NEPAL: MAOISTS OFFER TEN-DAY HOLIDAY TRUCE;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001888

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA
NSC FOR MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS OFFER TEN-DAY HOLIDAY TRUCE;
GOVERNMENT NONCOMMITTAL

REF: KATHMANDU 1836

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).


1. (U) On September 26 the Maoist leadership issued a press
statement declaring a ceasefire from October 2-9 in honor of
the Hindu festival of Dashain. In announcing the truce,
Maoist leader Prachanda cited the "feeling of the masses and
appeals from different political and human rights
organizations and civil society." (The Maoist website on
which the statement is posted notes that "it is quite ironic
that a revolutionary movement aimed at total . . .
transformation of the society has to consider . . . some
traditional festivals would take a long time to fade out of
the consciousness of the masses.")


2. (U) Prachanda's statement went on to allege that "we want
a genuine ceasefire, peace and progress in this country." He
attempts to shift the blame for breaking the January 29
ceasefire onto the "regressive old feudal state, playing into
the hands of foreign power centers, particularly US
imperialism, (which) has falsely and deliberately charged us
with having broken the ceasefire and peace talks . . . .
(but) who compelled our Party and the masses to go for
resistance by openly violating the ceasefire since the
beginning. . . ." He cautions that the unilateral ceasefire
may give "the old state" and its security forces "undue
opportunity," and thus calls on "all the democratic political
forces, human rights organizations, civil society and the
general masses of the people in the country to focus pressure
on the old state . . ."


3. (U) So far, however, public reaction to the announcement
has been fairly muted. Only one of Nepal's numerous human
rights organizations was quoted in the local press as
welcoming the truce. Response from mainstream political
parties has been similarly restrained, although Madhav Kumar
Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal -
United Marxist Leninist (UML),commended the move on
September 27 and is quoted in the local press as calling on
the Government of Nepal (GON) to reciprocate. The GON so far
has been noncommittal in its response to the declaration.
Cabinet Ministers Kamal Thapa and Sarbendra Nath Shukla were
both quoted in the local press as welcoming the
ceasefire--while adroitly sidestepping the question of
whether the GON would reciprocate.


4. (C) Comment: Since unilaterally breaking the ceasefire
on August 27, the Maoists have earned much condemnation from
"civil society" without being able to demonstrate many
tactical successes. Most important, the Maoists have thus
far proven unable to mount the kind of large-scale attacks
against GON security forces that stunned the RNA in November
2001 or the systematic urban guerrilla warfare that many
observers feared they had been planning during the
seven-month moratorium on fighting. With the exception of
the assassination of an RNA colonel the first day after the
ceasefire ended, in the one month since the resumption of
hostilities, the Maoists have little more to point to as
successes than the killings of village-level leaders,
lower-ranking policemen, and a three-day imposition of the
ever-unpopular general strike, or "bandh." Under such
circumstances, the Maoists may have decided that extending
an olive branch, however short, will deflect public scrutiny
of their unimpressive performance so far. The RNA is
aggressively pursuing the Maoists their mid-western
heartland, while security authorities in Kathmandu have made
a number of significant arrests, which forestalled or
disrupted Maoist plans.


5. (C) Comment Continued: The RNA, bolstered by its
apparent victory in Rolpa (Reftel),feels more confident than
before of its ability and is unlikely to advocate accepting a
ceasefire, however limited. The security authorities clearly
believe that they are putting considerable pressure on the
Maoists and want this pressure to continue. The
less-than-overwhelming public reception of Prachanda's
statement probably has more to do with the Nepali public's
wariness--and weariness-of the Maoists' pretensions to peace
than with any real appetite for a protracted conflict. The
insurgents have demonstrated their lack of credibility too
many times already for either the GON, the security forces,
or even the general public to believe that this offer is much
more than a cynical attempt to divert public criticism of
their tactics and forestall further RNA successes for the
near future.
MALINOWSKI