Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU656
2003-04-10 07:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: MAOISTS ON MEDIA OVERKILL; GOVERNMENT

Tags:  PTER PINR PGOV NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000656 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2013
TAGS: PTER PINR PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS ON MEDIA OVERKILL; GOVERNMENT
KEEPING OWN COUNSEL

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 0572


B. (B) KATHMANDU 0620

C. (C) KATHMANDU 0643

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E.MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

-------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000656

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2013
TAGS: PTER PINR PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS ON MEDIA OVERKILL; GOVERNMENT
KEEPING OWN COUNSEL

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 0572


B. (B) KATHMANDU 0620

C. (C) KATHMANDU 0643

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E.MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Since his emergence from under ground nearly two
weeks ago, Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai has dominated
the headlines and airwaves of the Nepali media. The Maoists
have used the opportunity to criticize the Government of
Nepal (GON) and the political parties for ineptitude; to
emphasize repeatedly their call for a constituent assembly to
draft a new constitution; to accuse the GON of deliberately
stalling the peace process; and to alter and increase their
demands. In contrast, the GON has been uncharacteristically
quiet, allowing the Maoists to occupy center stage virtually
unchallenged, at least for now. The GON's strategy of drawing
out the peace process for as long as possible may work up to
a point. There is some risk, however, that it may delay too
long and squander the momentum it has worked hard to develop.
The Maoist monologue in the media makes the political
parties, already complaining of being sidelined and ignored
by the Palace, appear increasingly superfluous. The Indian
Ambassador reports that the Maoists, still armed, are using
the threat of violence to extort and to enforce participation
at political rallies in the countryside. End summary.

--------------
BABURAM BLITZKRIEG
--------------


2. (SBU) Since his first public appearance at a
Maoist-staged press conference in Kathmandu on March 29 (Ref
A),revolutionary ideologue Baburam Bhattarai has become a
media staple, dominating the front pages and airwaves of both
the government-owned and independent news agencies nearly
non-stop for almost two weeks. Besides appearing at press
conferences, award ceremonies, and rallies, the heretofore
shadowy leader has been photographed meeting--and shaking
hands--with heads of the major political parties. These
meetings span the political spectrum, including the Maoists'
ideological rival Madhav Nepal, General Secretary of the
Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML),as

well as the aristocratic President of the right-wing,
pro-Palace National Democratic Party, Pashupati SJB Rana.
Following their large public rally in Kathmandu on April 3
(Ref B),Bhattarai and other members of the Maoist
negotiating team took their individual shows on the road,
with each hosting a "mass gathering" in five separate
locations on April 7: Bhattarai in far-western Nepalgunj;
military commander Ram Bahadur "Badal" Thapa in south-central
Chitwan; Krishna Mahara in southern Rupandehi; Matrika Yadav
in southeastern Rautahat; and Dev Gurung in north-central
Pokhara.

--------------
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY,
PRE-DIALOGUE DEMANDS DOMINATE
--------------


3. (SBU) Bhattarai and his colleagues have used their new
public podiums to underscore certain recurrent themes.
First, they assure their listeners that they are serious
about dialogue this time, their willingness to come to the
table impelled by the "strategic balance" between Government
of Nepal (GON) forces and their own. Second, they emphasize
(and re-emphasize) throughout their remarks that a
constituent assembly aimed at drafting an entirely new
constitution is the only way out of the current impasse. The
present constitution is dead, they assert (responsibility for
that death is variously assigned to the Palace or the
political parties, depending upon the audience); a new one
must thus be written from scratch. They generally decline to
be drawn into any discussion of the mechanics of how a
constituent assembly would operate or what specific parts of
the current constitution must be changed, other than to
suggest the absence of any "unalterable elements." (Note:
Most observers interpret this as a direct reference to the
monarchy and multi-party democracy, both of which are
stipulated in the "unalterable" preamble to the current
constitution. End note.) Third, they accuse the GON of
obstructing dialogue by delaying the formation of its
negotiating team and by refusing to meet the Maoists' more
recent demands, including the release of five prominent
Central Committee members still in GON detention. Fourth,
they threaten a return to violence if the peace initiative
fails. Other subsidiary themes frequently surface as well,
including appeals to the international community to meet
Maoist negotiators and to support their call for a
constituent assembly (often coupled with the contradictory
demand that foreign powers not interfere in the peace
process). Another consistent call is for armed Maoist cadres
to be absorbed into a new national army (the name of which,
of course, should then be changed from the Royal Nepal Army
to the People's Army) placed under the control of "the
people."


