NEPALI GOVERNMENT SAID TO ACCEPT OUTSIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001213

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SA/INS AND SA/RA
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY
NSC FOR MILLARD
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA - LILIENFELD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID NP GON
SUBJECT: NEPALI GOVERNMENT SAID TO ACCEPT OUTSIDE
ASSISTANCE ON NEGOTIATIONS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1097

B. KATHMANDU 0902

Classified By: DCM ROBERT K. BOGGS. REASON: 1.5 (B,D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Summary: According to a representative from a Swiss
NGO, the Government of Nepal (GON) peace negotiation team has
agreed in principle to accept outside "negotiation support,"
to be provided to both the GON and Maoist insurgents.
Despite the delay in peace talks, the recent change in
government, and the Maoists' increasingly belligerent
rhetoric, the NGO representative, who maintains regular
contact with insurgent ideologue Baburam Bhattarai, expressed
confidence that the Maoists are not prepared to walk away
from the table. The newly established Peace Secretariat is
not yet fully operational, its one-man staff primarily
engaged in hiring new personnel and securing office space.
Once peace talks resume, the Secretariat will be responsible
for managing paper flow, "implementing" the decisions reached
during negotiations, and acting as a liaison between the
Government talk team and the media, NGOs, and the donor
community. While the GON plainly needs outside assistance in
training both negotiators and Secretariat staff, it remains
unclear if the new administration of Prime Minister Thapa
will be more receptive to outside participation in this
sensitive area. End summary.

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NEW GOVERNMENT MAY ACCEPT
OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE IN TALKS
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2. (C) On June 26 Andrew Marshall (protect) of the Center
for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) in Geneva told poloff that
newly apppointed Information Minister and GON talk team
spokesman Kamal Thapa had agreed to accept limited
"negotiation support" from the Swiss organization. (Note:
Marshall is a semi-frequent visitor to Kathmandu whose
organization had offered similar support to both sides for
negotiations during the 2001 negotiations under Prime
Minister Deuba and the two rounds of negotiations held under
the Chand government in April and May. The GON had not
previously agreed to the assistance. Marshall maintains
regular contact with Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai. End
note.) Marshall, whose organization has no permanent
presence in Nepal, said that HD had already decided to keep
one staff member in country indefinitely for the time being.
The staff member has already begun providing some limited
assistance to the four Nepali facilitators who participated
in the last two rounds of dialogue, setting up office space
for them in a Kathmandu hotel and helping them better define
their role.



3. (C) Marshall indicated that the "negotiation support"
his organizatin will offer will focus, to a large degree, on
training members of both sides on negotiating techniques and
strategy. The GON has not thus far developed a strategy, he
opined, and neither side is giving appropriate focus to
confidence-building measures or "deliverables" that create a
sense of progress in a peace process. The GON attitude
toward dialogue to date has been haphazard, he continued,
which adds to the Maoists' frustration at the lack of
progress. He cited the continuing controversy about whether
the GON had agreed during the last round of talks to restrict
the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to within 5 km of barracks (Ref B)
as one pitfall that could have been averted by better
training and preparation on both sides. (Note: Several
sources have confirmed to us that no one on either talk team
nor any of the four facilitators took notes or kept written
records of the two rounds of dialogue that have taken place
so far. GON negotiators, according to one well-placed
source, attended both rounds "without even a piece of paper"
in hand to guide their discussion. According to one
anecdote, when one participant asked to borrow a pen to jot
something down during the last round, none of the 15 people
in the room could produce one. End note.)

4. (C) Marshall said the offer for assistance is open to
both sides--a point he claimed Thapa knows and accepts.
Training would also be made available to the GON's newly
formed Peace Secretariat. Marshall said he is optimistic
that the Maoists will respond favorably to the offer as well,
although he admitted not having made contact with them during
this latest visit. (Note: Each of the five Maoist
negotiators is apparently out of town and out of sight for
the time being. Speculation is rampant that some or all may
have returned to India. End note.) HD will keep any
assistance low-key and behind the scenes, Marshall
emphasized, and has no immediate plans to increase either its
staff or its visibility here. For this reason, he has
decided not to consult with the Indian government--which is
widely believed to have discouraged the GON from accepting
third-party assistance in the past. As long as the
assistance remains discreet, he reasoned, the Indians may
decide to overlook it. Formally notifying the Indian
government of the proposed assistance, on the other hand,
might force the southern neighbor to take a position against
the plan.

