NEPAL: KING KEEPS PARTIES AT BAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000961

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2013
TAGS: PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: KING KEEPS PARTIES AT BAY

REF: A. KATHMANDU 0942

B. KATHMANDU 0814

C. KATHMANDU 0684

Classified By: CDA ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) His public and private statements of support for the
principle of multiparty democracy notwithstanding, King
Gyanendra continues to hold mainstream political parties at
arm's length. Contrary to recent widespread expectations, he
has taken no visible steps to form an all-party government.
Instead, Cabinet ministers have continued--presumably with
royal sanction--to criticize the behavior and past
performance of party leaders. The political parties,
meanwhile, remain unable to shape a persuasive argument for
their inclusion in an interim Cabinet or a coordinated
political platform, and their joint protests so far have
attracted scant popular support. Political and diplomatic
contacts are uncertain why the King continues to resist
making an overture to the parties. Some sources suggest that
Maoist insurgents may have told the Palace that they will
break off dialogue if an all-party government is appointed.
Alternatively, the King may believe that the ceasefire and an
ongoing anti-corruption campaign (septel) are gaining him
sufficient popular good will to put off dealing with the
parties for the time being. Long-standing mutual distrust
between the parties and the Palace is undoubtedly a factor as
well. End summary.

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PARTIES' PROLONGED "JOINT STIR"
CAUSES LITTLE COMMOTION
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2. (SBU) Five mainstream political parties continued their
combined protest program, or "joint stir," for the third week
(Ref B) to little apparent avail. (Note: The parties have
pledged to continue the protests until the Constitution is
"reactivated" by the appointment of an all-party interim
government with full executive authority. End note.) The
demonstrations have remained largely peaceful, although
police reportedly baton charged participants in a May 18
protest in Kathmandu. Although party officials routinely
declare each daily program a grand success, so far the
protests appear to have attracted little popular support or
participation beyond professional party activists and members
of affiliated student wings. The Maoists have not taken part
publicly in any of the daily demonstrations, and the Maoist
student wing has been busy conducting its own independent
protest campaign against private schools. (Note: No
international schools have been targeted in this campaign.
End note.) Despite their consecutive protests, the parties,
moreover, remain unable to articulate either a persuasive
public argument for their inclusion in an interim Cabinet or
a coordinated political platform.

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NO TEA, NO SYMPATHY
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3. (C) The tepid turnout at their protest rallies is not the
only disappointment for the parties, however. The leaders of
the largest political parties--as well as members of several
diplomatic missions, including the generally well-informed
Indians--were expecting, based on firm indications from
well-placed Palace sources, King Gyanendra to take steps to
form an all-party government in early May. (Note: Party
leaders in both the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist
Leninist and the Nepali Congress have indicated to us that
they were led to expect a similar development on at least two
previous occasions in December and February. End note.)
Some of the leaders reportedly were told to expect an
invitation to a Palace "tea party" o/a May 2 (the vernacular
press was even reporting the invitations as faits accomplis)
in which the King was supposed to ask them to form a new
interim government. Some party sources say that leaders of
the two largest parties had already agreed among themselves,
if asked, that UML Secretary Madhav Nepal would head the new
government. Instead of the anticipated invitations to tea
and royal reconciliation, on May 2 the parties heard a
televised address by Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand
that chastised them for their poor performance over the past
twelve years of democracy. The failure of the rumored
rapprochement to materialize as expected has only increased
the party leaders' mistrust of the Palace.
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WHY KEEP THE PARTIES OUT?
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4. (C) Given the several occasions that the Palace has been
rumored to be on the brink of forming an all-party
government, and given the likely political and diplomatic
support for such a step, the question arises why nothing has
happened. (Note: The King so far has never granted the
parties' long-standing request for a joint meeting. The
Prime Minister, on the other hand, continues to invite them
to all-party meetings--most recently on May 23--which they
consistently boycott in protest of the "unconstitutionality"
of his government. End note.) Citing the King's frequent
public statements of support for multi-party democracy and
his desire to remain no more than a constitutional monarch, a
UML source noted that there is no ostensible philosophical
difference between the King and the parties on how the
interim government should be constituted. Moreover, being
left out in the cold for more than seven months has
transformed long-time rivals G.P. Koirala, head of the Nepali
Congress, and Madhav Nepal, leader of the UML, into
temporary, if unlikely, allies, thereby belying the King's
original justification for bypassing the parties--their
inability to agree on a single candidate.


5. (C) One theory holds that the Maoists, whose strategy
appears to hinge on keeping the parties and the Palace
divided, may have secretly told the Palace that they will not
negotiate with an all-party government. In particular, the
Maoists are widely believed to oppose a government led by the
UML, which they consider a rival for leftist support. Since
the members of the current interim Cabinet were all
hand-picked by the King and are widely assumed to work in
close consultation with him, the Maoists may reason that
negotiating with the current Cabinet is the closest they can
get to negotiating directly with the King. The Palace may be
unwilling to jeopardize the little progress made to date
toward dialogue with the insurgents by introducing a less
predictable, less pliable, and more partisan Cabinet at
mid-stream. Both the Government of Nepal (GON) and the
Maoists may have decided, some believe, that retaining the
Chand Cabinet during the negotiations is the simplest
alternative available, at least for the near term.


6. (C) Most political sources, however, believe the King has
not brought the parties on board because he wants a more
active role in governing. Sources who knew the monarch as a
businessman describe him as a "hands-on" manager, unlikely to
be content with the detached role and circumscribed powers of
his late brother. These sources interpret several of the
King's moves since October, including a royal ordinance
limiting government oversight of the Palace budget; the
appointment of Sharad Chandra Shah, a notorious anti-democrat
from the autocratic Panchayat era as advisor to the PM; the
PM's uncompromising, critical speech of May 2; and the recent
anti-corruption drive (septel) as virtual "in-your-face"
challenges to the parties, and thus evidence of this
purported ambition.


7. (C) The King may also believe that he is better able to
address the many challenges besetting Nepal than the feckless
democratic leaders. He could argue that he has been able to
respond to the two most pressing public concerns--peace and
corruption--by securing a ceasefire, resuming dialogue with
the Maoists, and initiating an intensive anti-corruption
campaign (septel). In addition, the GON can point with pride
to a number of reforms (many of which were initiated,
however, under earlier democratic governments) that have
earned it high praise--and increased levels of funding--from
international financial institutions (Ref A). Adding to his
confidence may be the parties' failure so far to generate
greater public support for their protests, contrasted with
the relatively large (if equally stage-managed) reception to
his own public appearances (Ref C).

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COMMENT
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8. (C) There are a number of plausible reasons why the King
has not yet made an overture to include the parties.
Possible Maoist objection to an all-party government, coupled
with the precarious nature of the peace process, may be the
most persuasive. The absence of public indignation (and, in
some quarters, the appearance of tacit support) at his
actions since dismissing the Deuba government on October 4
may also influence his thinking. But the number of rumored
false starts, in which the parties were apparently led to
believe an all-party government was imminent, is disturbing
and can only contribute to the atmosphere of debilitating
mutual distrust. Inserting himself so near the forefront of
government operations also carries an implicit risk for the
King, making him more visibly responsible for both its
successes and failures. Any lasting political resolution to
the insurgency will, moreover, require the support of the
political parties. The King should enlist the support of all
the legal and democratic forces--including the all-too-often
difficult and intractable political parties--in the GON
effort to craft a workable resolution to the conflict. Some
contacts tell us that the King is torn by conflicting advice
within the Palace, but his current lack of initiative may
prove to be a regrettable squandering of political
opportunity.
BOGGS