NEPAL: AMBASSADOR URGES PARTIES TO TURN OFF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001692

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL UK NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: AMBASSADOR URGES PARTIES TO TURN OFF
POTENTIALLY VIOLENT RALLY; SEEK UNDERSTANDING WITH PALACE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1674


B. KATHMANDU 1612

C. KATHMANDU 1664

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) Ambassador Malinowski, accompanied by British
Ambassador Keith Bloomfield, had separate discussions with
party leaders and the Prime Minister on August 31 and
September 1 in an effort to head off a potentially violent
all-party demonstration planned for September 4 (Ref A). The
Indian Ambassador carried the same message in his own
meetings with the party chiefs. The Ambassadors emphasized
that the August 27 break in the ceasefire offers a fresh
opportunity for the parties and the Palace to reconcile. The
party leaders committed to scale back the planned protest but
emphasized that they were seeking a sign from the Palace, in
return, indicating a willingness to reconsider reviving
Parliament and/or establishing an all-party government. Amb.
Bloomfield said that he would communicate the message to King
Gyanendra, currently in the UK for medical tests. End
summary.

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DOUBLING UP DIPLOMATICALLY;
US, UK AMBASSADORS IN FULL-COURT PRESS ON PARTIES
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2. (C) On August 31 and September 1, the US and UK
Ambassdors (together) and the Indian Ambassador (in his own
meetings) teamed up to send a strong joint message to the
political parties to call off the massive anti-government
protest planned for September 4 (Ref A). The Ambassadors
stressed in their meetings with party leaders that the break
in the ceasefire makes it likelier than ever that the Maoists
will try to infiltrate the protest, thereby virtually
guaranteeing significant violence. They emphasized that it
is the wrong time to place additional pressure on either the
Government of Nepal (GON) or the thinly stretched security
forces, who, after three assassination attempts by the
Maoists in the capital over the past week, cannot be diverted
to provide security for a mass rally. Should the rally turn
violent and the GON move firmly to quell it, the
confrontation could complicate possibilities for
rapprochement between the parties and the Palace.


3. (S) On August 31 the Foreign Secretary told the
Ambassador that the GON was planning to issue a ban on all
public rallies in the capital. The Ambassador said that no
one could object to the ban if its purpose is to ensure
safety and security in the capital, but asked that the GON
not surprise the parties by issuing it without alerting them
beforehand. Later the same day, the Ambassador, accompanied
by UK Ambassador Keith Bloomfield, met with Nepali Congress
President and former Prime Minister G.P. Koirala. The
Ambassadors reported indications from the Palace that King
Gyanendra (now in the UK for a medical check-up) may be
reconsidering reviving Parliament for a certain period and
with a limited mandate and/or setting up an all-party
government. They cautioned, however, that the planned
September 4 rally could derail such progress toward a
political understanding with the Palace. The envoys warned
of intelligence indicating that the Maoists plan to hijack
the rally for their own ends.


4. (S) While no one disputes the right to free assembly,
the Ambassadors said, holding such a rally now--after the
Maoists' decision to break the ceasefire with violence (and
the subsequent assassination attempts, including on two
former Nepali Congress figures)--would be nothing short of
irresponsible. Friendly countries, they emphasized, would
not understand such behavior on the part of democratic
leaders who should be working with the GON against the
Maoists. A Nepali Congress decision to push the rally to the
detriment of national security would negatively affect how
the US Embassy views the party in the future, the Ambassador
noted. The party should not back itself into a corner but
should seize this opportunity to pursue rapprochement with
the Palace. Both envoys urged Koirala to reconsider holding
the protest.


5. (S) Koirala, who seemed refreshingly flexible and
uncharacteristically amenable to reason, conceded the danger
of violence. A Parliament limited both in duration and
agenda--but with a mandate to negotiate with the Maoists and
to hold general elections--could be acceptable, he said. He
asked if the King could send a message, either public or
private, from London indicating his openness to the idea. UK
Ambassador Bloomfield said he would attempt to obtain such a
message.


