wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy  Privacy
03KUWAIT2668 2003-06-17 14:35:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  


pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 002668 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2013

REF: A. STATE 157973

B. STATE 163613

Classified By: DCM Frank C. Urbancic, for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

1. (C) Ambassador called on Kuwait's First Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmed June 17 to
register U.S. views on the need to shut down all types of
support for Hamas. Drawing on points in ref (a) and
non-paper in ref (b), Ambassador emphasized that the U.S.
wanted to work with all the states in the region to bring
peace to Palestinians. Hamas, unfortunately, was a direct
threat to this goal and it was important for the U.S. to work
with its friends in the region to block funds that are, in
many cases, sent to Hamas in the misguided belief that it was
supporting bona fide charity. He emphasized as well that the
U.S. freeze on assets of six individuals and four
organizations would be imposed on Thursday, June 19, and he
asked for Kuwaiti support and similar action.

2. (C) Sabah replied that the U.S. could be sure that Kuwait
supported the goal of staunching the flow of money to
terrorist organizations. Known Hamas members, such as Khalid
Meshaal, were persona non grata in Kuwait. Shaykh Sabah was
unaware of any actual Hamas activities in Kuwait, but he said
that the government had already given instructions to all of
its agencies to ensure that charitable contributions were, in
fact, channeled through verifiably charitable organizations.
Hamas was not one of those and the government would certainly
oppose any use of Hamas as a financial channel into the
territories. He asked in addition that the U.S. provide any
additional information to the Kuwaitis on activities that it
believes might be going on in Kuwait. If this information is
available, the GOK will certainly act, Sabah assured the

3. (C) On Palestinian-Israeli issues, Sabah said he was now
more hopeful than he had been in a long time. He sensed that
both sides might now be ready to come to an agreement. While
he acknowledged that the Arabs had a role to play with the
Palestinians. He underscored the need for firm U.S.
treatment of the Israelis. The Ambassador reminded Sabah
that the President had already been quite critical in his
comments about the Israeli attack on Rantissi. He said that
the U.S. was fully committed to the roadmap and we were
looking for full partners to push it forward.

4. (C) Finally, the Ambassador emphasized that the issue of
support for terrorist organizations was extremely sensitive
in the U.S. Assistant Secretary Burns had been questioned
sharply on Arab activities in this regard during his recent
testimony before the House International Relations Committee
on June 12. It was crucial for Kuwait to keep its reputation
intact on the Hill by taking serious steps against Hamas