Kuwait since the 1990-91 Gulf War. Beginning with the liberation of Kuwait, the fruits of this partnership have included the decade long successful containment of Saddam Hussein's quest for weapons of mass destruction and regional domination, the modernization and restructuring of Kuwait's armed forces and most recently the liberation of Iraq from Saddam's tyranny. Long-standing cooperation in several other areas has also served our mutual interests. For example, US firms played an active role in extinguishing Kuwait's oil fires after the war and rebuilding key components of the country's infrastructure. Kuwait has chosen American partners for major investments in its nascent petrochemical industry and American firms are now favorably positioned to compete for the Project Kuwait contract to develop and operate Kuwait's northern oil fields. American and Kuwaiti experts have also worked closely on nuclear non-proliferation and other important security issues. For example, Kuwait has been a willing partner in the global war on terrorism, offering extensive use of its facilities during Operation Enduring Freedom and taking steps to prevent the diversion of funds from legitimate purposes to the financing of terrorism. 2. (C) Notwithstanding the productive cooperation we have enjoyed in so many areas, there have been some notable exceptions. For example, Kuwait has so far failed to live up to commitments by its Amir to extend suffrage to women and to award a major commercial power project to an American firm. There has been little, if any, progress on political, economic or educational reform. A two-year old investment law remains unimplemented due to the GOK's failure to draft implementing regulations. Kuwait remains a poor performer, even by regional standards, on the protection of intellectual property rights and the rights of foreign workers. Kuwait has also not been sufficiently forthright in its support of efforts to find a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, an issue of professed importance to it. It has not yet ratified all of the major international conventions against terrorism, most notably the convention on the suppression of terrorist finance. 3. (C) With the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime, our overall relations with Kuwait are probably as good now as they've ever been since the immediate aftermath of liberation. However, potential future problems are already surfacing. The occasion of the inauguration of a new National Assembly and a new Council of Ministers in Kuwait, including a "new" Prime Minister, provides an excellent opportunity to review the current state of relations and to consider our most pressing priorities for the future as well as how best to accomplish them. Paragraphs 10 - 15 contain our key recommendations. -------------------------- The State of Relations -------------------------- 4. (C) Political Issues: Notwithstanding our stunning victory over Saddam's forces on the battlefield, the bilateral relationship is currently burdened by a widely held perception among Kuwaitis that the USG has not properly acknowledged Kuwait's indispensable role in the liberation of Iraq. This sentiment was fueled by the last-minute cancellation of President Bush's planned visit, and the fact that primary Iraq reconstruction contracts have been given only to US contractors. The GOK is already fretting about our ability to stay the course in Iraq while some private Kuwaitis gripe at perceived slights such as lack of adequate (in their eyes) support for TF Hope, the Kuwaiti task force hunting for Kuwaitis missing in Iraq from the Gulf War. UN Compensation Commission issues also bear close scrutiny as potentially huge negatives. There is little understanding here of the positive role the US played in the negotiation of UNSC 1483 to preserve contributions to the UN Compensation Fund. Over time, continued US requests for GOK resource contributions for various projects could also gradually help erode the overall relationship. 5. (S) Somewhat paradoxically, the removal of the Iraqi threat may negatively alter our ability to advance important US objectives such as women's suffrage and the extension of labor law to domestic servants in the coming year. Prior to the conflict in Iraq, GOK action on such progressive issues - issues sometimes vehemently opposed by Islamist and other sectors of Kuwait's generally conservative society - was often undertaken simply out of fear that inaction would damage the U.S./Kuwaiti relationship. In other words, regardless of the merits of the arguments or positions advocated by the USG, they were often sold - if tacitly - to the Kuwaiti public as necessary for maintaining the special strategic/security relationship with its ultimate security guarantor, the United States. With the backdrop of this security threat removed, the GOK will likely meet with less success on divisive issues such as women's suffrage or the extension of labor rights (even if it chooses to push them) until a stronger domestic