Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU657
2003-04-10 09:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

CEASEFIRE BRINGS UNEASY PEACE TO NEPAL'S NORTHEAST

Tags:  PTER PGOV CASC NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KATHMANDU 000657 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
STATE ALSO PLEASE PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA
MANILA PLEASE PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA
LONDON FOR POL/REIDEL
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2013
TAGS: PTER PGOV CASC NP
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE BRINGS UNEASY PEACE TO NEPAL'S NORTHEAST

REF: A. 02 KATHMANDU 1970

B. 02 KATHMANDU 2151

C. 02 KATHMANDU 914

Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5(b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KATHMANDU 000657

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
STATE ALSO PLEASE PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA
MANILA PLEASE PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA
LONDON FOR POL/REIDEL
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2013
TAGS: PTER PGOV CASC NP
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE BRINGS UNEASY PEACE TO NEPAL'S NORTHEAST

REF: A. 02 KATHMANDU 1970

B. 02 KATHMANDU 2151

C. 02 KATHMANDU 914

Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5(b,d)


1. Summary: On an April 2-3 trip to northeastern Dolakha
district, PolOff and PolFSN met with civil servants, police
and local business owners. The district has remained quiet
since the January 29 declaration of nationwide cease-fire,
though some non-violent Maoist activities continue. Civil
servants are returning to most villages, and government
services are resuming, leading most locals to assume that
lasting peace is at hand. Contacted sources said that
international pressure, internal dissatisfaction and supply
problems have contributed to the willingness of the Maoists
to negotiate. Sources also stated that Maoist support in the
district derives exclusively from fear, and that
international pressure will be necessary to ensure that
Maoist leaders accept election results. Hope for peace in
the district sometimes borders on desperation, and is coupled
with a strong anxiety about what to do with the now-armed
Maoist soldiers. Local leaders say that Maoist cadres expect
to be absorbed into the Royal Nepal Army as part of any
eventual peace agreement. End summary.

SECURITY SITUATION: LIVE AND LET LIVE
--------------


2. (U) On April 2 and 3, PolOff and PolFSN met with
government leaders and business owners in northeastern
Dolakha district, seeking information about local conditions
since the January 29 declaration of a cease-fire between the
Government of Nepal (GON) and Maoist insurgents. Prior to
the cease-fire, Dolakha had experienced a relatively high
level of Maoist activity for the Eastern region, though the
number of reported killings--approximately 50--is less than
in some surrounding districts. All police posts but two were
destroyed in the seven-year insurgency, along with all post
offices. The District Headquarters at Charikot was the
target of several small-scale attacks that damaged nearby
buildings. In Jiri, the district's second largest town,

Maoists destroyed an MI-17 helicopter in a night-time raid,
shot and killed a political activist in the crowded central
market, and robbed the main bank in broad daylight. In
October 2002, Maoists did approximately USD 1 million damage
to the Norwegian-financed Khimti Hydropower plant on the
district border (ref A). The district's highways were the
scene of several attacks on civilian vehicles, including a
November 2002 landmine attack on a crowded passenger bus (ref
B) and a May 2002 attack on a Pepsi truck (ref C). Sources
in Charikot (including GON civil servants, police and local
politicians and business leaders) indicated that Maoists have
often used Dolakha as a staging ground for attacks into
neighboring districts, because of its central location and
good roads.


3. (C) Since the declaration of a nationwide cease-fire, the
local Maoists have been living in an uneasy truce with
government forces and the population. There have been no
reported violations of the code of conduct, but according to
Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Thakur Ram Bartaula,
armed Maoist cadre still patrol some areas of the district in
combat dress, demanding food and shelter from villagers.
Police and Royal Nepal Army (RNA) personnel from the two
remaining police and army posts do not typically venture more
than 15-20 kilometers away from their post on patrol,
returning home each night and deliberately avoiding
Maoist-populated areas in order to preclude the possibility
of a clash that might upset the peace. Activity by the
security forces has focused on preserving the
telecommunication infrastructure remaining in Charikot, and
on "dominating" the Jiri-Kathmandu highway. Curfews have
been abolished.


4. (SBU) There are 17 suspected Maoists in police custody in
Charikot. Representatives of INSEC, a human rights NGO
affiliated with the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist
Leninists (UML),insist that only a few are 'actual' Maoists,
and the rest are either unfortunate villagers who were
coerced into Maoist activity, or are simple cases of mistaken
identity. In one case, the human rights group alleges, a
woman has been jailed for 14 months because her husband is a
known Maoist. No charges have been filed against any of the
detainees.

