Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KUWAIT3044
2003-07-03 01:06:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

TERRORIST FINANCING: POST IN-HOUSE VIEWS ON

Tags:  EFIN ETTC PTER PREL PGOV KU 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T KUWAIT 003044 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GLASS)
STATE FOR S/CT (FOX)
STATE FOR IO/PHO (PEREZ)
STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/RA
TREASURY FOR GENERAL COUNSEL AUFHAUSER
TREASURY FOR OFAC DIRECTOR NEWCOMB
TREASURY FOR DASS FOR TERRORISM AND VIOLENT CRIMES (ZARATE)
TREASURY FOR TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FINANCING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2013
TAGS: EFIN ETTC PTER PREL PGOV KU
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCING: POST IN-HOUSE VIEWS ON
POTENTIAL HAMAS-LINKED TARGETS FOR ASSET FREEZE DESIGNATION

REF: A. A. STATE 194837

B. B. STATE 193410

C. C. KUWAIT 1221

D. D. STATE 79970

Classified By: PER REFTEL B DTG 030106Z JUL 03

S E C R E T KUWAIT 003044

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GLASS)
STATE FOR S/CT (FOX)
STATE FOR IO/PHO (PEREZ)
STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/RA
TREASURY FOR GENERAL COUNSEL AUFHAUSER
TREASURY FOR OFAC DIRECTOR NEWCOMB
TREASURY FOR DASS FOR TERRORISM AND VIOLENT CRIMES (ZARATE)
TREASURY FOR TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FINANCING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2013
TAGS: EFIN ETTC PTER PREL PGOV KU
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCING: POST IN-HOUSE VIEWS ON
POTENTIAL HAMAS-LINKED TARGETS FOR ASSET FREEZE DESIGNATION

REF: A. A. STATE 194837

B. B. STATE 193410

C. C. KUWAIT 1221

D. D. STATE 79970

Classified By: PER REFTEL B DTG 030106Z JUL 03


1. (S) Summary: Post-election Kuwait's somewhat defused
political environment offers greater latitude than before for
USG action. Post confirms Ref C recommendation that absent
substantive evidence linking certain Islamic charities to
terrorist activity, USG interests might best be served via
collaboration with GOK oversight authorities and perhaps
select officials of the concerned charities as well. Should
such efforts fail, E.O. 13224 designation immediately would
be appropriate. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) In response to Ref B request for update, Post
confirms Ref C core recommendations regarding the Social
Reform Society (Jamiyat al-Islah al-Ijtima 'Ikuwait) (SRS).
Absent substantive evidence of SRS key management witting
support for terrorism, USG might consider a direct approach
to SRS leadership. This would follow consultation with the
GOK's new Office of Charity Oversight and Supervision (OCOS)
within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. A
collaborative review of our concerns, first with the GOK and
then, if appropriate, with responsible SRS leadership is the
preferred approach in our view. Concerns about the activities
of satellite offices, e.g., Amman, Jordan, could be addressed
simultaneously.


3. (S/NF) Post suggests a similar approach regarding the
International Islamic Charity Organization (IICO) (aka:
International Islamic Charitable Society) and its various
subsidiaries and associated entities. IICO appears to have a
good reputation locally. Absent substantive information
suggesting it inappropriate, a direct approach offers us
opportunity to test the feasibility of bringing on board
responsible elements within the OCOS and perhaps the
charities themselves.


4. (S/NF) The post-election environment in Kuwait provides
USG greater latitude than earlier. SRS's political arm, the
Islamic Constitutional Movement, lost four of its six
National Assembly seats on 5 July. That cut in the charity's
political popularity and the onset of the summer vacation
doldrums present a more stable political environment than
that described in Ref C.


5. (S) Should low-key pursuit of responsible action by the
charities' leadership and the GOK oversight authorities fail,
immediate public designation under E.O. 13224 would become
Post's preference. It is unclear to us now, however, what
special benefit could be gained by going public first without
at least having tried the collaborative and consultative
route that remains our preferred first option.
JONES