NEPAL: GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATOR GLUM ON PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001612

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/INS
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY
NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPAL: GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATOR GLUM ON PROSPECTS
FOR PEACE, MULTI-PARTY COOPERATION

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1586


B. KATHMANDU 1577

C. KATHMANDU 0860

Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI. REASON: 1.5 (B,D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In an August 25 meeting with the Ambassador, Kamal
Thapa, Information Minister and a Government of Nepal's (GON)
negotiator with the Maoists, appeared pessimistic about
prospects for dialogue after the August 17-19 round of talks
(Refs A-B). The Maoists rejected, among other things, a GON
suggestion to establish a ceasefire monitoring mechanism at
the district level. Thapa also expressed trepidation that
the mainstream political parties' plans for a joint protest
against the GON, scheduled to begin on September 4, could
turn violent. End summary.

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PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE:
"ALMOST FINISHED"
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2. (C) On August 25 the Ambassador met with Information
Minister Kamal Thapa, a member of the Government of Nepal
(GON) two-man negotiating team, for a read-out on the August
17-19 round of talks (Refs A-B). The Maoist negotiators
seemed to come to the talks with "a predetermined notion" of
their outcome, Thapa said, and rejected the GON's political
proposals "outright." Given the Maoists' flat refusal to
discuss anything other than GON acceptance of the constituent
assembly--which the GON is not prepared to do--Thapa said he
has "concluded that the prospects for dialogue are almost
finished."


3. (C) Thapa described the GON negotiators' frustration at
being unable to identify any middle ground for discussion
during the two sessions. The GON side tried to persuade its
Maoist counterparts first to draft an agenda for subsequent
talks and then find some common ground for initial
discussions, he said, but the Maoists refused to entertain
the suggestion. The Maoist talk team seemed to have no
mandate to talk about anything beside the constituent
assembly, Thapa commented, and responded to each GON overture
with the same mantra. For example, the GON side offered to
address Maoist concerns about the 13-man monitoring committee
appointed during the May 9 round under the previous
government (Ref C),Thapa said, and had prepared draft
guidelines that provided for monitoring at the district and
local levels. Their insurgent interlocutors dismissed the
idea, saying the monitors are irrelevant in the present
situation. Thapa quoted Maoist negotiator Bhattarai as
declaring that GON rejection of the proposed constituent
assembly would mean war--thereby precluding the need for
monitors--while GON acceptance would mean an immediate end to
the conflict--and thus no need for monitors. The GON team
then proposed a referendum on the constituent assembly, a
suggestion that the insurgents rejected as a royalist ploy.

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MAOISTS TERM PARTIES IRRELEVANT;
1990-STYLE DEMOCRACY TO BE DESTROYED
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4. (C) Maoist negotiators demanded to know if the GON talk
team had been empowered to discuss the future of the
monarchy, Thapa reported. The GON talk team, noting that the
Maoists had not included that topic on the agenda,
nonetheless asked the insurgents to elaborate on their vision
of the role of the constitutional monarchy and the political
parties. According to Thapa, the Maoist negotiators scoffed
at the notion of giving the parties a role, claiming that
they are unable to influence the outcome of the talks and
that they would have to abide by whatever the Maoists decide
to do. As for the monarch, the Maoists reportedly committed
to giving him a "place" according to the "level of his
sacrifice" in ceding authority. When asked about the
sovereignty of the Nepali people, which the GON team
described as one of the gains of the 1990 democracy movement,
the Maoists would only answer that the goal of their movement
was to destroy the old regime to create a new one that would
not be based on the 1990 "people's movement."

