NEPAL: MAOIST WEBSITE, LEADERSHIP ELABORATE ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002163

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOIST WEBSITE, LEADERSHIP ELABORATE ON
NEW POLITBURO DIRECTIVES

REF: KATHMANDU 2048

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Recent public announcements by Nepal's Maoist
leaders indicate an awareness of the movement's dwindling
popular support and a continuing attempt to explain
ideologically their failure to win power. For example,
following the recent Maoist Politburo meeting (Reftel),the
Maoists have posted a lengthy, turgid exposition on the
Nepali version of their website (cpnm.org) that purports to
provide a doctrinal framework for the policy shifts announced
at the meeting. Highlights include an assessment of the U.S.
as a declining global power; an assertion that constitutional
monarchy is incompatible with the 21st century; a discussion
of a three-phase military strategy; an acknowledgement that
Maoist abuses in the field have cost them popular sympathy; a
commitment not to undermine NGO projects run by countries
"not hostile to the People's War"; and a decision to seek
broader international support, including from the United
Nations. The site also carries a separate interview with
Maoist leader Prachanda explaining the rationale for the
policy changes and reiterating that the Maoists will not harm
US citizens. Consistency between rhetoric and behavior has
never been a Maoist strength, but we believe that this recent
bombast signals a shift in the leadership's thinking away
from rural warfare in favor of greater emphasis on propaganda
and public relations. Part of this public relations strategy
appears to be a continued effort to drive a wedge between the
US, which is consistently portrayed as "hostile" to the
Maoists and supportive of "royal fascism," and other donors .
End summary.

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MAOIST VIEW OF THE WORLD
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2. (U) The Nepali language version of the Maoist website
cpnm.org has posted an elaboration of the policy decisions
referred to in Maoist leader Prachanda's October 21 press
statement following a recent Politburo meeting (Reftel). Not
surprisingly, the self-congratulatory text, entitled
"Supplementary Resolution on the Current Situation and Our
Historic Task," asserts the rapid decline of the Maoists'
enemies (principally, the U.S. and the Palace) and predicts
the certain victory of the People's War. U.S. strategy, the
resolution claimed, has been to divert attention from its
diplomatic and military failures in the Middle East, Iraq,
and Afghanistan by "tightening its hegemony in South Asia."
The Maoists' success in exposing true U.S. aims has won them
sympathy not only with "anti-imperialist masses the world
over" but also with unnamed "reactionary forces" purportedly
troubled by U.S. policy.

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DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION
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3. (U) The text charges the Palace with perpetuating a
system of "military fascism," dismissing as "insane" the
Prime Minister's call for parliamentary elections in
mid-2004. (Note: The statement conveniently does not
explain that Maoist threats and terror have forced the
indefinite postponement of both local and national elections.
End note.) The democratic political parties, according to
the Maoists, are contributing to the situation through their
passivity, thus "gradually causing their own extinction." In
an astounding leap of logic, the statement asserts that
because constitutional monarchy is inappropriate for the 21st
century, "the development of civil war in the country is
quite natural" and attacks on "military fascism" justifiable.

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THREE NEW PHASES IN STRATEGY
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4. (U) The web statement reveals a certain amount of Maoist
sensitivity to speculation that the insurgents' failure to
mount successful large-scale attacks against Government
security forcs since the end of the ceasefire could indicate
that Maoist strength is declining or its command structure
compromised. On the contrary, the statement claims; the
Politburo decision to plan and execute the "strategic
offensive" in three phases (small-scale, decentralized
attacks; medium-sized, somewhat centralized attacks;
large-scale, centralized actions) has been successful so far.
Since the offensive is still in the first stage, the failure
to mount large-scale attacks thus far is all part of the
plan. "A section of the masses, particularly urban middle
class intellectuals, appear to be in some confusion . . .
Even some revolutionary cadres seem to be disappointed in the
absence of big shock attacks," the statement acknowledges.
Perhaps in an effort to reassure these disappointed cadres,
the statement promises that once the first phase is completed
at some unspecified date in the future, "stress should be
placed on organizing centralized large-scale actions."


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REFORMS TO WIN HEARTS AND MINDS
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5. (U) Much of the statement addresses reforms that seem
intended to curb the excesses and arbitrary cruelty that have
cost the Maoists much of their popular base, even among their
purported constituency in rural areas. The text acknowledges
that in "areas that have come under the leadership and
influence of the Party" the Maoists have not done enough to
win hearts and minds. In particular, three abuses--the
destruction of key rural infrastructure, the arbitrary, often
savage murders of local residents, and extortion--are cited.
First, the statement attempts to answer recent criticism in
the local press that the Maoist "jana sarkar" ("people's
governments") supposedly established in areas under insurgent
control provide to local residents little or no development
services, security, or institutional structure analogous to a
government. While the aim of a revolutionary power is to
tear down the apparatus of the old regime, not enough has
been done to reconstruct or develop such infrastructure in
areas under Maoist influence. (Or, as the text so eloquently
puts it, "the dialectical relationship between destruction
and construction has not been properly expressed.") Instead,
in many areas some local commanders seem bent on destroying
all vestiges of the old regime--even important infrastructure
on which the local population depends. Continued destruction
"raises the danger of increasing people's grievances against
us and the enemy's ability to capitalize on that." Instead,
the Maoists should "mobilize the masses" to "carry forward
construction and development activities" in those areas under
their control.


