Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU1684
2003-09-02 09:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: FORMER PRESIDENT OF FINLAND AHTISAARI

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV NP GON 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001684 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: FORMER PRESIDENT OF FINLAND AHTISAARI
BROUGHT IN FOR CONSULTATIONS ON GON-MAOIST DIALOGUE

REF: KATHMANDU 1677

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001684

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2013
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: FORMER PRESIDENT OF FINLAND AHTISAARI
BROUGHT IN FOR CONSULTATIONS ON GON-MAOIST DIALOGUE

REF: KATHMANDU 1677

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Former President of Finland Marti Ahtisaari
paid a three-day visit to Nepal August 28-30 at the request
of British aid agency DFID to provide assistance to the
facilitators of the GON-Maoist peace talks. During a meeting
with Ambassador Malinowski, Ahtisaari expressed optimism
that, despite resumed violence, a negotiated political
settlement between the government and the insurgents
eventually could be reached. He questioned, however, the
viability of holding elections with the Maoists as a
legitimate political party until the insurgents have laid
down their arms. Ahtisaari's visit planned by DFID, although
well-intentioned, did nothing to further the peace process
and caused some consternation within the GON and the Indian
Embassy. End Summary.


2. (C) On August 29, Ambassador Malinowski met with former
President of Finland Marti Ahtisaari to discuss the prospects
for peace in Nepal. Ahtisaari said he had been approached
two weeks prior, with the support and assistance of British
aid agency DFID, by the four facilitators to the
Maoist-Government of Nepal dialogue asking Ahtisaari to
travel to Nepal to make an assessment and offer advice on how
to move the peace process forward. Ahtisaari agreed to the
visit, which he made from August 28 - 30.


3. (C) During his visit, Ahtisaari spent over three hours
with the facilitators and the Government of Nepal's lead
negotiator and Minister of Finance, Dr. Prakash Chandra
Lohani. (Note. The facilitators have been disbanded as a
result of the break in the cease-fire. (Reftel) End Note.)
After these discussions, Ahtisaari observed that the only way
to resolve the conflict would be to provide conditions under
which the Maoists could play a role in government through
national elections. However, any election would require
international supervision, he said. Ahtisaari questioned the
need for a constituent assembly and suggested that both sides
first agree on a constitutional framework, such as

constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy, that would
provide the basis from which to proceed. He concluded that
the Maoist insurgency and political crisis in Nepal are not
as bad as that with the LTTE in Sri Lanka.


4. (C) Ahtisaari asked the Ambassador for his assessment of
Maoist intentions and the possibility of renewed peace talks.
The Ambassador replied that the main problem centers around
what the Maoists expect to get from negotiations with the
government, namely that the insurgents want control over
elections and, ultimately, over the government. However, the
Ambassador opined, the Maoists may be miscalculating the
impact of their terror campaign on GON thinking. Maoist
threats to bomb the capital and attempts to assassinate
political and military leaders will not cause the GON to
capitulate to Maoist demands, he said.


5. (C) Ahtisaari expressed concern that the Royal Nepal Army
(RNA) had not used the seven-month long cease-fire to improve
and expand the counter-insurgency effort. Ambassador
Malinowksi pointed out, however, that the RNA had used the
cease-fire to fortify its bases around the country so that
mass attacks by the Maoists will be less likely to succeed.
The Ambassador suggested that there are four components to
the peace effort. First, Nepal's constitutional forces --
the King and political parties -- must come together and
present a unified front against the insurgents. Second, the
GON must begin to address the root causes of the conflict by
distributing resources more fairly and including
disenfranchised groups, such as women and members of the
low-castes, into the political system. Third, the GON must
improve the ability of its security forces to protect the
Nepali people. Fourth, the international community must
support the GON against the Maoists, assist the GON's
development effort, and build the GON's capacity to negotiate
with the insurgents.


6. (C) Ambassador Malinowski warned, however, that the
Government of India is very sensitive to third-party
involvement in resolving the Maoist conflict in Nepal and
recommended strongly that Ahtisaari pay a visit to Indian
Ambassador Shyam Saran during his stay in Kathmandu.
Ahtisaari agreed to see Ambassador Saran as well as the
British Ambassador before leaving the country. Ahtisaari
said that because the Maoist leadership is now in hiding, he
would not have the chance to meet with them. He intended
perhaps to hold a separate meeting with talks facilitator
Padma Ratna Tuladhar and journalist Shyam Shrestha, both
known to be surrogate Maoists with close ties to political
leader Baburam Bhattarai. Ahtisaari did not expect to return
to Nepal for a second visit.


7. (U) Biographic Note: Marti Ahtisaari was elected
President of the Republic of Finland in 1994 and held office
until 2000. Shortly after leaving office, Ahtisaari assumed
the Co-Chairmanship of the East-West Institute based in New
York and Chairmanship of the International Crisis Group based
in Brussels. In June 2003, U.N. General Secretary Kofi Annan
appointed Ahtisaari as a U.N. Special Envoy for the
Humanitarian Crisis in the Horn of Africa. He has also done
a significant amount of work furthering peace in the Balkans.
End Biographic Note.


8. (C) Comment. Although Marti Ahtisaari's visit was
well-intentioned, it did not appear to have a significant
impact on the peace process (especially since the
facilitators for the peace talks were relieved of their
duties). Moreover, DFID provided the GON with little prior
notice, and the Indian Embassy no advance notice, of this
high-profile visit. DFID, which has advocated direct donor
contact with the Maoists, has been criticized by Palace
officials who are suspicious of DFID's activities and feel
that the development agency is ignoring political and
security sensitivities surrounding the Maoist insurgency.
When finally informed, the Indian Ambassador privately
expressed ire over DFID's actions in this regard. Although
Post does not necessarily agree with the Indian position on
the possible value of outside mediation, we do not advise
antagonizing the Indians over this issue at a time when the
Indians are increasing the level of their cooperation with
Nepal and other countries on the Maoist insurgency. Post
believes it is important that the U.S., UK and India maintain
a common message toward the Maoists and fear that DFID may be
countermanding this effort. End Comment.
MALINOWSKI