MAOISTS HOLD MASS MEETINGS,
CONTINUE EXTORTION
--------------


5. (C) Bartaula reported that Maoists have held several mass
meetings since the start of the cease-fire. Police
intelligence suggests that the meetings have been attended by
Maoist supporters, criminals, locals dissatisfied with their
own political parties and some villagers afraid of
retribution if they do not attend.


6. (C) Some businesses, schools and travelers have reported
continued Maoist extortion after the cease-fire, but others
have been successful in refusing to pay. One hotel owner
explained that when a Maoist asked him for a "donation," he
simply stated that such things weren't allowed under the
cease-fire. Even before the truce, some organizations in
Dolakha had managed to negotiate their own agreements with
the Maoists. A large technical school in Jiri remained open
throughout the State of Emergency by convincing local Maoist
commanders that the practical training they offer is the type
of education the Maoists should support. A community school
in the same town, established by parents when the local
private boarding school was forced to close by the
insurgents, came to much the same arrangement. A
U.S.-affiliated medical research station got Maoist
"permission" to remain open because their clinic provides
free services to villagers.

GOVERNMENT SERVICES RETURNING TO VILLAGES
--------------


7. (SBU) Chief District Officer (CDO) Chandeshwore Acharya
told PolOff that most Village Development Committee (VDC)
Secretaries who had taken shelter in Charikot have returned

SIPDIS
to their villages. (Note: VDCs are the smallest unit of
local government. End note.) Those secretaries whose VDCs
are heavily populated by Maoists remain in the District
Headquarters. Almost all teachers have returned to their
schools and are holding classes, though Acharya suspects that
some teachers may be paying extortion money to the Maoists in
order to stay at their posts. Programs such as family
planning clinics, distribution of government funds to the
elderly and agricultural development assistance have returned
to some VDCs. Mail service reportedly has been restored in
all VDCs, though not all postal buildings have been rebuilt.


8. (SBU) Though road construction projects continued
throughout the State of Emergency, other development work had
been stalled by the lack of government representatives in
villages. According to Local Development Officer (LDO) Gopi
Khanal, work has resumed on conservation, telecommunication,
microenterprise and other projects throughout the district.
On April 2, the Local Development Office was full of
applicants for volunteer positions as project coordinators.

POLITICAL OPINION DIVIDED
--------------


9. (SBU) The Charikot office of the UML has organized a
"Campaign for Peace and Democracy," a road show of joint
meetings including speeches by both UML and Maoist local
leaders. Though UML representatives told PolOff that they
had "pressed the Maoists very hard" on their record of
violence and terrorism, INSEC representatives who attended
one of the organized meetings said that Maoist commanders
refused to apologize for their activities during the
insurgency. "Whatever we did, we did," the local commander
reportedly stated in a speech at the event. "That was all
during the war, and we're not going to apologize."


10. (SBU) When asked how local UML representatives viewed
the decision of their party's central leadership to talk with
Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai, given the kidnapping,
torture and murder of several UML party workers in Dolakha,
UML local party secretary Ananda Pokharel attributed the move
to "diplomatic relations." The UML wants to convince the
Maoists to give up violence in favor of politics, he said.
Rather than ostracizing the insurgents, the UML wants to
provide "a warm lap" into which the rebels can climb.
Pokharel also called on the King to work together with
political parties in order to preserve democracy. "The
parties are coming together," in his estimation, "but there
is still a big gap between the Palace and the parties. The
King should come a little bit down to us."


11. (SBU) Not all local representatives were as supportive of
policies from Kathmandu. In Jiri, where politicians are also
hotel owners and trekking guides, Nepali Congress (NC) and
UML representatives were openly critical of their parties'
leaders. "The leadership may blame the King for their
problems, but they caused their own troubles by not getting
along, and by focusing too much on the (Prime Minister's)
chair," said a former VDC representative for Nepali Congress.
"Here in Jiri, at election time, we all have our own flags
and our own slogans, and there are differences among us. But
after the election, we come together to work for the good of
the people. If the politicians at the center can't figure
that out, they should come here and learn from us." Other
local leaders of the predominantly UML town nodded in
agreement. "Peace is the most important thing," said one.
"People don't care about an all-party government or
restoration of the former Parliament. They just want to be
able to run their businesses and move around freely."

