Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU1620
2003-08-26 11:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: REPEATED VIOLATIONS, INCREASED ATTACKS

Tags:  PTER PGOV ASEC CASC NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001620 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2013
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC CASC NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: REPEATED VIOLATIONS, INCREASED ATTACKS
RENDER CEASEFIRE ALL BUT NON-EXISTENT

REF: KATHMANDU 1611

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

--------
SUMMARY
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001620

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS AND DS/IP/SA
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2013
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC CASC NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: REPEATED VIOLATIONS, INCREASED ATTACKS
RENDER CEASEFIRE ALL BUT NON-EXISTENT

REF: KATHMANDU 1611

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Since the beginning of August, increased violence and
armed engagements between Government of Nepal (GON) security
forces and Maoist insurgents have left the seven-month-old
ceasefire a ceasefire in name only. Representatives of the
GON and security forces believe that the Maoists are
provoking attacks in the hopes that the Government will
officially break the ceasefire, thereby shifting the blame
from the Maoists themselves. The August 25 attack on the
convoy of former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba seems to
have been calculated to elicit just such a GON reaction. For
now, we believe the GON will try to maintain the status
quo--keeping the door open to another round of peace talks
while responding militarily to almost daily attacks. The
Maoists, on the other hand, seem bent on ratcheting up
terrorist violence without explicitly breaking the ceasefire.
End summary.

--------------
AUGUST IS THE HOTTEST MONTH?
--------------


2. (U) Although Maoist conscription, abductions, extortion
and intimidation have violated the January 29 ceasefire
constantly almost since its inception, the number and
intensity of armed engagements between Government of Nepal
(GON) security forces and the insurgents have escalated
rapidly since the beginning of August. A brief chronology of
such incidents, as reported in the local press, follows below:

August 1: 1 civilian policeman killed in Amarapuri,
Nawalaparisi

August 4: 1 Maoist killed in Dailekh
August 4: 3 policemen, 1 Royal Nepal Army (RNA) soldier, one
civilian killed in Maoist landmine in Gopetar, Panchthaar
August 4: District Police Office in Ramechhap attacked

August 6: 1 policeman, 1 RNA soldier killed

August 10: 5 Maoists killed in Masuriya, Kailali
August 10: 1 Maoist killed in Khokling, Taplejung

August 11: 1 policeman killed in Barabhise, Sindhupalchowk

August 11: 1 Maoist killed in Nagma, Kalikot

August 12: 1 RNA soldier killed while on leave in Thansing,
Nuwakot

August 14: 1 civilian killed in crossfire in Thamlung,
Taplejung
August 14: 3 Maoists killed in Tehrathum

August 16: 1 policeman killed in Dolakha

August 17: 17-19 Maoists killed in Doramba, Ramechhap

August 19: 2 Maoists killed in Dokhu, Taplejung
August 19: 2 policemen killed in Siraha

August 24: 10 Maoists killed in Nothan, Lamjung
August 24: 10 Maoists killed in Chitti, Kaski

August 25: Maoists destroy paper factory in Dhanusha
August 25: Suspected Maoists fire on vehicle of former Prime
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in Kailali
August 25: 1 Maoist killed in Marmung, Gulmi

August 26: 3 Maoists killed in Brahmadev, Darchula


3. (C) According to security forces, many of the
engagements occur when local Maoist commanders attempt to
enforce a controversial 5 km-limit on the RNA that the
insurgents contend the GON accepted at the May 9 round of
negotiations. (Note: The RNA maintains that no such
agreement was made and patrols as needed throughout the
country. End note.) There is some suspicion that the
Maoists may be energizing sympathetic audiences in the NGO
community to portray these engagements--when they do not turn
out well for the Maoists--as human rights violations.

--------------
ATTACK ON DEUBA
--------------


4. (C) Besides open engagements with the security forces,
the Maoists upped the ante with a targeted attack on the
convoy of former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in Kailali
on August 25 (Reftel). In a conversation with the Ambassador
on August 26, Deuba said that he was en route to a political
rally in Dang at the time of the attack. He had received no
specific direct threats (although a vernacular newspaper had
reported on August 18 that the Maoists were planning to
target Deuba because he is an "American puppet"),but the
police had warned him that the area was dangerous and had
urged him not to travel by road. At an uninhabited and
heavily wooded area along the East-West Highway (where
several incidents had occurred previously),suspected Maoists
opened fire on the lead vehicle in Deuba's convoy, a police
car. According to Deuba, the first vehicle was hit three
times by gunfire, while his own vehicle was hit in the tire.
No one was injured in the incident, and Deuba said he was
planning to continue his political program in Dang later that
same day. He attributed the attack to Maoist displeasure
with his recent public statements criticizing them, as well
as his history of successfully marshaling international
support to oppose the Maoists. On August 26 Prime Minister
Surya Bahadur Thapa condemned the attack as a violation of
the ceasefire that "raised serious doubts about the Maoists'
commitment to the peace process."

--------------
TURNING UP THE HEAT ON BIG BUSINESSES
--------------


5. (C) Besides armed hostilities, Maoist extortion on large
businesses, including some high-profile foreign investments,
has rapidly escalated. Besides the arson that destroyed the
paper mill in Dhanusha on August 25 (Reftel),a prominent
local businessman told us that the Maoists have threatened to
shut down a large jute mill that he owns in Morang. The
Maoists also have levied exorbitant demands for "donations"
on the operators of two separate hydropower projects with
German and Norwegian investment. The Nepali plant manager
for the Khimti Power Plant in Dolakha District, in which the
Norwegian government holds a 73 percent share, reported
receiving a demand for 20 million Nepali rupees
(approximately USD 270,000),or 50 percent of the royalties
the plant pays to the GON. According to the manager, the
Maoists justified their demand by claiming that they were a
political force equal in power to the GON and thus entitled
to an equal amount of revenue from the project. The Maoists
also threatened the personal safety of the director and that
of his family unless he provided an additional USD 2,500 from
his own pocket. (So far, the Bhote Koshi power project,
which is composed of more than 98 percent U.S. investment,
has received no such threats.) The Maoists are reportedly
putting the touch on members of mainstream political parties
as well. One source in the Nepali Congress reported
extortion demands ranging from USD 300-2,700. The parties
are reluctant to publicize the threats out of fear of Maoist
retaliation.

--------------
WHY NOW?
--------------


6. (C) We view the increased incidence of armed engagements
as a calculated attempt by the Maoists to provoke the GON
into ending the ceasefire--thereby, at least in the Maoists'
logic, forfeiting the moral high ground of continuing
negotiations and pursuing peace. The assassination attempt
on Deuba is a particularly flagrant effort to achieve that
aim. The Maoists have likely determined that they will be
unable to obtain GON commitment to (or multi-party support
for),a constituent assembly but are unwilling to
appear--especially to the international community--to be the
intransigent party. Instead, the Maoists appear to be
pursuing a policy of escalating violence, gradually
increasing the pressure on the GON without ever closing the
door to further negotiations--on their terms. So far, the
GON has not reacted to Maoist provocation except to respond
to individual attacks. While the RNA has proven itself ready
to return Maoist fire, it is just as unwilling as its
adversaries to pronounce the peace process officially dead.
We expect the current situation--a nominal ceasefire with an
increasing level of violent confrontations--to continue in
the near term.



MALINOWSKI