4. (SBU) On the few occasions when the five Maoist
negotiators have discussed their thinking in detail,
contradictory statements inevitably emerge. For example,
Krishna Mahara told a gathering of prominent local
businessmen that the Maoists do not oppose a market economy.
A few days later, Dev Gurung gave another group a
diametrically different interpretation of Maoist ideology,
concluding that the Maoists, if in power, would indeed oppose
a market economy and nationalize the nation's means of
production. A few days subsequently, Baburam Bhattarai, in
an apparent effort to explain the contradiction (or perhaps
to confuse his bewildered audience still further) offered the
opaque pronouncement that the Maoists differentiate between
"nationalist" and "anti-nationalist" capitalists, favoring
the former and opposing the latter. (Note: Many observers
interpreted "anti-nationalist" as a thinly veiled threat
against the influential Indian Marwari business community
here. End note.)

--------------
GOVERNMENT COMPARATIVELY QUIET
--------------


5. (SBU) Throughout the Maoists' media blitz, the GON has
been comparatively quiet, as if intentionally ceding center
stage to the insurgents. With the exception of the King's
public address in the far west on April 4 (Ref C),the GON
appears to have made little effort to counter the insurgents'
public relations campaign. When GON representatives do speak
publicly, their remarks and actions seem only to reinforce
Maoist claims. On March 30 Narayan Singh Pun, Minister for
Physical Planning and GON-appointed negotiator, conceded
publicly the Maoist argument that there are "two state
powers" in Nepal and averred that there is "a balance of
power between the government and the Maoists." The Maoists
are not terrorists, Pun further elaborated, because
terrorists have "no political base, whereas the Maoists were
supported by a huge mass of people." The following day,
Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand shared the dais with
Baburam Bhattarai at a press function, wherein the event
sponsor referred to Bhattarai as an "alternate prime
minister" and Chand was photographed grinning and pumping the
hand of the Maoist second-in-command (Ref C). (Note: The PM
was apparently not forewarned that Bhattarai would be there
and was reportedly furious for being blind-sided. End note.)
Not until one week later, on April 6, did Minister Pun pose
any objection to the barrage of Maoist accusations and
demands, noting that the GON "may not" accede to the
insurgents' call to release Maoist detainees as a
pre-condition to dialogue.


6. (C) Sources close to the Palace have told us that the
GON strategy for now is to spin out the pre-dialogue phase
for as long as possible. The GON believes that time is on
its side, and that every day of peace under the ceasefire
increases popular distaste for a return to violence and thus
erodes support for the Maoists. The strategy is to eschew
engaging in lengthy, contentious public debates with the
Maoists about their particular issues--from the constituent
assembly to integrating the People's Army--and focus instead
on broad-brush humanitarian and social matters likely to gain
public sympathy. Hence the GON delay in naming members to
its negotiating team, let alone discussing possible agenda
items for eventual talks. One GON source, elucidating this
strategy, indicated that by giving the Maoists free rein to
expound their doctrine in the media, the GON hopes to expose
to the public the shallowness and hypocrisy of the
insurgents' ideology. There is also an expectation in
government and media quarters that the sustained limelight
will strip away the Maoists' mystique as secretive
revolutionaries and reveal them, like other party leaders, as
self-serving politicians.

--------------
ARMY REACTION
--------------


7. (C) While the GON is keeping its own counsel for now,
the leadership of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) is privately
letting its dissatisfaction with the situation be known. On
April 7, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Pyar Jung Thapa
complained to the Ambassador that the RNA had agreed only to
a ceasefire--not to carte blanche for the Maoists to travel
all over the country and hold mass meetings. He also
expressed dismay at the number of Maoist prisoners that have
been released since the ceasefire. (Note: The total number
of prisoners released thus far is unclear. The Home Ministry
has estimated that 100 detainees have been set free but is
awaiting data from the districts to finalize the tally. A
source at the Supreme Court estimated the total to be 200.
End note.) In the meantime, Thapa said that the RNA is using
the ceasefire to recruit and retrain.


