NEPAL: MAOISTS ISSUE PRE-CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001388

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SA/INS, SA/RA
LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: MAOISTS ISSUE PRE-CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION
OF TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. On July 23, the Maoist leadership publicly
released a letter responding to the Government of Nepal's
invitation to resume formal peace negotiations stalled since
early May. Blaming the GON for violations of the cease-fire
code of conduct, the letter represents another effort to turn
public opinion against King Gyanendra's government and
against "foreign powers", specifically the United States. In
the letter, the Maoists set unrealistic pre-conditions for
the resumption of peace talks. Post believes this is a
continuation of the Maoist strategy of insisting on
concessions from the GON without having to negotiate. The
letter also provided thinly-veiled threats that if the
pre-conditions are not met, the Maoists will re-initiate its
campaign of violence and terror. The GON negotiating team
has indicated that it would respond as calmly and quickly as
possible, but that the demands will be difficult to satisfy.
However, the RNA reportedly has put its forces on heightened
alert in anticipation of renewed violence. In sum, by making
unrealistic demands, the Maoists have brought the cease-fire
one step closer to collapse. End Summary.

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The Maoists' Demands
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2. (C) On July 23, the Maoist leadership issued a letter
signed by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai to Prime Minister Surya
Bahadur Thapa outlining the conditions the Government of
Nepal must meet before formal negotiations can resume.
Specifically, the Maoist letter:

-- (a) Demands that the agreements allegedly reached at the
second round of talks in May must be implemented before peace
negotiations can resume. The insurgents claim that the GON
had agreed to limit the Royal Nepal Army to within 5
kilometers of its barracks, release three Maoist leaders from
prison, and make public the whereabouts of missing Maoist
activists. The GON, however, has denied reaching agreement
on limiting the RNA's movements and, in any case, the RNA has
flatly refused to comply with such a request as it would give
the Maoists an enormous tactical advantage should hostilities
resume. The letter also claimed that although "all district
headquarters and large cities" were under RNA control, "the
rest of the villages and rural areas were under the control
of the Liberation Army." As a result, the Maoists state that
they will regard any RNA or police patrol outside urban areas
to be a violation of the cease-fire code of conduct.

-- (b) Complains that without executive authority, the
negotiating team is useless and, therefore, the King must
accord the team full authority before talks can resume.
-- (c) Demands that the King and political parties must
reconcile their differences prior to re-initiating
negotiations.

-- (d) Claims that the RNA has "invited hundreds of U.S.
military experts and advisors into the country," thereby
disrupting the peace process. The letter also refers to the
RNA as a "foreign puppet military" and likens the Maoist
insurgency to the 1960s war in Vietnam.

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Government Reaction
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3. (C) On July 23, Kamal Thapa, Minister of Information and
member of the GON negotiating team expressed concern to the
Ambassador about the letter's contents, describing it overall
as "negative." The local press reports that Thapa felt the
Maoists' pre-conditions are "very tough" and would cause a
delay in the resumption of peace talks. Thapa noted to the
Ambassador that the Maoists had also focused attention on the
U.S. military in Nepal. He commented that the GON would
respond as calmly and quickly as possible, perhaps as soon as
July 24 or 25. Other sources indicate that the GON already
has solicited recommendations from RNA and National Police
leaders. Senior police officers reportedly suggested that
the GON response should focus on Maoist violations of the
cease-fire rather than directly addressing the insurgents'
unrealistic demands.


4. (C) Separately, the Chief of Army Staff Pyar Jung Thapa
also expressed concern over the Maoists' intentions and
confided to the Ambassador that he had raised the Army's
alert level. Press reports indicate that all RNA soldiers on
leave have been recalled in anticipation of renewed violence.


5. (C) Indian Ambassador Saran expressed less concern to the
Ambassador over the letter, seeing it as a likely tactic to
gain concessions and not necessarily a prelude to terminating
the talks. He claimed to have some information from Maoist
sources indicating that the Maoists wanted the talks to
continue.

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Comment
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6. (C) The Maoist response to Prime Minister Thapa's
invitation to peace talks represents a continuation of their
strategy of extracting concessions from the GON without
entering into formal negotiations. By all indications, the
Maoist leadership correctly perceive the more organized and
structured approach to negotiations of the Thapa government
as less susceptible to their intimidation and manipulation.
By setting unrealistic pre-conditions for the resumption of
talks, the Maoists have set up the peace process for failure.
Maoist accusations that the GON is "continuously" violating
the code of conduct are a transparent effort to shift blame
for a break in the cease-fire to the RNA and National Police.
In fact, Post's assessment is that the Maoists have been
much more guilty of cease-fire violations than Nepal's
security forces.


7. (C) Maoist rhetoric against the U.S., while nothing new,
appeals to Nepali nationalism and politicizes U.S. military
assistance to Nepal, increasing pressure on the GON to refuse
such assistance. The Maoist effort to end U.S. military
training is further proof that they see our assistance as a
threat to their political and military objectives. In sum,
while the Maoists may be playing some type of brinkmanship
game to extract concessions, in doing so they have brought
the cease-fire one step closer to collapse. End Comment.
MALINOWSKI