constituency for these issues arises. In addition, the election of a National Assembly where so-called Independents have the potential to provide swing votes on many issues may prove a further obstacle to the successful passage of progressive reform, particularly if a cohesive Islamist opposition emerges. As evidenced by the furor over the former Minister of Education's comments vis-a-vis education reform, Islamist demagogues are more than ready to try to tar any initiative that can be deemed un-Islamic and/or is associated with the West as being raised solely due to U.S. "interference" in domestic political matters. It is difficult to exaggerate the level of sensitivity to any perceived imposition of Western culture. US initiatives in key areas of women's suffrage, reform of education and extension of labor law to domestics will inevitably put us at cross purposes with some GOK constituencies. 6. (S/NOFORN) Military Cooperation Issues: Although military-military cooperation remains generally excellent, there are already some signs of deterioration in this area as well. The GOK recently informed us that it has decided to cancel its participation in Exercise Lucky Sentinel, the only bilateral joint and combined exercise on the books. (This decision seems to be budget driven and possibly subject to change.) They are also pushing back on Burden Sharing support under the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement for our planned long-term deployment of an augmented Brigade Combat Team (15,000 US troops) and dragging their feet on Camp Arifjan upgrades (which could delay our planned early 2005 departure from Camp Doha) and on previous commitments to upgrades at Al Jaber and Al Salem Airbases. Meanwhile, delays in the search for POW's, continued high throughput of USG officials and Iraqis without proper documentation (visas) on short notice are a potential political irritant that might eventually impact on mil-mil relations. On the other hand, a bright spot is that the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff are known quantities with whom we've worked well. 7. (S/NOFORN) Counter-Terrorism/Security Issues: The USG has enjoyed excellent cooperation from the various Kuwaiti government organs involved in counter terrorism and security issues since the terrorist attacks of September 11, culminating in a number of new cooperative initiatives during the war in Iraq. Many of these initiatives, aimed at countering potential Iraqi threats, were worked at a vigorous pace before and during the war, leading to extreme fatigue on the part of Kuwaiti services. The Kuwaiti State Security (KSS) Service, overworked during the war, will no doubt slow its pace somewhat as it focuses on its move to a new headquarters this fall. Most KSS officers of senior rank are planning long vacations beginning in late July or August 2003, returning to work just prior to the move in October. The KSS still has an interim director and many officers are suffering from chronically poor morale as a result of public criticism (fueled by allegations of abuse from extremists arrested or questioned by KSS) and their perceived lack of adequate compensation. All of the above issues will likely contribute to an anticipated slowing in joint counter-terrorism efforts in the near term. Moreover, leadership on this front, which should come from the Minister of Interior, remains a question mark, as we have relatively little experience with the newly named minister. Nonetheless, physical security provided by the Ministry of Interior should remain fully adequate and we expect no diminution in this regard. Kuwaiti support is also expected to remain strong on military security issues. The well-respected director of the Kuwaiti military intelligence (KMI) service, Brigadier General Khalid al-Jarrah al-Sabah, has been informally named the new J-2 for the Ministry of Defense, insuring a proactive senior interlocutor in military security issues for the foreseeable future. On the political level, the continued detention of 12 Kuwait at GTMO could become an irritant as the detainees' families and their sympathizers periodically stir the pot. 8. (C) Commercial Issues: Commercial relations are a relatively bright spot in bilateral relations. We've won several contracts for American companies recently and US firms are well positioned to be big players in the development of Kuwait's northern oil fields. However, the terms offered thus far are not at all attractive. The status of the Amir's commitment on the Al Zour North power project also remains elusive. (The Ambassador recently transmitted Secretary of Commerce Evan's letter to the Prime Minister SIPDIS asking for reaffirmation of this commitment - by "employing US firms to supply equipment and services necessary for the development of this power project.") Such advocacy demands will continue, potentially alienating domestic constituencies already disappointed by the alleged lack of success thus far of Kuwaiti companies in securing contracts on Iraq reconstruction