NEPAL: MAOISTS CHANGE TACTICS AND TARGETS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002363

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2013
TAGS: PTER PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS CHANGE TACTICS AND TARGETS

REF: A. (A) KATHMANDU 1979

B. (B) KATHMANDU 2020

C. (C) KATHMANDU 2266

D. (D) KATHMANDU 2164

E. (E) KATHMANDU 2340

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Since 2002, improvements in the
effectiveness of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA),among other
reasons, have caused Nepal's Maoist insurgents to shift the
focus of many of their operations from the hills to the
lowland Terai. The Maoists' expansion into the Terai has
enabled them to widen and deepen their extortion campaign and
shorten supply lines from India. The insurgents also have
limited the size of their attacks, targeting primarily small
patrols and police posts, ambushing selected vehicles with
IEDs, and assassinating individuals. The insurgents have
restricted heavily the movement of local civilians and
political party activists, putting a stranglehold on trade
and commerce in the countryside. There are some signs of a
possible disconnect between Maoist leadership and those in
the field. Royal Nepal Army contacts believe the failure to
launch major assaults reveals significant weaknesses within
the Maoist military wing. The RNA will continue to control
urban centers and prevent the Maoists from achieving
large-scale successes. However, through guerrilla warfare
tactics, the Maoists will continue to victimize all levels of
Nepal society, from villagers to the elite in Kathmandu,
while destroying infrastructure and restricting economic
activity. End Summary.

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MAOISTS EXTEND THEIR REACH INTO TERAI LOWLANDS
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2. (C) The tactics used by Nepal's Maoist insurgents have
changed significantly since 2002. At that time, the
insurgents focused their attacks and strength in remote,
impoverished mountainous areas, primarily in the mid- and
far-west of the country. Today, however, the Maoists have
extended their theater of influence into eastern Nepal and
the lowlands, or Terai. There may be several reasons for the
Maoists' expansion into the Terai. First, the Terai produces
much of the wealth of the country, in agricultural
production, industry and trade, enabling the insurgents to
extort more money to finance their military operations.
Second, the increased scope of Maoist operations combined
with the desire to avoid large-scale Maoist successes has
forced the Royal Nepal Army and security personnel to spread
themselves even thinner on the ground. While the flat land
of the Terai allows for relatively high mobility, the nearby
hills provide the Maoists with look-out posts from which to
stage attacks on small security patrols or vehicular convoys.


3. (C) Third, proximity to the Indian border allows the
Maoists to smuggle black-market explosives and ammunition and
shorten their supply lines. However, this proximity has also
raised more concern on the part of the Government of India
(GOI). The Maoists might find themselves facing a second
enemy if the GOI begins to crack down on Maoists in northern
India. Fourth, expansion of their operations into the Terai
could be a focused effort by the Maoists to nationalize the
conflict in preparation for renewed negotiations with the
Government of Nepal (GON). The Maoists must have a national
power base if they are to be credible in their claim to be a
national movement. If the GON were to accede to the Maoist
demand for constituent assembly elections -- which many
analysts believe is merely a ploy aimed at abolishing the
constitutional monarchy and bringing the Maoists to power --
the insurgents' stranglehold in many parts of the country
might allow them to win votes through fear and intimidation
at the ballot box. Likewise, Prime Minister Surya Bahadur
Thapa's government has committed itself to holding phased
national elections, possibly beginning in the Terai; such
elections would pose a serious threat to the Maoists, who
have alienated many Nepalis by their violence and
depredations. With the stronger Maoist presence in the
lowlands, the government's promise to hold elections may be
difficult to keep.

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INCREASED EXTORTION AND FORCED RECRUITMENT
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4. (C) The Maoists' expansion into the Terai has enabled the
movement to increase extortion activities in the wealthiest
parts of the country. Extortion is widespread and reaches
nearly every strata of society. Villagers are required to
give food, shelter, and sometimes cash while business owners
in urban centers are faced with letters demanding hefty
"taxes." Extortion demands are often accompanied by personal
threats. In October, for example, the Colgate-Palmolive
plant in Hetauda was forced to close its doors after
receiving a threatening letter demanding NRs 1.5 million
(roughly USD 20,500) (ref B).


5. (C) Before the spread of the conflict, Maoist recruitment
occurred primarily in Maoist home areas in north-central
Nepal, such as Dolpa and Jumla districts. Now, however, the
insurgency must recruit in areas outside its traditional
areas of support. In September, for example, the media
reported that Maoists had issued letters and verbal demands
to households in rural areas in the eastern Terai requiring
each household to provide either one son or daughter to serve
in the Maoist armed forces. Moreover, the Maoist leadership
has moved its armed cadre into the East and Terai where the
insurgents do not have cultural and social linkages with the
local population. Caste, language and cultural differences
have increased tensions between the populace and the Maoists,
contributing to the perception that the Maoists are invaders,
not native sons. Likewise, the Maoists must extort and steal
food from locals in order to sustain themselves. Forced
recruitment and the criminalization of the insurgency have
forced many young men and women to migrate to India and urban
areas.

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FOCUS ON SMALL, TARGETED ASSAULTS AND ASSASSINATIONS
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6. (C) Since the collapse of the cease-fire in August, the
Maoists have foregone their traditional, large-scale attacks
on military and armed police encampments in favor of small,
targeted assaults and assassinations. The Maoists have
attempted to reach the political elite in Kathmandu by
destroying ancestral homes and assets of political and
business leaders. The insurgents have relied heavily on
Improvised Explosion Devices (IEDs) planted along roads or
footpaths to kill small mobile security patrols and have also
focused heavily on the destruction of public infrastructure,
such as radio towers, telephone exchanges, bridges and power
plants. The Maoists' ability to operate in smaller cells
makes it harder for the RNA to detect and counteract them.