8. (C) National Security Council member Maj. Gen.
Rookmangud Katuwal expressed concern that Maoists in the far
west are exploiting the ceasefire to increase their strength.
Now that the security forces have reduced their patrols, the
insurgents can intimidate and extort money from the local
population at will, Katuwal charged. The insurgents have
busily been organizing multiple mass meetings to broadcast
their ideology, as permitted now under the ceasefire, while
the mainstream political parties, whether through fear,
inertia, or both, have been idle. The Maoists are filling
the vacuum left by the legitimate political parties at the
local level, Katuwal worried.

--------------
POLITICAL PARTIES:
ON THE SIDELINES AGAIN
--------------


9. (SBU) It is not only at the local level, however, that
the insurgents are crowding the mainstream political parties
out of the public arena. The Maoist media frenzy has pushed
the political parties, already worried that the King's
appointment of an interim government has rendered them
inconsequential, even further onto the sidelines. Bhattarai
followed up his initial meetings with the party leaders by
blasting them in print for their mismanagement of democracy
over the past 12 years. In his April 3 public rally in the
capital, Bhattarai belittled them as "dinosaurs" incapable of
changing with the times. Despite their lack of support for a
constituent assembly, leaders of the major parties have not
offered a well-reasoned rebuttal to the proposal or a defense
of the constitution under which all of them have served as
Prime Ministers or Members of Parliament. Nor have they
proposed other issues from their own parties' agendas (i.e.,
equal rights for women, land reform, international relations)
to be included as topics for GON/Maoist dialogue in the
future. What little press time leaders of the two largest
parties can garner these days is, for the most part, spent
criticizing both the King and the Maoists for excluding them
from dialogue without, however, offering any suggestions of
what they would contribute.


10. (C) Some of the parties' inactivity may be due in part
to continued Maoist intimidation at the local level. The
Indian Ambassador reports that Gurkha Welfare Officers spread
across the country have found that the Maoists, still armed,
are using the threat of violence to extract financial
"contributions" and enforce participation at political
rallies. The insincerity of Maoist claims to support
democracy, he asserts, is proven by their intolerance of
political competition in the countryside.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Despite the Maoists' public prolixity over the past
two weeks, they seem determined not to be drawn into the
specifics of any of their proposals or to describe what a
Maoist-led government might look like. For now, they are
keeping their agenda intentionally vague and their
pronouncements purposely elliptical so as to confuse and
divide even further their politically factionalized
audiences. To a certain degree, their strategy may be
working. Despite the lack of popular enthusiasm for the
proposed constituent assembly, the political parties and
members of civil society are spending most of their time
arguing among themselves about what the Maoist proposals
entail, instead of uniting in a well-reasoned defense of the
current constitution or of multi-party democracy. The
political parties' performance thus far has been particularly
disappointing. At this crucial watershed in Nepal's
democratic history, they are focusing all of their energies
on complaining about the interim government and reiterating
their refusal to work with it, thereby cutting themselves out
of any role in shaping the agenda for dialogue with the
Maoists. The party leaders' paralysis in the capital could
cost them dearly at the local level, leaving the Maoists to
fill the vacuum.


12. (C) Comment continued: Throughout the Maoists' media
blitz lies one consistent subtext: that the insurgents
represent a legitimate political and military "force" on a
par with the GON and entitled to the same status and
recognition. Their efforts to be photographed meeting GON
and political leaders and their outreach to the international
community are clearly intended to reinforce that message.
The GON, on the other hand, apparently is hoping that the
Maoists will talk themselves out, wearying the public with
their empty rhetoric and ultimately revealing the hollowness
of their proposals. The Government reasons that prolonging
the ceasefire will build up an internal momentum and popular
expectations of peace that will make it exceedingly difficult
for the Maoists to mobilize their rank-and-file for a return
to violence. That strategy may be a sound one up to a point.
If the RNA is using the ceasefire to retrain and recruit, it
can be safely assumed that the Maoists are doing the same.
The danger remains that the GON may overplay its hand,
stalling a bit too long and squandering the momentum toward
negotiations it has worked hard to develop.
MALINOWSKI