NEPALI MAOISTS PURSUE SEPARATE DIALOGUE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000566

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID SZ NP
SUBJECT: NEPALI MAOISTS PURSUE SEPARATE DIALOGUE WITH
EUROPEAN DONOR MISSIONS

REF: KATHMANDU 0408

Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Anton Hagen, local head of the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC),confirmed to the DCM that
Maoist insurgents have enlisted his help in sounding out
other European and Canadian donor agencies regarding a
possible meeting with Maoist interlocutors. Hagen also
confirmed that SDC had quietly sponsored a conflict mediation
workshop, attended by both Maoist and mainstream political
party representatives, in Switzerland in February. The DCM
cautioned that meeting the Maoists at senior levels might
give the insurgents, who attempt to portray themselves as a
legitimate political force, a respectability and
international profile they do not deserve and urged him to
keep the Government of Nepal (GON) apprised. The Foreign
Secretary told the Ambassador on March 28 that the GON

SIPDIS
strongly opposes the initiative and will do "as much as
possible" to ensure the proposed meeting does not occur.
Although, as far as we know, no such meetings have yet
materialized, it is clear that the Maoists are adopting the
same "divide-and-conquer" strategy toward donors perceived as
sympathetic as they employ with domestic political leaders.
End summary.

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SWISS SURROGATES?
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2. (C) Anton Hagen, the local head of the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC),confirmed to the DCM that
Maoist representatives had asked him recently to sound out
the heads of European and Canadian donor agencies and certain
embassies about possibly meeting with the Maoists. (Note:
The Americans, Japanese, AUSTRALIAns, and the British
Ambassador were pointedly excluded from the Maoist
invitation, although British aid agency DFID was not. End
note.) Hagen acknowledged "responding positively" to the
request, reasoning that donors "will have to talk with the
Maoists sooner or later" anyway. He has since polled the
Danes, Norwegians, Canadians, Finns, Dutch, EU, DFID, and
German aid agency GTZ about their willingness to participate
in such a meeting. Hagen told the DCM the Maoists have not
contacted him since the initial overture to learn the results
of his survey, and he expressed regret that certain missions
(e.g, the U.S.) were excluded from the invitation. (Note:
The Maoists approached the Danish Embassy with a similar
request several weeks before. The Danes agreed to pass the
message but not to organize an actual meeting. The Maoists
never contacted them again. End note.)


3. (C) The DCM told Hagen that the USG fully supports
negotiations that will lead to a final and peaceful
resolution of the seven-year Maoist insurgency. Such
negotiations are certain to be complicated, lengthy, and
delicate, he cautioned, and friends of Nepal should do
nothing to increase their difficulty. The Maoists are trying
to (mis)represent themselves as a legitimate political force,
claiming that they constitute the government in areas under
their sway, and want to be recognized by the international
community on the same level as the Government of Nepal (GON).
Senior-level foreign diplomats and aid directors agreeing to
meet the Maoists could give the insurgents a status and
respectability they do not deserve, the DCM warned.
Moreover, if the insurgents believe they have international
support, it could affect their negotiating strategy with the
GON. He urged Hagen to keep the GON informed of his efforts.
Hagen thanked the DCM for his comments, but did not commit
to advising the GON.

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SWISS PEACE SEMINAR
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4. (C) Hagen also acknowledged to the DCM that the SDC had
quietly sponsored a seminar on conflict resolution and peace
building for about 20 Nepali participants in Switzerland from
February 11-18. (We had learned about the seminar from at
least two of the participants.) In addition to members of
civil society, businessmen, and mainstream political parties,
SDC had also invited two Maoist representatives. SDC in
Bern, along with Swiss NGO Inter Cooperation, were the main
impetus for the seminar, Hagen said, determining the
participants and the agenda.


5. (C) Nischal Nath Pandey, Deputy Executive Director of
the GON-sponsored Institute of Foreign Affairs and son of
Information Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey, told the DCM in a
separate conversation that the GON had declined SDC's
invitation to send official representatives to the February
conference, opting instead to send him and National Assembly
member Padma Jyoti as unofficial observers. Pandey said he
found the seminar useful and instructive as background on how
other domestic conflicts had been resolved. For the first
several days of the seminar, the Maoists were silent, he
said, speaking instead through three pro-Maoist "human
rights" activists. On the fourth day--when the Swiss
facilitators left the Nepali participants alone to hammer out
a joint statement--the two insurgents spoke for two hours,
explaining their position to the other participants at
considerable length, Pandey recalled. They reportedly
stressed three points. First, they denied having any secret
agreement with the Palace. Second, they appealed to the
mainstream political parties to forge an alliance with them
against the King to press for a constituent assembly. (Note:
Jhala Nath Khanal, a Communist Party of Nepal - United
Marxist Leninist (UML) member who also attended the seminar,
recalls this point being communicated with a somewhat
different emphasis than the pro-Palace Pandey. According to
Khanal, the Maoists argued that if they are now willing to
accept multiparty democracy, then the political parties
should be willing to consider a constituent assembly. End
note.) Finally, the Maoists denied having engaged in
indiscrimate violence but acknowledged killing "intelligence
officers," among whom they explicitly included U.S. Embassy
guards Ramesh Manandhar (killed in December 2001) and Deepak
Pokhrel (killed in November 2002).

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GON REACTION
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6. (C) On March 28 Foreign Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya
told the Ambassador and DCM that he had personally called
Hagen to express the GON's "explicit opposition" to the
proposed meeting between European aid donors and the Maoists.
Acharya said he stressed that the GON was committed to doing
"as much as possible" to ensure that such a meeting does not
take place. The Foreign Secretary added that the GON had
also rejected two other proposals (one from the UNDP and the
other in the context of ongoing GON/donor dialogue) to
include Maoists in formal discussions with foreign missions.
The GON believes the Maoists are doing all that they can to
burnish their international image and credentials in order to
strengthen their hand before negotiations begin, Acharya
concluded.


7. (C) The Ambassador told Acharya that the Embassy, which
had not been included in the Maoist overture, has been
counseling its diplomatic colleagues against agreeing to such
a meeting. (Note: The Indian Ambassador told his US and
British counterparts on March 27 that his government strongly
opposes the idea as well. End note.) As guests of the GON,
foreign diplomats have an obligation to keep the Government
informed of any such initiative, he emphasized. In any
event, formal talks between diplomatic missions and the
Maoists are premature as long as the insurgents have not
renounced violence. Most donors have already established a
modus vivendi for getting humanitarian aid to recipients in
Maoist-affected areas, and thus do not need to establish
formal channels of communication to carry out their projects,
he observed. Many of the donors most intimately involved in
this overture provide comparatively modest aid, he noted,
adding that he resents Maoist attempts to split the donor
community.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) While we don't doubt the good intentions of some of
our diplomatic colleagues here, we do question the wisdom of
even appearing to accord violent insurgents the same status
due a legitimate government. By limiting their invitation to
those missions and donors they perceive as more sympathetic,
the Maoists are clearly using the same "divide-and-conquer"
strategy they have employed so effectively against domestic
political parties. The insurgents can be counted on to
exploit any form of favorable recognition from the
international community to legitimate their claims of
constituting a viable alternative government to the GON. We
will continue to strongly counsel our colleagues against
pursuing any contact with the Maoists that could jeopardize
progress toward peace talks.



MALINOWSKI