7. (C) The only two major attacks the Maoists have launched
since the cease-fire collapsed in August were on Armed Police
Force (APF) camps in Dang and Banke districts on October 10
and 12 (reported Ref A) and were largely unsuccessful. The
RNA and others believe the Maoists' change in tactics is a
sign that the insurgents are incapable now of launching major
attacks on security forces, with their improved defensive
positions and better equipment and training. To prevent the
Maoists from succeeding at large-scale attacks, however, the
RNA and Nepal Police have been forced to withdraw their
presence from most Village Development Committee (VDC) areas
and outlying areas in favor of consolidated, fortified bases.
In Makwanpur District south of Kathmandu, for example, only
three police posts currently are staffed: one in the district
headquarters and two in smaller urban centers. Their absence
in the country side will make it more difficult for the GON
to win the hearts and minds of the people.


8. (C) The Maoists themselves, in a statement by Pushpa Kumar
Dahal (alias Prachanda) in late October, explained their
operational strategy in three phases. First, the insurgents
would carry out decentralized action through small ambushes
and raids in the rural areas as well as urban centers. The
goal of the first phase was to "shock and set into disarray
the enemy" in the capital and rural areas. The second and
third phases would involve a gradual centralization of their
attacks through operations involving larger numbers of
combatants. According to Prachanda, the first phase of the
strategy has been "a complete success." The RNA and many
other analysts insist that phase has been a failure.


9. (C) The concentration of GON security forces, plus their
desire to expand the conflict and their sphere of influence,
were likely important factors in the Maoist decision to
modify their tactics. Recognizing the difficulty of
launching large-scale attacks, the Maoists may have decided
small-scale, hit-and-run attacks are the most efficient and
cost-effective means to achieve the same objective --
destabilizing and undermining central authority.

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RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT
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10. (C) The insurgents' control in the countryside enables
them to restrict the movement of locals and strangle commerce
and trade. (A report on the economic costs of the conflict
provided septel.) The Maoists are also able to limit the
activities of political parties in nearly all of Nepal's 75
districts. By preventing party leaders from reaching their
constituencies, the insurgents may seek to strengthen their
own political presence while eroding popular support for the
legitimate parties. Likewise, the Maoist stranglehold has
effectively prevented the government from delivering
services, thereby undermining the GON's legitimacy. However,
the brutal, arbitrary nature of the vigilante justice meted
out by "People's Courts" and local commanders likely outweigh
whatever limited popular appeal they once had.

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SCHISM BETWEEN THE RANK AND FILE?
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11. (C) There are signs of a possible disconnect between the
Maoist leadership, most of whom we believe now reside in
India or abroad, and the Maoist cadre. NGO and INGO staff
report that local cadres appear to have greater discretionary
authority since the end of the cease-fire (Refs C and D).
Moreover, the Maoist leadership has made policy
pronouncements in some cases that appear to have been ignored
by those in the field. In late October, for example, Maoist
commander Prachanda stated that it was not Maoist policy to
kill security personnel on leave or at home. Since then,
however, many low-level policemen have been assassinated
while drinking tea, leaving their homes, or engaging in some
other innocuous activity. Also, Maoist cadre in rural areas
have brutally murdered even the family members of security
forces. Prachanda also indicated that the insurgents would
not target public infrastructure in areas controlled by the
Maoists. However, the destruction of power plants and vital
bridges linking local villages with district centers have
continued unabated. Whether the Maoist leadership is unable
to control local-level commanders or has made a conscious
decision not to follow through on public statements is
unclear.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) From their two failed attacks on APF camps in
October, the Maoists appear incapable of resuming a series of
large-scale attacks to gain prestige and arms as they did in
2001-2002, although we do not preclude that they will try one
of these attacks again. Realizing the impossibility of an
outright military victory, the Maoist leadership may rely
more and more on guerrilla warfare tactics, such as road
mines, targeted assassinations and attacks on small security
patrols. The insurgents are highly mobile, able to disappear
into dense forests and jungle and to blend in with local
populations. These tactics will allow the Maoists to
maintain overwhelming influence over -- and deny control to
the government of -- the majority of Nepal's rural areas,
restricting the movement of locals and political party
activists, and strangling trade and commerce. Their
influence in these areas will have a significant effect on
elections unless the GON is able to fill the current
administrative and security void.


13. (C) As discussed Ref E, the Maoists, through their
rhetoric, have attempted to isolate the U.S. diplomatically
and discourage other donors from collaborating with us. The
Maoists have been successful in generating a climate of fear
among both average Nepali workers in rural areas and the
political elite in Kathmandu. Ironically, many Nepalis feel
less secure now than they did last year, when the intensity
of the Maoists' "people's war" was more intense. Maoist
extortion, accompanied by personal threats, as well as
targeted assassinations seems to have had a deeper
psychological impact than the random bombings and forced
closures, or bandhs, of last year. Also, the withdrawal of
security forces from most of the countryside has left Nepali
villagers feeling more vulnerable. The challenge facing GON
security forces is how to modify their tactics to counter the
Maoist terror campaign. In the east, at least, aggressive
counter-insurgency tactics have been achieving some success
in blunting Maoist strength. End Comment.
MALINOWSKI