Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU477
2003-03-18 09:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

MAOISTS IN WESTERN NEPAL DISCUSS TERMS OF

Tags:  PINS PTER NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000477 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL/ERIEDEL
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2008
TAGS: PINS PTER NP
SUBJECT: MAOISTS IN WESTERN NEPAL DISCUSS TERMS OF
CEASE-FIRE


Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

Summary
=======

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000477

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL/ERIEDEL
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2008
TAGS: PINS PTER NP
SUBJECT: MAOISTS IN WESTERN NEPAL DISCUSS TERMS OF
CEASE-FIRE


Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

Summary
=======


1. (SBU) On March 4, a non-governmental organization held a
meeting with Maoist, government, and social organization
representatives in Jumla, a district headquarters in Nepal's
mid-western hills. The Maoists tentatively agreed to end
extortion and allow for the free movement of political
parties and the resumption of development programs, although
these concessions must be approved by top Maoist leaders
before being operative. The Maoists refused to put aside
their arms or to quit holding mass meetings, while the army
and police refused to return to their barracks. Notably,
local government and Maoist representatives agreed to resolve
potential flash-points through discussion, although the
details of this mechanism have yet to be finalized. End
Summary.

Talks on Talks: INSEC Brings 25 Parties to the Table in Jumla
============================================= ================


2. (SBU) On March 4, Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC),
a non-governmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the
Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (UML),held
a meeting with a regional Maoist leader and 25 government and
social organizations. The meeting was held in the Local
Development Office in Jumla district headquarters. A
spontaneous crowd of 200 people gathered at the site to watch
the interaction. (Note: The police speculate that armed
Maoist security personnel were hiding among the spectators.)
Econoff arrived the following day and was able to talk with
many of the participants, including the Local Representative
of INSEC and organizer of the meeting; the Chief District
Officer (CDO); the Deputy Superintendent of Police; and a
local spokesperson for the UML. The Maoists were represented
by the Chief of the District Intellectual Committee.


3. (SBU) The INSEC organizer reported that it had taken him
ten days to forge an agreement to meet between the Maoists
and the Chief District Office. Most of that time was spent
in working through the hierarchy of Maoist contacts. An
agenda was not approved in advance, and the INSEC forum was
open for all participants to air their grievances.


Local Code of Conduct: A Reflection of National Debate
============================================= =========


4. (SBU) During his opening remarks, the Maoists'
representative objected to the presence of an armed police
officer, but agreed to proceed. (Note: The meeting was held
100 feet from the officer's home and adjacent to the police
headquarters.) The attendees then presented a list of
demands to the Maoists, including:
-- Freedom of movement for mainstream political party members;
-- Non-interference with development projects; and
-- An end to Maoist extortion, carrying of arms, and mass
meetings.
The Maoists in response requested that the Royal Nepal Army
(RNA),not represented at the meeting, and the police return
to their barracks and allow the Maoists free movement in all
areas of the district.


5. (U) The UML representative demanded an apology from the
Maoists for the November attack on Jumla and an explanation
of what the Maoists had expected to gain. His request was
met by silence. The representative of the lower castes took
the opportunity to protest the Maoist practice of impressing
low-caste people into work as porters. If people do not
agree to work for the Maoists, they will be killed; if they
do, they could be shot by security forces as Maoist
sympathizers, he complained. The Maoist representative
stated only that there was no longer a need for porter
services during the cease-fire.


6. (SBU) According to the INSEC organizer, the Maoists
conceded in principle to the free movement of political party
members; to non-interference in development projects, if they
are given sufficient notice; and to stop fund raising.
However, the Maoist refused to put aside weapons or stop
organizing mass meetings. Most importantly, the police and
the Maoists agreed to put in place a mechanism through which
disputes in the field can be resolved through dialogue rather
than violence. The details of the mechanism, including the
forum, ground rules, and representatives, have yet to be
established. The Maoist told the other participants that the
concessions requested of them must be reviewed by the central
Maoist leadership before agreement could be confirmed. He
would schedule a mass meeting the next week, he said, to
announce the decisions of the Maoist party.

UML Touting the Party Line Despite Threats
==========================================


7. (C) The UML representative told econoff that during the
meeting the Maoists demonstrated flexibility, while the
government did not. He accused the local government
representatives and the King of undermining the cease-fire by
not taking "positive steps." When asked what those steps
were, he repeated the UML's standard demand for an all-party
interim government to replace the "illegitimate" government
of Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand. Both the UML and
INSEC representatives related that the Maoists accused the
UML of undermining the peace process. The Maoists reportedly
expect to become more powerful politically than the UML
through negotiations. The Maoists suspect that the only way
for the UML to prevent this outcome is for the UML to
undermine the cease-fire. The UML representative said he
fears for his life and the lives of UML cadre; therefore UML
cadres no longer venture outside Jumla and have developed
plans to leave the district if the cease-fire breaks down.

More to Come
============


8. (SBU) The INSEC organizer was very happy with the outcome
of the March 4 session and is working with the regional INSEC
office in Nepalgunj in the southwestern lowlands to organize
a mass interaction after the first round of anticipated peace
talks in Kathmandu. The purpose will be to air the
grievances of all parties affected by the conflict in order
to make the peace agreement as broad based as possible.

Comment
=======


9. (C) Since the January 29 announcement of the cease-fire,
local Maoist representatives have held meetings with
politicians and members of civil society in a number of
districts as a way to improve their public image, which had
been badly damaged by a year of violent excesses. The March
4 meeting in Jumla, although organized by an NGO, is another
example of the Maoists' efforts to project themselves as a
responsible political party. It is unlikely that the
discussions in Jumla have any implications for talks at the
national level, as many of the concessions reached in Jumla
had already been agreed to by the central Maoist leadership.
Too little time has elapsed to evaluate whether the
concessions on mass meetings and extorting funds will hold.


10. (C) Despite speculation by the vernacular press and
Embassy contacts of emerging political factions within the
Maoist movement, the near mirror-image demands of the Maoists
at local and national levels and the need for the local
representative to refer back to the center for approval
demonstrate a highly centralized political organization.
Whatever initiatives may be developed at the local level,
little progress can be made without the imprimatur of the
Maoist political hierarchy. In any case, this example of
peaceful interaction between local Maoists and their recent
victims bears testimony to Maoist seriousness so far about
above-ground negotiations.
MALINOWSKI