5. (C) Bhattarai ended the talks by issuing an ultimatum,
Thapa said: Unless the GON comes up with a new proposal (to
consider the constituent assembly),"we'll consider the
ceasefire over." Given the Maoists' uncompromising stance,
Thapa concluded, prospects for dialogue are not good. The
GON has no problem with the constituent assembly per se,
Thapa stressed. The important question is to identify the
Maoists' motives and objectives behind their demand. Because
their interpretation of multi-party democracy is not the same
as the GON's, the Maoists will use the constituent assembly
to sideline legal political forces, he predicted. The
Maoists want to use the proposed constituent assembly only as
a way to grab power for themselves, he continued, while the
GON is trying to incorporate all political forces in a
negotiated political accord. Why are the Maoists so
confident? he wondered. Who is backing them? The Ambassador
noted the August 20 arrest of Maoist Central Committee member
Chandra Gajurel by Indian authorities in Chennai as a
positive sign. Thapa thanked the U.S. Embassy for its August
23 press statement urging the peace process to continue,
adding that the Indians, EU, and Japanese had also made
recent helpful statements.

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PEACE SECRETARIAT HELPFUL;
HUMAN RIGHTS ACCORD EXTRANEOUS
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6. (C) The newly established Peace Secretariat played a
useful role during the August 17-19 round, Thapa said, adding
that it helped produce, for the first time, signed minutes
and signed press statements for both sessions. The GON has
no objection to signing the human rights accord proposed by
the National Human Rights Commission (along with the UNHRC),
Thapa said, especially since the GON is already legally bound
to observe a number of international human rights treaties
that it has signed in the past. The GON does object,
however, to signing an agreement at the same nominal
political level as the Maoists, he said, adding that the GON
has already told the National Human Rights Commission that it
is prepared to sign a separate, stand-alone document. "We
still want to save the process. We don't want to be seen as
blocking it," he concluded.

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RECALCITRANT PARTIES TO RESUME AGITATION
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7. (C) The GON remains unable to persuade leaders of the
mainstream political parties to join it, Thapa said. He
reported having just met with Madhav Kumar Nepal, General
Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist

SIPDIS
Leninist (UML),to try to forestall an anti-GON protest the
parties have planned to begin on September 4. (Note: The
King, who left Nepal for medical treatment in the UK on Auust
24, is not scheduled to return until o/a September 7. End
note.) The parties have threatened to bring workers from all
over the country into the capital to "paralyze the state
machinery," Thapa noted, and have promised that the upcoming
agitation (presumably in contrast to earlier, less
enthusiastically received demonstrations) will be of
indefinite duration and "final and decisive." He said that
Nepal did not listen to his arguments that the protest would
serve only to benefit the Maoists by keeping the legal,
pro-democracy forces divided, even though Nepal has "even
less faith" in the Maoists than the GON. He expressed fear
that the agitation could turn violent, especially if the
Maoists infiltrate the protesters. The GON must take a stand
if the protests turn unruly or it will risk appearing weak,
he stated, adding that the parties and the GON seem headed
for a confrontation.


8. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the GON must respect
the parties' right to free and peaceful assembly. Given the
very real possibility of Maoist infiltration--and thus
violence--he said the Embassy will engage with the democratic
political leaders to urge prudence and restraint. The GON
must be careful not to over-react, he cautioned; that could
only make matters worse. Noting that the parties and the GON
stand for the same principles (constitutional monarchy,
multi-party democracy, popular sovereignty, human rights),he
asked why the parties could not endorse a common statement
with the GON to uphold such values. Despite these common
aims, the parties are "not ready" to be seen as supporting
the GON, Thapa said, preferring instead to subvert it through
street protests. The parties maintain the current government
is illegitimate because the King appointed it, even though in
practice the King has granted the GON full executive
authority, Thapa asserted. For example, the GON itself
drafted the political reform proposals presented to the
Maoists during the last round; the King only approved the
final draft.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) In private, all of the political party leaders we
contact admit that they and the GON share the same main
principles, as well as a common adversary--the Maoists.
Sadly, however, having common interests is not enough to
secure unity of purpose in Nepal's contentious political
environment. The parties' decision to resume protests
against the GON, following so quickly on the disappointing
third round of talks and increasing violations of the
ceasefire (septel),seems intentionally designed to put
additional pressure on a government already under the gun.
We will continue our efforts to persuade political party
leaders to direct their democratic energies toward acting in
the best interests of the country.

MALINOWSKI