NEPAL: HEAD OF BRITISH AID IN KATHMANDU TALKS

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002364

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR SA/INS
STATE PLEASE ALSO PASS USAID - ANE/SA
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2013
TAGS: PREL PTER EAID NP UK
SUBJECT: NEPAL: HEAD OF BRITISH AID IN KATHMANDU TALKS
WITH MAOIST LEADER

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2340

B. KATHMANDU 2254

C. KATHMANDU 2048

D. STATE 321142 (NOTAL)

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).


1. (S/NF) Summary: On December 3 Pol/Mil Chief received
from his British counterpart notes from a November 13
telephone conversation between David Wood, the head of the
UK's Department for International Development (DFID) in
Nepal, and Baburam Bhattarai, top ideologue and erstwhile
lead negotiator for the Maoists. Bhattarai reportedly asked
for advice on how to influence the U.S., which he described
as "hostile" to the Maoists. Wood recommended that the
Maoists end their anti-U.S. rhetoric and return to the
negotiating table. The British Mission's willingness to
share this information with us (albeit somewhat after the
fact) is an encouraging sign of efforts to improve
information sharing and transparency. End summary.


2. (S/NF) On December 3 Pol/Mil Chief received from his
British counterpart notes from a November 13 telephone
conversation between David Wood, the head of the Department
for International Development (DFID) in Nepal, and Baburam
Bhattarai, top ideologue and erstwhile lead negotiator for
the Maoists. According to Wood's notes, Bhattarai's call was
"completely unexpected." When asked by Bhattarai for his
assessment of the situation, Wood reportedly expressed dismay
at the Maoists' decision to break the ceasefire, relayed his
concern at the escalating casualties, and emphasized that
since a military solution to the conflict is impracticable,
negotiations must be resumed at some point.


3. (S/NF) Asked by Bhattarai how to achieve a political
solution to the conflict, Wood reportedly reminded him that
political questions of that nature are more appropriately
adderessed to others, rather than to the head of a
development agency. Bhattarai then contrasted DFID's
position with that of the U.S., claiming that "DFID had a
clear position on peace," while the U.S. is "hostile" to the
Maoists. He asked Wood's advice on how to influence the U.S.
According to Wood's notes, he replied, "by ending their
anti-US rhetoric, and restoring the ceasefire and
negotiations."


4. (S/NF) Bhattarai then attempted to reassure Wood that the
Maoists are "not against development and would do nothing to
disturb it." That said, he acknowledged that the Politburo
directive ordering Maoist cadres not to attack development
projects (Ref C) "was taking time to implement." Wood
reportedly concluded the conversation by observing that
undermining development hurts all Nepalis, which, he
suggested, is not in the Maoists' "long-term political
interest." According to the SIS Chief at the British
Embassy, Wood and Bhattarai have not spoken subsequently.


5. (S/NF) Recently Major General Rookmangud Katawal,
Nepal's National Security Advisor, told the Ambassador that
the Maoist leadership twice had contacted DFID's Wood to ask
for details of DFID's ongoing and future programs and plans
in Nepal. On both occasions Wood refused to comply with the
Maoist request. Katawal did not provide the source of his
information.


6. (S/NF) Comment: This is the first acknowledgement by
our British colleagues that the head of the UK's development
mission here in Kathmandu, as well as the British SIS chief,
has been in contact with a Maoist leader. (We suspect this
is not the only time that Wood has conversed with Bhattarai.)
The implications of this conversation for U.S. security are
attenuated by the fact that it predated the November 17
Maoist threat to our Peace Corps trainees in Rupandehi
District (Ref B),and the Department's subsequent
instructions to demarche the UK Government to pass a message
to its covert Maoist contacts to stop threatening our
interests (Ref D). The UK Embassy has since confirmed that
its SIS Chief has passed such a message. Nonetheless, the UK
Mission's willingness to share this information with us--even
if three weeks after the fact--is a hopeful sign of its
efforts to improve communication and transparency with us.



MALINOWSKI