LOCALS LIVE IN FEAR, HOPE FOR PEACE
--------------


12. (U) The cease-fire has raised hopes that peace is on
the horizon. People in Jiri are pleased to see tourists
passing through again, and children in Charikot feel safe
enough to walk through town at night. With peace potentially
so close, the thought of returning to the curfews and terror
that existed prior to the cease-fire is not something that
the people of Dolakha care to contemplate. "The peace talks
have to succeed," said DSP Bartaula, echoing the sentiments
of government workers and private businessmen alike. "There
is simply no other option."


13. (SBU) Nevertheless, some villagers have been slow to
leave the safety of the District Headquarters to return to
their farms. Maoist commanders in the region reportedly have
told villagers that they will be safe if they return home,
but few people trust their motives. According to contacted
sources, fear is the insurgents' only source of support.
"People in Dolakha support the Maoists not from the heart,
but because of their guns," said LDO Khanal. "If they
surrender their guns, only one or two percent of the
population will support them." Local UML leadership agreed.
"If you take away their guns, the Maoists won't get a single
seat in any election," said Ananda Pokharel. "Their support
is based only on fear."

DOLAKHA'S MAOISTS FACE PRESSURE
FROM INSIDE AND OUT
--------------


14. (U) When asked why the Maoists have elected to pursue
peace talks, all respondents cited growing international
pressure as the primary impetus toward a cease-fire. They
also said that continued pressure would be necessary in order
to ensure that the Maoists accept the results of democratic
elections.


15. (C) In addition, internal pressure may have played a
role in forcing the Maoists to seek a settlement. According
to DSP Bartaula, police intelligence sources have reported
food problems and financial problems among the Maoists.
Local villagers are simply running out of resources to
extort. At the same time, said the DSP, the improved
standard of living of some Maoist commanders has caused a
great deal of resentment among the rank and file. The only
Maoist leader to be killed in the district bought a farm and
started building a house shortly before his death. Most
locals believe that he was subsequently killed by his own
dissatisfied troops.

PROBLEMS APLENTY IF PEACE BREAKS OUT
--------------


16. (SBU) Though they assume that peace is necessary and
therefore a given, local leaders are quick to point out a
host of problems that may arise in the future. Of primary
concern is the fact that the rank and file Maoists in Dolakha
are convinced that if there is a permanent cessation of
hostilities, they will be given positions in the Royal Nepal
Army. The CDO's office has seen a sharp increase in the
number of Maoists requesting citizenship cards, presumably
for eventual enlistment. According to INSEC, most villagers
are equally convinced. Their concern is not whether the
Maoists will be brought into the RNA, but rather how the
reorganization will be accomplished. "If the Maoist army is
just left as it is," warned the INSEC representatives, "peace
will not come smoothly."


17. (C) It won't come smoothly for a number of reasons,
according to contacted sources. One possibility is that some
Maoists simply may not obey orders to stop fighting; another
is that some Maoists may keep their weapons and turn to a
life of crime. "The economy is hard in Dolakha," said the
CDO. "A Maoist without a rifle has no chance to make a
living here at all. But once he has a gun, he can get a lot
of things." Maoists who stop fighting will face problems
other than economic, say police and human rights activists.
Those who were directly involved in extortion, kidnappings
and murder will be recognized, and may face retribution. DSP
Bartaula asked one Maoist prisoner why his brother, a local
unit commander, hadn't returned to his village following the
cease-fire. The prisoner reportedly replied, "He used to
bring 40 or 50 Maoists there to eat all the food. If he goes
back now, they'll break his legs."

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) Local leaders in Dolakha are firm in their belief
that the Maoists are serious about pursuing lasting peace.
The police seem certain that if they can just prolong the
cease-fire, the insurgency must necessarily come to an end.
However, most of the basis for this strongly held view
appears to come from nothing but the intense desire for it to
be true. Rumors of supply problems and dissatisfaction among
the Maoist soldiers, while offering some insight into
difficulties faced by the insurgents, do not prove that they
have lost their ability or their will to fight.
Nevertheless, the only problem that the local leaders were
interested in discussing was what to do with the Maoist cadre
when the war is over.


19. (C) The deliberate optimism in this northeastern
district, like the optimism in much of Nepal, is occasionally
tinged with a bit of desperation. "The peace talks must
succeed this time," is repeated like a mantra to ward off the
unspeakable-- the possibility that they might indeed fail.
If the Maoists really are as weary of war as the citizens of
Dolakha, and if the leaders of both sides take heed of that
fact, then there is every possibility that peace talks may
succeed. If they fail, then whoever is to blame will have a
very hard time explaining himself to the people of Dolakha.
MALINOWSKI