Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KATHMANDU1413
2003-07-28 10:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: MAOISTS SET JULY 31 DEADLINE FOR POSSIBLE

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREL NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001413 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS SET JULY 31 DEADLINE FOR POSSIBLE
END TO CEASE-FIRE

REF: KATHMANDU 1388

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001413

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS SET JULY 31 DEADLINE FOR POSSIBLE
END TO CEASE-FIRE

REF: KATHMANDU 1388

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) On July 25, Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa's
government replied to the Maoist letter setting
pre-conditions for the resumption of peace talks (reftel).
In its response, the Government of Nepal (GON) reaffirmed its
commitment to the peace talks, but stated it would not
concede to Maoist demands without first initiating the third
round of negotiations.


2. (C) On July 27, the insurgents responded to the GON in an
8-page letter addressed to the negotiating team and signed by
Maoist political leader Babarum Bhattarai. The letter, which
has not yet been made public, but which we expect soon will,
demands that the GON implement its pre-conditions (reported
reftel) by July 31 or face a break-down in the cease-fire.
The final page of the letter summarizes the Maoist ultimatum
and is provided below in rough translation:

BEGIN TEXT:

Maoists have requested the government fulfill all the
decisions (mentioned below) made during the first and second
round of talks by July 31, 2003, Thursday to show the
government's commitment towards the cease-fire. If these
pre-requisites for dialogue are fulfilled by then, then the
Maoists would come for the third round of talks. If not, the
Maoists will conclude that the government has unilaterally
dissolved the cease-fire and the dialogue.

-- Implement the decision made during the second round of
talks to limit the activities of the Royal Army within 5
kilometers of the barracks, release the central level
prisoners of war and publicize the whereabouts of the missing.

-- In the new round of talks, the King should involve himself
in the dialogue or give full authority to the formal dialogue
team to make agreement on necessary subjects including the
progressive political solution and have the determined
authority to follow the agreements.

-- The Royal Nepal Army should publicize its determination to
follow the code of conduct and the decisions made during all
rounds of talks.

-- Abandon the anti-terrorist treaty signed recently with
America for five years and throw out all the American
military advisors and specialists from the country.

-- Publicize the progressive agenda of the old regime.

END TEXT


3. (C) Comment. The Maoist response to last week's letter
from Prime Minister Thapa's negotiating team came
unexpectedly fast, suggesting that the Maoist leadership had
decided already to break the cease-fire and attempt to
deflect responsibility for the failure of the talks onto the
GON. There is virtual unanimity among non-Maoist spokesmen
for political and civil society that the GON will not and
should not meet the insurgents' unrealistic pre-conditions
for resumption of the peace talks. Post will seek further
information from government sources and hold an Emergency
Action Committee in anticipation of renewed violence. End
Comment.

MALINOWSKI