Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KABUL1744
2003-06-29 05:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

NATO ISAF DELEGATION DISCUSSES SECURITY, AIRPORT

Tags:  PGOV MOPS MARR AF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001744 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ZKHALILZAD, DSEDNEY, RHANSON
DEPT FOR SA/PAB
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2013
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MARR AF
SUBJECT: NATO ISAF DELEGATION DISCUSSES SECURITY, AIRPORT
OPERATIONS, RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Robert P. Finn for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

--------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001744

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ZKHALILZAD, DSEDNEY, RHANSON
DEPT FOR SA/PAB
CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2013
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MARR AF
SUBJECT: NATO ISAF DELEGATION DISCUSSES SECURITY, AIRPORT
OPERATIONS, RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Robert P. Finn for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Post hosted June 19 a meeting with the visiting NATO
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) delegation led
by Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping Robert Serry.
Representatives from NATO embassies in Kabul included the UK,
Spanish, Turks, Danes, and Dutch; the Germans, Belgians and
French also have embassies in Kabul but did not attend the
meeting. Discussion focused on security in and around Kabul,
necessary preparations for NATO,s assumption of ISAF
command, lead nation responsibility for Kabul International
Airport, and potential Russian assistance to ISAF. End
summary.

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SECURITY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR NATO ISAF
--------------


2. (C) The delegation expressed pleasant surprise regarding
the efficiency of the Afghan MFA and Embassy in Brussels,
which transmitted a NATO paper to Kabul, circulated it
amongst other Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
(TISA) ministries, collected comments, and generated
constructive feedback.


3. (C) Deputy Secretary General Serry and his staff inquired
about security in Kabul and throughout the country,
developments surrounding the October Constitutional Loya
Jirga (CLJ),the summer 2004 elections, and security sector
reforms including disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR) and restructuring the Ministry of
Defense. The discussion touched only briefly on Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT),as the delegation intended to
address the issue separately in a subsequent meeting with
Office of Military Cooperation Chief MG Karl Eikenberry.


4. (C) Offering the Embassy Kabul perspective on important
steps in NATO,s assumption of ISAF command, CDA and Poloffs
stressed the need to immediately establish contact with key
TISA ministries, especially the Ministry of Interior, UNAMA,
and counterparts in CJTF-180. Embassy officers underscored
the need to start planning for security in the Kabul area of

responsibility in advance of the selection of CLJ delegates
and the actual convening of the CLJ in October. Another
significant point is the imperative of establishing a robust
public relations/psychological operations program that
targets Kabul,s population. Emboffs suggested that it was
not too late to start planning with relevant TISA officials
for the Hajj; such planning should start at least three
months beforehand, i.e. in September. ISAF,s major role is
cooperation at the Kabul airport, which funneled almost half
of last year,s 26,000 Hajjis, with particular focus on
security around the airport and passenger assembly point in
liaison with the Ministry of Interior.


5. (C) CDA and Poloffs also emphasized that NATO should
consider the role of ISAF in the DDR process when it arrives
in Kabul. Furthermore, ISAF,s part in demilitarizing Kabul
(i.e. removing Afghan Militia Forces in the capital, most of
whom are Panjshiris loyal to Defense Minister Fahim) in
accordance with the Bonn Agreement should be carefully
thought out and strategized as TISA authorities and the
international community muster the political will and a
practical plan to carry out demilitarization.

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LEAD NATION FOR KABUL AIRPORT
--------------


6. (C) Responding to a query on a lead nation for Kabul,s
international airport, Serry stated that the Germans were
ready to continue as lead nation provided there was common
funding. (Comment: Since taking over the APOD (aerial point
of departure - the military side of the combined
civilian/military Kabul International Airport) from the
Turks, the Germans have done a superb job; they have invested
much in repairing bombed out buildings, paving a new heliport
area, expanding the apron, marshalling more fire and safety
equipment, and installing many new prefabs for offices,
barracks, and storehouses. Embassy recommends the Germans,
with whom the Embassy has an excellent working relationship,
remain in charge of the airport. End comment.)

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RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE OFFER TO NATO ISAF
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7. (C) On the question of Russian interest in assisting NATO
ISAF, Serry conveyed that the Alliance,s Military Committee
was studying the Russian offer, though NATO members were
divided in opinion. Serry explained that Russian transit and
overflight permissions would be useful, but that no Russian
soldiers would be stationed with ISAF. Intelligence sharing
via Tajikistan and possible Russian military airlift are also
part of the offer, Serry said. He also mentioned that
Secretary General Lord Robertson had phoned Karzai about the

SIPDIS
Russian offer of assistance and Karzai stated it was a very
sensitive subject that would have to be considered carefully.
(Comment: Karzai, perhaps, in his first phone call with
Robertson, was too polite to tell him outright, NOT a good
idea. End comment.)


8. (C) Embassy officers held that Russian involvement in ISAF
is politically infeasible at this time for the Karzai
administration. With memories still fresh of the calamity
inflicted on Afghanistan by the Soviets, most Afghans would
not understand observable Russian participation in ISAF.
Were they to become visibly involved, ISAF might face an
additional security threat with irate Afghans targeting ISAF
because of the Russian (Soviet) connection. Also, the
Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) would try
to score public relations points against the Karzai
government and Coalition for including the Russians.


9. (C) Deputy Secretary General Serry informed the group that
President Karzai invited SG Robertson to Kabul on September
26, if Karzai himself is not attending the UN General
Assembly at that time. He also conveyed that NATO invited
Foreign Minister Abdullah and SRSG Brahimi to North Atlantic
Council meetings on July 16 and 23, respectively. Finally,
Serry offered that SG Robertson would not come to the August
12 ISAF change of command ceremony, which NATO wants to keep
low-key.

10. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered.
FINN