NEPAL: THIRD ROUND OF TALKS ENDS WITHOUT AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001577

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: THIRD ROUND OF TALKS ENDS WITHOUT AGREEMENT

REF: KATHMANDU 1565

Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for Reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Amidst increased violence over the past
several days, the third round of peace talks between the
Government of Nepal and the Maoists concluded on August 19
without agreement. Both sides left open the possibility of
returning for a fourth round of talks. However, a growing
number of people within Nepal's security forces believe the
cease-fire is fatally fragile. The Maoists' refusal to
compromise on its demand for a constituent assembly is
consistent with the insurgents' past practice of attempting
to gain concessions from the government without compromising
their own position. The Maoist leadership's ideological
rigidity and belief in the weakness of the current government
may lead the Maoists to break the cease-fire unilaterally.
End Summary.


2. (C) The third round of peace talks between the Government
of Nepal and the Maoists ended without agreement after a
third day of meetings concluded on August 19 (reftel). While
the GON agreed to two of three basic Maoist demands, namely
an interim government and roundtable conference, the Maoist
team torpedoed the negotiations by refusing to compromise on
the remaining demand for a constituent assembly. The meeting
disbanded with the understanding that the facilitators to the
negotiations would recommend a date for the next round of
talks. Press reports have suggested that at least a week
will pass before the facilitators decide upon a date.


3. (C) The negotiating teams permitted journalists to attend
the third day of talks, August 19, in Dang District in the
mid-Western Terai. From statements made by the GON and
Maoist negotiators that day, one senior Nepali journalist, in
a telephone conversation with the DCM, reported his
impression that the "talks are now dead." The journalist
also reported that Dang was crawling with young Maoist cadre
with guns in an attempt to demonstrate Maoist military might
to the GON talk team and media representatives.


4. (C) Some NGOs and donor governments, including the UK,
U.S. and India, have reacted favorably to the GON concept
paper (reftel). Nepal's political parties, however, have
complained publically that the paper does not take into
consideration their agenda. On the other hand, some
political leaders within both the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML
have indicated privately their agreement with the principles
outlined in the GON's concept paper. This paper outlines the
GON's strategy for major social and political reforms and
clearly states its core principles of maintaining a
constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy. The
Maoists' outright rejection of the GON's paper has caused a
growing number of people within Nepal's security forces to
believe that the cease-fire is hanging only by a slender
thread. Many military and police officials have indicated
that they believe the chances of a unilateral break in the
cease-fire by the Maoists are high. Estimates of when a
break will occur range from a few days to a few weeks (the
latter corresponding to the end of monsoon rains.)

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Comment: Why the Maoist Insistence a Constituent Assembly?
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5. (C) Why have the Maoists' categorically refused to
compromise on its demand for a constituent assembly when the
GON has offered so much? Although the answer is not clear,
the following factors likely play a role:

-- First, if we take seriously what Maoists leaders have said
in other contexts, there is every reason to believe that
negotiations with the government are seen merely as a
tactical ploy to further the Maoist goals of revolution and
single-party rule. A constituent assembly is viewed as a
bourgeois-democratic issue, not a communist one, and
therefore has no long-term validity.

-- Second, throughout the current cease-fire the Maoist
leadership has displayed consistent contempt for the code of
conduct to which it has agreed. Likewise, Maoist activities
to date suggest that the insurgents are not looking for a
compromise solution through political reform but would accept
only total surrender by the state.
-- Third, the Maoists appear to be locked into an inflexible
ideological mind-set. The Maoist leadership has looked often
to historical examples, such as the Shining Path and the
Russian Bolsheviks, as guides for its military and political
strategy. An American academic specializing in insurgencies
who has spoken at length with Baburam Bhattarai indicates
that the Maoists' ideology appears to be based heavily on
out-dated Marxist-Leninism, with Stalin regarded as an icon.
This scholar reports that, if pushed on specific political
and social policies, the Maoists fall back readily to
dogmatism. Moreover, he said, Bhattarai continues to claim
that communism is the solution to all problems while at the
same time he is searching for new communist models for
guidance on issues to which his old-style dogma offers no
answers.

-- Fourth, the Maoist leadership regards the government as
illegitimate and weak. The Maoists' negotiating strategy
reportedly resembles most closely that of Gerry Adams, who
used the argument that IRA rebels did not have to lay down
their arms because the government was illegitimate and
maintained an armed force. The rebels, by this reasoning,
have a non-negotiable right to an army as well.


6. (C) Although both sides may agree to return for another
round of talks, it appears that the Maoists are merely biding
their time and do not intend to seek a peaceful solution to
the conflict. End Comment.

MALINOWSKI