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MAOISTS MAY FULMINATE,
BUT WON'T QUIT TALKS
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5. (C) In his most recent telephone conversation with
Bhattarai a week earlier, Marshall said that the Maoist
ideologue was "frothing at the mouth" at perceived
interference by the US, UK, and India in the June 4 change in
government. Despite their displeasure at the change in
government, the Maoists will not break off dialogue, Marshall
predicted. He noted the Maoists' uncharacteristic silence
after the local press reported that 7 insurgents had been
killed in a fire fight with the RNA in Jajarkot on June 21
(septel),speculating that the Maoists were unwilling to
jeopardize relations with the new goverment by raising an
outcry. When poloff asked why the Maoists were so angry at a
change that swapped one royally appointed National Democratic
Party leader for another, Marshall replied that the Maoists
fear that the new government will renege on commitments made
by the Chand governent in the two previous rounds. He cited
the 5-km restriction on the RNA and an as-yet unfulfilled
promise to release all Maoist Central Committee members as
examples. Bhattarai remains especially incensed at the USG,
and continually raises the placement of the Maoists on a
watchlist in the annual terrorism report as evidence of US
enmity. The Maoists truly cannot understand the USG refusal
to "get over" the murders of two locally employed Embassy
guards, Marshall said, indicating that the Maoists believe
that their admission of responsibility and characterization
of the executions as mistakes should have been sufficient to
clear the air. Poloff said that the USG is seeking justice
for the two slayings, as well as an end to extortion of US
businesses, and will not "get over" anything until progress
is demonstrated on these fronts. Marshall said he
understands the US view.

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SECRETARIAT SET UP;

SIPDIS
NOT YET READY TO GO
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6. (SBU) On June 26 emboffs met with Janak Raj Joshi, Joint
Secretary at the 10-day-old Peace Secretariat, which was set

SIPDIS
up by Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa as one of his first
acts in office. Joshi, who is currently "squatting" at the
Ministry of Population and Environment, said he is spending
most of his time now hiring additional staff members and
securing suitable office space. Joshi said he meets with the
two members of the GON's newest talk team (Ref A) on a daily
basis. He has not, however, yet met with the four
facilitators who participated in the two previous rounds, nor
with the six members of the previous GON negotiating team.
He acknowledged that neither side apparently had kept minutes
of the two previous sessions, making his own task of picking
up where the last round ended significantly more difficult.



7. (SBU) The terms of reference for the Secretariat task it
with six areas of responsibility. First, the Secretariat is
charged with "implementation" of all decisions made during
the talks. Second, it is to provide negotiators with
"advice, information and documents" related to the conduct of
the negotiations. Joshi said that documenting alleged
violations of the code of conduct would be an example of a
duty under this rubric. Third, the Secretariat is
responsible for "research and development," i.e., hiring
consultants and experts and/or developing a "road map" for
the peace process. Fourth, the Secretariat will document
each round of negotiations (a marked departure from past
practice). Fifth, it is responsible for "generic
coordination" with NGOs, civil society, and the donor
community. Sixth, it will act as the talk team's media
liaison. (Note: A wire diagram outlining the Secretariat's
organizational structure has been e-mailed to SA/INS. End
note.)


8. (SBU) Poloff asked about possible Secretariat plans to
hire consultants and experts. Joshi emphasized that the GON
has not yet decided whether to solicit outside assistance,
adding that any experts or consultants needed might be
locally hired. "We have to be careful of outside influence,"
he noted, but added that assistance from a multilateral,
neutral organization could be more politically acceptable.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) With Prime Minister Thapa still trying to urge
political parties to join his half-full Cabinet and with only
two members of a talk team appointed, the GON is unlikely to
be re-open formal negotiations very soon. However much the
Maoists may complain that the change in government is
delaying progress, the hiatus between rounds of dialogue
offers a valuable window of opportunity for the GON to
receive some desperately needed aid in preparing for
negotiations. Despite its obvious need, the GON had
previously parried all offers of negotiation assistance from
donors eager to assist the peace process with polite refusals
that usually contained some reference to "regional
sensitivities" (Nepali-speak for India). It is difficult to
determine whether the GON has overcome its reservations and
decided to accept some quiet, low-profile assistance, or
whether Information Minister Thapa, who has apparently been
on cordial terms with Marshall for some time, simply could
not bring himself to refuse the offer outright. The Embassy
will follow up with the resident HD staff member and with
others in the GON to learn if the government has changed its
attitude toward third-party assistance in the peace process.

MALINOWSKI