Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU472
2003-03-14 12:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS AGREE TO CODE OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000472 

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR POL/REIDEL
STATE FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS AGREE TO CODE OF
CONDUCT

REF: A. KATHMANDU 408


B. KATHMANDU 427

SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000472

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR POL/REIDEL
STATE FOR SA/INS
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: GOVERNMENT AND MAOISTS AGREE TO CODE OF
CONDUCT

REF: A. KATHMANDU 408


B. KATHMANDU 427

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) At a press conference on March 13, Government of Nepal
(GON) and Maoist representatives released a long-awaited code
of conduct to govern behavior during the ongoing ceasefire.
The 22-point program contains language that is ambiguous in
parts, but which defines some clear ground rules for the two
sides as they enter negotiations on a political settlement.
The code also provides for a monitoring team to resolve
disputes. Political parties were generally positive about
the code. Omission of several Maoist demands, including
their insistence that the army return to its barracks, may
indicate that the insurgents are sincerely interested in
purusing a peaceful solution. End summary.

CODE CALLS FOR END TO EXTORTION AND STRIKES;
SOME LANGUAGE AMBIGUOUS
--------------


2. (U) After more than a month of negotiations, drafting and
debate, the Government of Nepal (GON) and leaders of the
Maoist insurgency have agreed on a code of conduct to
regulate the behavior of both sides during the ongoing
ceasefire. The 22-point code was released at a
late-afternoon press conference on March 13, signed by
Minister for Physical Planning and Works Narayan Singh Pun,
and the Maoists' second-ranking leader Baburam Bhattarai. It
will be considered fully in force within three weeks. Though
Bhattarai signed the document, he did not appear at the press
conference. The Maoists were represented by Krishna Bahadur
Mahara, a senior spokesman.


3. (U) The code of conduct reaffirms the commitment of both
parties to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict, and
calls on both sides to "try to find a consensus... while
remaining sensitive to the country's interest." Several
points promise relief to Nepal's beleaguered populace,
calling for an end to extortion; forbidding restrictions on
the transportation of food, medicines and other consumer
goods; and promising that both parties to the agreement will
help displaced people to return to their homes to be
resettled peacefully. The code also stipulates there can be
no "bandhs" (general or targeted strikes that close
businesses and schools for a specified timeframe) during

peace talks.


4. (U) Two points seek to prevent statements in the media
from derailing the peace process. In support of the code's
stated goal to "create a conducive environment for dialogue,"
the code requires that government-owned media outlets must
carry views of both parties objectively and neutrally. A
second clause calls for representatives from both parties to
take care to express their political views "in a courteous
and ethical manner" when dealing with the media.


5. (SBU) On several of the issues, the language of the code
is ambiguous. One point calls for a cessation of
"provocative activities" in "sensitive areas," phrases which
are open to interpretation. Another point requires both
parties to stop "unnecessary searches, arrests and
kidnappings," vague language likely to spark debate about
which arrests are necessary, and what sort of kidnappings
could be so considered. The spokesman for the Nepal
Sadbhavana Party (NSP),for example, interpreted the clause
as evidence that the GON had given Maoists legal authority to
search, arrest and kidnap in some circumstances.
Disagreements about interpretation of the code and adherence
to its provisions will be monitored by a team of observers to
be established by both sides.


MAOISTS COMPROMISE ON ISSUES OF RNA DEPLOYMENT AND
IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF PRISONERS
-------------- --------------


6. (U) The code of conduct does not set any time schedule
for the release of prisoners, one of the Maoists' key
pre-conditions to talks (ref A). The relevant provision
merely specifies that both parties will "gradually release"
their captives. (Note: At the March 13 press conference,
Maoist spokesman Mahara stated that to the best of his
knowledge, the Maoists do not currently have any prisoners.
However, the Maoist leadership reportedly had instructed
their local commanders to release immediately any prisoners
unknown to the leadership. End note.)


7. (C) Language addressing the movement of security forces
is imprecise, but clearly indicates that the Maoists have
backed down on their prior demand that Royal Nepal Army (RNA)
forces be confined to their barracks for the duration of the
talks. The demand was wholly unacceptable to the Palace, and
the issue had proved to be a stumbling block for at least one
prior draft of the code (ref B). According to the
watered-down language released on the 13th: "Both sides will
stop violence and the use of force. Both sides will stop
mobilization and the use of armed force which might terrorize
the common people."


8. (C) What this means in terms of RNA operations is not
immediately clear. A local brigade commander in Kathmandu
told DATT on March 14 that he is still conducting normal
patrols, and is planning to put up checkpoints in the city as
usual after dark. His troops will continue to carry their
weapons and will continue to safeguard law and order in the
city. He has not received any new orders relating to the
conditions of the code of conduct. However, the commander
also stated that a meeting was in progress to determine if
any changes would have to be made in order to meet the
requirements of the code.

POLITICAL PARTIES REACT
--------------


9. (SBU) Though entreating "both sides" to "stop the use of
force" is a far cry from requiring the RNA to sit idle in its
barracks, not all observers see the clause as a victory for
the GON. Spokesmen from the Nepali Congress (NC) and Nepal
Sadbhavana Party (NSP) told PolOff that by calling on both
parties to stop mobilization of their armed forces, the GON
has accepted the legitimacy of the Maoist insurgents. The
term "mobilization" is also a matter of some confusion.
According to the NSP, the term "implies that the armies of
both sides have control over certain areas, and both armies
should not cross over into one another's territory." A
spokesman for the United Marxist Leninists (UML) said that
the language was unclear and that his party would have to ask
coordinators Pun and Mahara for clarification.


10. (SBU) Other responses from the major parties have been
mixed. The most positive initial reaction comes from the
Nepali Congress, whose spokesman told PolOff that "points
mentioned in the code of conduct are ambiguous and unclear,
but the party takes it positively, as a beginning to the
peace process." A spokesman for the UML was less satisfied.
"We are not happy that the government has undermined the
major political parties," he told PolOff. "We take the code
of conduct positively, but with certain reservations.
Lasting peace can only be achieved if a responsible and
accountable government is put in place with the support of
the people and the international community."

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) While some points in the code of conduct are
unclear, the sincerity of the GON and the Maoists in adhering
to its terms will determine its usefulness. The most
ambiguous points are those that deal with the most
contentious issues, and the diluted language is likely the
only form weak enough to make it to consensus. While the
vague language might represent a possible "trap door" for any
party looking for a way out of peace talks, the requirement
that both sides work toward a solution of any disputes within
the framework of the code of conduct will make it more
difficult for either side to walk away unilaterally.
Including a restriction on negative commentary in the media
might make it harder for the Maoists to play the game of
flagging GON "failures" in the media as possible reasons for
a breakdown in talks.


12. (C) It is highly significant that several Maoist demands
have been omitted from the final text. Previously
"non-negotiable" pre-conditions for talks, including the
repeal of anti-terrorism legislation, the immediate release
of all Maoist prisoners with weapons, and the return of the
RNA to its barracks are conspicuously absent in the
agreed-upon version of the code. The Maoists clearly have
backed down on several key issues in order to achieve
consensus on the code and to move ahead toward peace
negotiations. This willingness to compromise may be a signal
that the Maoists are concerned about their inability to
combat increasing RNA capabilities, it may be a sign of
fatigue among their cadre after seven years of jungle
warfare, or it may be simply the best indication yet that the
Maoists are more serious about getting to the dialogue table.
MALINOWSKI