programs. An upside, however, could be growing cooperation between US and Kuwaiti firms to exploit commercial opportunities in Iraq. 9. (C) Economic Reform Issues: Cooperation on economic policy issues remains perhaps the most disappointing area of our bilateral relationship. Without significant further progress on the protection of intellectual property rights this year, Kuwait should be put on the Special 301 Priority Watch List. GOK tax policy and offset requirements as well as the GOK's failure to conform to its WTO obligations are also potentially serious negatives. In developing our program to address these and other economic issues with Kuwait, we will emphasize the win-win aspects of market-based reform. Rather than emphasize the IPR revenue that U.S. exporters lose to counterfeiters of software and entertainment products, for example, we will quantify the costs to Kuwait's importers, distributors and its nascent IPR industry. Rather than dwell on past stumbles in our bilateral efforts toward economic and regulatory reform, we will attempt to tie progressive GOK actions to beneficial regional or multilateral steps at the WTO and elsewhere. The same strategy will be applied to the issue of the inequity in Kuwait's treatment of foreign workers, by highlighting the increased productivity that enlightened labor law produces over time. -------------------------- Achieving the Bilateral Agenda -------------------------- 10. (C) It is an axiom of international diplomacy that a downturn in bilateral relations follows any great effort in a common cause. In the case of Kuwait, the GOK leadership and the majority of the country's elites have stood steadfastly with the US against Iraq at some cost to their relations with their Muslim/Arab neighbors. While they had very good reasons for doing so--Kuwaitis needed no reminder of the existential threat they faced from Saddam--it must be said that their support for us during OIF exceeded our expectations. Now that that threat has been removed we must show our friends here that the US continues to value its friendship and commitment to Kuwait, and that we do not view the country merely as a cash cow for international commitments or as a parking lot for regional military forces. While Kuwait continues to be a moderate and relatively (by Arab world standards) progressive society, even Desert Storm and OIF did not completely inoculate it against the wider political currents sweeping the Muslim world. Lacking personal experience with liberation, younger Kuwaitis are particularly vulnerable to these contagions. Our strategies to effect the changes enumerated above should be conducted in a manner that supports reform without allowing our opponents to convince the average Kuwaiti that we are wantonly interfering in domestic affairs. We must therefore be prepared to articulate clearly the reasons behind our requests, why we feel we have a stake in the issues and how our proposals will benefit Kuwait as well as the US. These are sometimes difficult tasks to accomplish; we will then need Washington's active support to succeed. Our key recommendations are given below. 11. (C) Political Issues: -- Increased visits by high-level USG officials (including the Secretary, and hopefully, the President) this fall would do much to reverse the ongoing erosion in relations due to local concerns that Kuwait's contributions to OIF have not been sufficiently recognized by the USG. Such visits would also help to bolster Shaykh Sabah at an early stage of his tenure as Prime Minister and could energize him to act on issues of importance to us sooner than otherwise. -- If visits to Kuwait are not feasible for the Secretary/President, an invitation for Shaykh Sabah to visit SIPDIS Washington in the fall would be well received, although it would not have the same domestic resonance in Kuwait as a visit here. -- With regard to specific issues, our highest priorities are women's suffrage, educational reform and trafficking in persons, primarily a labor reform issue here. All lie in the sensitive socio/religious field. They will be our toughest nuts to crack. Given the political environment, our work on such issues must be persistent but low-key. -- Substantive embassy sections are coordinating closely with one another to target post's MEPI proposals effectively and accurately to build domestic constituencies in favor of reform. Specific suggestions include an increase in exchanges between influential Kuwaitis and U.S. NGO's focusing on advancing the role of women in political life. -- Facilitation of contacts between the National Assembly and the US Congress could also be beneficial. We need to work harder to arrange visits to Washington by key parliamentarians and to exploit the temporary surge in CODEL's passing through Kuwait to set up meetings with important counterparts in the National Assembly as well as with GOK officials. 