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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
03KUWAIT1221 2003-03-27 23:09:00 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

TERRORIST FINANCE: POST VETTING OF PROPOSED

Tags:   EFIN ETTC PTER PREL PGOV KU 
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					  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001221 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GLASS)
STATE FOR S/CT (FOX)
STATE FOR IO/PHO (PEREZ)
STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/RA
TREASURY FOR GENERAL COUNSEL AUFHAUSER
TREASURY FOR OFAC DIRECTOR NEWCOMB
TREASURY FOR DAS FOR TERRORISM AND VIOLENT CRIMES (ZARATE)
TREASURY FOR TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FINANCING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/24/2012
TAGS: EFIN ETTC PTER PREL PGOV KU
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: POST VETTING OF PROPOSED
TERRORIST FINANCE TARGETS

REF: STATE 79970

Classified By: Per Reference Telegram DTG 272309Z MAR 03

1.(S) Two of the proposed terrorist finance designation
targets described in reftel have significance for Kuwait. As
requested, post provides the following comments on these two
entities.



2. (S) Abdullah Al-Nafisi: Post foresees no significant
negative reaction to the designation of Al-Nafisi, and
believes the GOK has the legal authority, administrative
capability, and political will to enforce such a designation
if it is confirmed by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee.



3. (S/NF) Social Reform Society (SRS) and subsidiaries:
Post notes that it is difficult to judge the credibility of
these allegations without seeing the reports upon which they
are based, and requests that such reports be provided to post
through ORCA channels for review as soon as possible.



4. (S) The SRS designation was originally proposed in late
2001, but the USG ultimately decided not to propose
designation at that time, for reasons unknown to post. To
our recollection, we were never actually instructed to engage
the GOK to express our concerns about SRS. The allegations
now presented appear significantly broader and more detailed
than earlier reports. Post would welcome instructions to
share our concerns with the appropriate GOK officials, but
will need detailed and credible evidence that we can share to
do so.



5. (S) Clarifications: Please note that reftel summary
includes the Islamic Missionary Commission, which is another
name for the SRS branch committee Lajnat al-Daawa
al-Islamiyya (LDI, or Islamic Call Committee. LDI was
designated on January 9, 2003 and by the UN in February.
Post reported that the GOK has frozen at least KD 1.4 million
in LDI assets. Additionally, post is not aware of the
affiliation of the African Relief Agency with SRS, and
believe this may refer to the Africa Relief Committee,
another SRS subcommittee.



6. (S) Domestic Political Fallout: Public designation of
SRS, with National Assembly elections only a few months away,
would be a political bombshell. An untimely designation
could cause some to accuse the U.S. of trying to influence
the election and Kuwaiti internal politics. The Muslim
Brotherhood -affiliated SRS is closely tied with a small but
powerful political Islamist bloc in the National Assembly,
the Islamic Constitutional Movement. Conceivably, a
designation could garner the group sympathy, and cause their
representation and influence to grow; or it could discredit
the group causing them to lose seats and power. We would
recommend discussing such issues fully with senior GOK
officials before proceeding.



7. (S) Bilateral Political Fallout: An SRS designation would
be big news in Kuwait. If not handled properly, it could
become an unwelcome irritant in the bilateral relationship.
There is also a risk that it could distract GOK officials
from their unwavering support for our current war effort and
undercut broad local public support at a time when we need it
most.



8. (S) Recommendation: On balance, we would suggest that a
public designation of SRS and/or its branches be delayed
until after hostilities cease in Iraq. In the meantime, we
note that reftel admits there is no evidence SRS's key
management wittingly supports terrorism. We would suggest a
direct approach to senior SRS officials to share our
allegations and allow them to clean house quietly. (Such an
approach would have to be previously discussed and
coordinated with the GOK. Indeed, the GOKs new office of
Charity Oversight and Supervision, housed in the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Labor, could be a valuable partner in this
effort, which could serve as a springboard for a combined
technical assistance mission and joint investigation.)
Should SRS officials refuse to cooperate, an immediate
designation of the branches would be politically more
palatable. However, given the apparent lack of evidence on
SRS Kuwait complicity in terrorist finance, and the
precedents of the designation of branches (but not the main
office) of the SRS and the Revival of Islamic Heritage
Society based on a similar pattern of evidence, we would not
recommend the designation of the parent SRS operation in
Kuwait at this stage.
JONES