6. (U) Second, indiscriminate killing of "class enemies" and
spies without proper analysis of the perpetrator's class, the
nature of the crime and due process is detrimental to the
cause as well, the statement continues. "In the past some of
the killings have taken place on flimsy grounds" such as not
heeding "donation" demands, not having provided food and
shelter, or even on the basis of a personal vendetta with
local comanders or members of the "people's government." To
safeguard against such excesses, when killing class enemies,
"a certain minimum legal method (must be) adhered to. . . .
Red terror does not mean anarchy."


7. (U) Third, because "enemy" propaganda about Maoist
extortion is spreading "illusion" among the middle class,
"our donations policy (must be) more systematic and refined.
In the past, while collecting donations there have been some
lapses in making adequate class analysis of persons and
organizations, in studying their background and dealing with
them accordingly." To avert future lapses, "concrete
criteria" for assessing "donations" on a class basis must be
developed, and Party Regional Bureaus should control the
collection of all "donations" and taxes.

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INTERNATIONAL APPEAL
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8. (U) The text announces a revised policy toward NGOs and
INGOs "not linked politically with the old regime" and not
"directly financed by US imperialism, which has been most
hostile towards the People's War at the international level."
From now on, "we should not carry out any physical action or
coercion against the INGOs associated with neutral countries
or those not hostile to the People's War, like the European
Union." The statement calls on the Party to "appeal to the
United Nations and other international fora" for recognition
as the legitimate government of Nepal and for the support and
cooperation of all nations against the old regime.

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PRACHANDA ON THE NEW POLICY . . .
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9. (U) An interview with Maoist leader Prachanda posted on
the same website on November 3 offers further explication of
the reforms. The policy changes are based on "lessons from
various shortcomings and weaknesses of the Party," Prachanda
admitted, including the need to "organize the people's state
power" in areas under putative Maoist control. When asked to
explain the "legal" process under which class "enemies" would
now be tried, Prachanda said that the People's Liberation
Army or militia henceforth will hand over all suspects "to
the Justice Department of the People's State Power for
prosecution through the judicial process." Further
clarification will be available in an interim draft
Constitution and "other necessary directives" soon to be
announced, he promised. While the Maoists have not "closed
the door" on future negotiations, "there is no possibility of
talks immediately," he cautions.

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. . . AND THE FOREIGN HAND
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10. (U) The Prachanda interview echoes recent rhetoriocal
efforts by the Maoists to depict U.S. policy in Nepal as
"interference" and "imperialism," aimed at destabilizing the
region and threatening the national interests of India and
China. The Maoists, Prachanda asserts, "have been
maintaining correspondence with UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan" and welcome the interest the UN has shown in
"peacefully resolving the problem by establishing the
sovereign right of the great Nepali people to
self-determination." The Politburo has decided to request
international organizations, including the UN, to recognize
the Maoists as the legitimate representatives of the Nepali
people, instead of the "representatives of the old regime
which has fully lost the people's trust and which functions
under the direction of US imperialism." That said, "we would
like to make it clear that it has been our Party policy not
to take physical action against any US citizen, tourist or
personnel except the US soldiers who come with the so-called
Royal Army to fight in direct encounters."

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COMMENT
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11. (SBU) The Politburo decisions--at least as characterized
on the website--clearly indicate Maoist sensitivity to their
deteriorating public image. The insurgents' unbridled
campaign of murder, destruction, and perhaps most important,
extortion in the countryside has decimated their popular
following and created serious doubts about their ability to
control their cadres. While the policy "reforms" seem an
obvious effort to address these concerns, we have observed
little practical effect so far, as wanton killing,
destruction of infrastructure, and "donation" demands by
Maoist cadres continue undiminished. The website apologia
also attemps to respond to other recent criticisms that
question the Maoists' longevity as an insurgent movement,
i.e., their failure so far to provide any kind of
quasi-governmental services or structures in areas they claim
are under their control and their inability since the end of
the ceasefire to mount large-scale attacks on government
forces.


12. (SBU) Comment Continued: In an effort to deflect
negative attention from themselves, the Maoist leadership
continues to try to externalize the conflict, attempting to
depict USG policy as "intervention" that directly threatens
both India and China and that differs significantly from the
purportedly more tolerant and sympathetic attitudes of other
donors. The Maoists are plainly trying to practice the same
technique of divide-and-conquer--which they have employed to
such advantage in pitting the Palace/Government and political
parties against one another--to the international community.
The Politburo ramblings, followed closely by Prachanda's
long-distance exegesis, signals to us a movement under
increasing pressure, both from its own excesses and
consequently tarnished public image, as well as from our
support and assistance to the Government of Nepal.

BOGGS