12. (S/NOFORN) Military Cooperation: -- While we should not rule out active participation in coalition activities outside Kuwait's borders, the true military value of this partnership lies in Kuwait's strategic location and readiness to provide a base of operations. Although Kuwait is currently resisting increasing levels of requested burden sharing support, this probably reflects fiscal realities and a perception of the elimination of their principal threat more than anything else. We should have little real difficulty maintaining a significant US military presence (primarily land forces) while focusing our engagement with the Kuwaitis on bilateral exercises, training and military sales targeted to give needed capabilities. -- A robust slate of engagement activities is critical to honing KAF capabilities, maintaining personal relationships with key military and GOK leaders, and providing a stable foundation for continued activities in Iraq, as well as for any potential future requirements in the GWOT. Planned enhancements to Camp Arifjan, to which we should move the bulk of our forces in early 2005, and upgrades to the two airbases will support this and should be pushed. -- The US must also make every attempt to ensure interoperability of Kuwait's military with our own and their willingness to employ it if needed. Continuance of a full slate of bilateral exercises will help ensure this and must be stressed continuously. Such continued engagement activities should stress the global terrorist nature of the threat (ala Saudi 12 May 03 attacks) and the capabilities Kuwait needs to defend against similar threats. -- Several bilateral activities this fall and/or early 2004 could serve all these goals: a meeting of the bilateral Defense Review Group followed by a visit of the Minister of Defense to the US, during which a meeting of the Joint Military Commission could take place for the first time since 1999. 13. (S/NOFORN) Counter-Terrorism/Security: -- As threats related to Iraq continue to diminish we will be able to focus even greater attention on foreign and domestic Sunni extremists such as al-Qa'ida members and sympathizers, as well as Iranian sponsored threats and local Hizbullah elements. This will mean turning even more attention to potential threats from Kuwaiti citizens-a very sensitive political issue for KSS, KMI and the Ministry of Interior. It will surely take time and considerable patient effort to re-energize the Kuwaiti security forces and focus them on working jointly on our perceived priority threats. -- Continued high level visits from ORCA HQ and invitations to the Minister of Interior to visit there will be crucial in nurturing these efforts. We May also wish to consider visits by senior FBI and Department of Justice Officials, as well as by State's Coordinator for Counter-terrorism and the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, perhaps in conjunction with any future visits to Iraq. 14. (C) Commercial: -- We will continue to pursue advocacy requests energetically, including through written appeals from senior Administration officials on high-value cases, such as Project Kuwait and the al-Zour North power plant. However, we should recognize the limitations of such approaches. -- To adequately exploit the many commercial opportunities likely to be available in Kuwait in the coming two years, full staffing of the embassy's FCS section will be essential. We also encourage Washington to reconsider our previous proposal for the establishment of a trade and investment promotion office in Kuwait. -- This will help to get the GOK and Kuwaiti private sector more actively engaged on Iraqi reconstruction. Mobilizing private investment and job creation is much more important than any concessional assistance we can possibly wring out of the GOK. 15. (C) Economic Reform: -- Based on our consultations with industry representatives, relevant USG agencies and WTO guidelines, we will engage the GOK with specific proposals to achieve reform of all major IPR areas, including amendments to its copyright law and improved inter-ministerial cooperation on enforcement. We will promote industry-designed seminars and training programs on combating piracy. We will work with EB's IPR office to adapt to Kuwait's environment an enforcement model that USTR has recommended for Poland. -- On economic and regulatory reform issues, we will lay the groundwork by encouraging Kuwait's return to long-suspended negotiations on a Double-Taxation Treaty. A Bilateral Investment Treaty and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement may also be potentially negotiable. USTR is preparing summaries of USG's earlier positions on a BIT and Double-Taxation Treaty. The GOK meanwhile is documenting its earlier positions and formulating an initial offer. -- On terrorist finance, in the short term, we will encourage the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Kuwait to nominate officers for U.S. Department of the Treasury Anti-Terrorist Financing and Money-Laundering Courses. We will also work with the GOK to prepare a base-line study of GOK actions on freeze requests up until this time. JONES |