NEPAL'S CEASE-FIRE: HINTS OF MAOIST STRATEGY FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000480

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL/ERIEDEL
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2008
TAGS: PINS PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL'S CEASE-FIRE: HINTS OF MAOIST STRATEGY FROM
THE MIDWEST

REF: A. A. KATHMANDU 312


B. B. KATHMANDU 477

Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

Summary
=======


1. (SBU) Econoff visited Nepalgunj and Jumla districts of
midwestern Nepal from March 4 to 7 to assess the effects of
the cease-fire. Despite statements from the Maoists at the
national level (Ref A),insurgents in the Midwest Development
Region are still using rhetoric calling for the establishment
of a communist republic, the dissolution of the Royal
Nepalese Army, and elimination of the constitutional
monarchy. Despite the cease-fire, Maoists continue to hold
mass meetings, extort funds, and carry weapons in the
midwest. The activities of the Maoists in rural parts of the
country raise serious questions regarding the sustainability
of the cease-fire and the success of future negotiations.
(Note: This is the second in a series of reports on this
recent trip. See Ref B for first report.) End summary.

Away from the Center, Maoist Rhetoric Differs
=============================================


2. (C) Econoff visited Nepalgunj and Jumla districts of
midwestern Nepal from March 4 to 7 to assess the effects of
the cease-fire. According to a number of reliable sources,
including businessmen, politicians, government officials,
social activists, and local residents, the Maoists in the
Midwest Development Region, often called the Maoist
heartland, made strikingly different statements from those of
the Maoist leadership. For example, during preliminary
negotiations in Kathmandu, the Maoists have indicated that
they are willing to support the principles of multi-party
democracy and constitutional monarchy (Ref A). However,
Rajendra Mohat, Jumla Local Representative of the
non-governmental organization (NGO) INSEC, summarized the
insurgents' objectives, as expressed to him by local Maoists,
as:
-- 1. Secure the leadership of Baburam Bhattarai, head of the
Maoist negotiating team and the Maoists' number two
ideologue, in a constituent assembly;
-- 2. Use Maoist leadership of the constituent assembly to
transform Nepal into a communist republic;
-- 3. Dissolve the Royal Nepal Army and re-establish the
national armed forces on the Maoist militia model; and
-- 4. Offer the King a position of respect "without
facilities," meaning a title without authority, budget, or
official residence.

Is the Cease-Fire a Tactic?
===========================


3. (C) Most government officers without regular, direct
interaction with the Maoists had similar impressions of
Maoist intent. Dilli Raj Joshi, Chief District Officer of
Banke, the midwest's economic center, stated that
negotiations were doomed to fail as the Maoists had not given
up their main objective of attaining power by building a
communist republic. The Senior Superintendent of Police in
Jumla, Madan Khadka, also learned through his sources that
the Maoists at the grass-roots level are continuing to call
for a republic. He surmises that Maoist-Government
negotiations at the national level are a tactic to buy time.
It is the consensus of both police and government officers in
Jumla that it is only a matter of time before the cease-fire
collapses and Jumla will be one of the first sites attacked
again.


4. (C) During econoff's visit, only Him Gurung, Deputy
Inspector General of Police for the region in Nepalgunj, was
optimistic about the prospects for the peace process. He
opined that the Maoists have exhausted themselves and now
must return to the political process. He believes that the
Maoists have eroded their public support and must use
coercion to maintain their political base. Other
interlocutors echoed his perception that the Maoists were
exhausted, due to various causes, e.g., increased Indian
security along the border, Maoist losses incurred in
November, and pressure from the international community.
However, Gurung's belief that the Maoists can muster support
only through the threat of force was not repeated by other
sources.
Talking Peace, Maintaining Force
================================


5. (C) The Maoists continue to hold mass meetings, extort
funds, and openly carry weapons in Jumla. Three major trails
from the north, west and east enter the district headquarters
(there are no motorable roads). On all of these axes, the
Maoists continue to demonstrate their strength. According to
Jumla's Police and INSEC Representative, the Maoists have
massed several hundred cadres with weapons, including
explosives, three hours to the west in Tatopani. Villagers
coming to the district headquarters to buy government rice
report that Maoists have established a gate and a bridge two
kilometers east of Jumla. The villagers added that the
Maoists had stopped harassing them since the beginning of the
cease-fire. In Sinja, one day's walk to the north, Major
Khanal, the Company Commander of the local Royal Nepal Army
garrison, stated that the Maoists had recently held a mass
meeting with weapons. During his visit, econoff observed
Maoist flags surrounding the district headquarters. The
flags had been planted on the anniversary of the launching of
the Maoist "People's War" (February 13) and, according to
local residents, demarcate Maoist-controlled territory.

Comment
=======


6. (C) The information gathered on this recent trip exposes
some glaring differences in Maoist rhetoric at the national
and local levels. This inconsistency reinforces the
suspicion of many at senior levels of Nepal's security forces
that the cease-fire is a Maoist tactic to buy time and
attempt to achieve revolutionary goals through manipulation
of the fractious political setup at the center. The
insurgents' ambitious objectives, as described by INSEC's
local representative, present some difficult negotiating
challenges--if not obstacles--for the Nepali government. Any
delay or refusal to accede on the part of the government
could serve as a pretext for the Maoists to call an end to
the cease-fire.
MALINOWSKI