6. (S) The Ambassador then spoke by telephone with Madhav
Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal -
United Marxist Leninist (UML),about the rally and the
likelihood of reconciliation with the Palace. Nepal
confirmed that a Palace representative had floated a similar
plan with the party (Ref A) and said that the UML would
attempt to modify the September 4 program in view of security
concerns. The parties might hold separate programs on that
day in different locations to cut down on traffic in the
capital, he suggested. He said that he, like Koirala, was
open to reconciliation with the Palace (although he prefers
an all-party government to restoration of Parliament). Like
Koirala, he is also seeking some sign or message from the
Palace confirming the openness is mutual.

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PM PREDICTABLY LESS ENTHUSIASTIC
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7. (C) On September 1 the Ambassador, again accompanied by
the British Ambassador, met with Prime Minister Surya Bahadur
Thapa. Ambassador-at-large Bekh Thapa also participated in
the meeting (Ref C). PM Thapa said the security forces were
reviewing the scope of the as-yet unissued ban on assemblies.
(Note: A notice was issued later that day banning public
assemblies of more than five people in all three districts in
the Kathmandu Valley until September 23. End note.) The
Ambassadors briefed Thapa on their efforts to dissuade the
political parties from holding the rally and on the parties'
interest in reaching a political settlement with the Palace.
While welcoming the news of the parties' apparent openness to
modifying their program, he was somewhat less enthusiastic
about either the prospect of an all-party government or a
revived Parliament (both of which scenarios would,
implicitly, require his resignation). It might be improper
for the King to send a message from a foreign country, he
quibbled, for (unspecified) reasons of protocol.

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PARTIES' COMPROMISE:
DECENTRALIZED PROGRAM
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8. (U) On September 2 the five parties who had been
planning the September 4 rally, citing "the current critical
and sad situation of the breakdown of the ceasefire and peace
talks," announced a modified program of protest. Instead of
having one massive rally in Kathmandu, the parties have
decided to hold a peaceful non-cooperation program in the
capital (which would nonetheless defy the curfew),with
additional protests at the district level. What exactly will
constitute the non-cooperation program was not spelled out in
the press statement.

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WAITING FOR A MESSAGE FROM LONDON
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9. (C) After an all-party meeting on September 2, Nepali
Congress Central Committee member Dr. Suresh Chalise and
Sujata Koirala, daughter of the Party President, met with the
Ambassador to brief him on the parties' decision and to
inquire if a message had been received from the King. In
light of the security concerns posed by the break in the
ceasefire, the parties had decided to pare down the scale of
the planned protest, they reported. Party workers were no
longer being asked to travel to Kathmandu from across the
country, they said, and were being told instead to hold their
own separate programs in their own districts. Nonetheless,
the Kathmandu rally may attract "ten or twenty thousand,"
they claimed. (Comment: We think this is very optimistic.
End comment.) The program in Kathmandu would be primarily
"symbolic," Sujata said, aimed at demonstrating the parties'
"non-cooperation" with the GON. Now that the Nepali Congress
leadership had put its credibility on the line by dissuading
its party workers (whom they described as eager to die for
democracy) from participating in the rally, it was all the
more important for the King to send a message from London.
Otherwise, how could they pacify their zealous party cadres?
The Ambassador emphasized that the British Ambassador had
committed to trying to obtain such a message; if, how and
when such a message might be obtained cannot be certain. It
is important to remain focused on the goal of political
reconciliation, he stressed, and not to allow possible
fall-out from the rally to undermine the prospects for
progress. The parties do not want a confrontation, Sujata
said, and are actually seeking a way out. She added that the
pair would be visiting the British Ambassador later in the
afternoon. (Note: They did. End note.)


10. (S) On September 2 the Indian Ambassador told
Ambassador Malinowski that he had contacted royal confidant
Prabhakar Rana, now en route to London to meet the King, to
urge that the monarch send the desired message to the
parties. Rana reportedly said he would convey the request.

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COMMENT
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11. (S) Despite the Nepali Congress claims that hordes of
party workers are only too eager to protest, we suspect the
parties would welcome a face-saving device that would avert
almost certain Maoist-instigated violence and a confrontation
with the government. Both the Nepali Congress (with a Party
President more affable and accommodating than we can recall
in more than two years) and the UML seem ready to consider
several options--as long as those options contain one crucial
component: an overture from the King. In the parties' view,
the ball is squarely in the royal court.

MALINOWSKI