Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03KABUL1029
2003-04-21 02:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

CONGRESSMAN ROHRABACHER'S APRIL 16 MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL SNAR PINR PTER AF 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KABUL 001029 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ZKHALILZAD, JDWORKEN, HMANN, RHANSON, DSEDNEY
DEPT FOR SA/PAB, SA/AR, EUR/WE
MANILA PLEASE PASS AMB PSPELTZ
USDOC FOR DAS/TD MURPHY AND AFGHAN RECON TASK FORCE
STATE PASS USAID FOR JPRYOR
STATE PASS TDA FOR DSTEIN AND JSUSSMAN
STATE PASS TREASURY FOR U/S TAYLOR, LMCDONALD
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RCONNELLY AND DZAHNHEISER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2013
TAGS: PREL SNAR PINR PTER AF
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN ROHRABACHER'S APRIL 16 MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT KARZAI

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KABUL 001029

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ZKHALILZAD, JDWORKEN, HMANN, RHANSON, DSEDNEY
DEPT FOR SA/PAB, SA/AR, EUR/WE
MANILA PLEASE PASS AMB PSPELTZ
USDOC FOR DAS/TD MURPHY AND AFGHAN RECON TASK FORCE
STATE PASS USAID FOR JPRYOR
STATE PASS TDA FOR DSTEIN AND JSUSSMAN
STATE PASS TREASURY FOR U/S TAYLOR, LMCDONALD
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RCONNELLY AND DZAHNHEISER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2013
TAGS: PREL SNAR PINR PTER AF
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN ROHRABACHER'S APRIL 16 MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT KARZAI

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: On April 16, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher met
with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Rohrabacher was
accompanied by his spouse, Ambassador and Econ/Comofficer
(notetaker). Congressman Rohrabacher began by assuring
Karzai that the war in Iraq had not diverted attention from
Afghanistan. Rather, his message in Washington was that both
efforts were part of the same war on terrorism. Rohrabacher
added that even fiscally frugal members of Congress look upon
funds in support of Afghanistan as war expenditures and not
aid expenditures. Rohrabacher noted, however, that he needed
to speak frankly with Karzai about the pace of
counter-narcotic efforts and the strategy for addressing
warlordism. Rohrabacher pointed out that pressure was
building in Congress to link Afghan government poppy
eradication efforts with levels of aid. Karzai was surprised
by this concern, as he was under the impression that poppy
eradication was proceeding well. Rohrabacher also pressed
Karzai to integrate the warlords ) whom he referred to as
ðnic leaders8 ) into the central government by pursuing
a federalist decentralization of power. Karzai strongly
disagreed with both Rohrabacher,s premise of ðnic
leaders8 as suitable local authorities and his conclusion
that federalism was the appropriate solution for
Afghanistan,s fractured polity. End summary.

=========================
Pressure Building to Link
Aid and Anti-Drug Efforts
=========================


2. (C) Rohrabacher indicated that aid to Afghanistan was
still seen by Congress as a battleground in the war against
terror. This meant that, despite the intense global
attention raised by the war in Iraq, Congress did not plan to
divert funds or attention from Afghan reconstruction efforts.

After providing this reassurance, Rohrabacher said he needed
to speak frankly about two issues of importance.

3. (C) The first issue was the potential political liability
of Afghanistan,s recent resumption of its place as number
one producer of narcotics. In a presidential election year,
Rohrabacher was concerned that the administration would find
it increasingly difficult to support funding the leading
source country for the heroin reaching America,s streets.
He was also concerned that political rivals of the
administration would make an embarrassing election issue out
of this situation. President Karzai reacted with surprise,
asking Rohrabacher if those with such views realized that the
Afghan government was working hard to eradicate and reduce
poppy production. In his view, the poppy and heroin problem
was under control. The real key to solving this problem
conclusively was finalizing road and alternative livelihoods
projects. Rohrabacher responded that the strong mood of
Congress ) based largely on the notable increase in poppy
production during the last year ) was to begin scaling back
funding to Afghanistan.


4. (C) Karzai, still taken aback by this sentiment, asked
Rohrabacher, &Is the war on terror even over, that we can
now turn our full attention to the war on drugs?8
Rohrabacher suggested that a poppy eradication program using
planes spraying appropriate herbicides could wipe out half
the existing poppy crop. Not specifically responding to this
proposal, Karzai replied that it was his impression that
Afghan-British counter-drug efforts had already eradicated 60
percent of this year,s poppy production ) resulting in
substantial eradication of the first and second poppy
harvests of this season. Karzai said that the local
populations of traditional poppy growing areas did not resist
eradication efforts. What worried Karzai far more were the
new poppy cultivation regions, such as Takhar and Bamiyan,
which began production only this year. These new areas were
a result of a policy error, Karzai said, noting that
counter-drug efforts should never have included paying
farmers to destroy their crops. This had resulted in
increased production in both traditional and new cultivation
regions in anticipation of transfer payments for destruction.
We are paying for that mistake now, Karzai concluded.


5. (C) Rohrabacher returned to his poppy spraying proposal,
emphasizing to Karzai that he must be ready to take strong
action to destroy poppies. Rohrabacher asked Karzai for a
letter of no objection ) which he could present to Congress
if controversy arose ) to proceed with spraying. This,
Rohrabacher maintained, would demonstrate Karzai was willing
to take whatever measures were necessary ) up to and
including spraying ) to eradicate poppies. Karzai,s Chief
of Staff, Sayed Jawad raised the issue of environmental
impact. Rohrabacher agreed that the letter could contain a
caveat regarding environmental impact.

=========================================
Warlords, &Ethnic Leaders8 and Federalism
=========================================


6. (C) Rohrabacher then turned to his second issue - which
was finding an appropriate role for such figures as Jumbesh
leader Abdul Rashid Dostum and Herat Governor Ismail Khan.
Rohrabacher told Karzai that Operation Enduring Freedom was
successful because Afghans were willing to fight hard to
change the status quo. Having reviewed the American
military-only Afghan war plan, he was convinced that the
coalition could not have prevailed without Afghan support.
The Afghan leaders in the war effort were from different
ethnic backgrounds. &Warlords8 was an inappropriate term
for these figures. Rohrabacher preferred ðnic leaders.8
Rohrabacher concluded that Afghanistan had always had
powerful provincial figures and that Karzai had to find some
way to incorporate these ðnic leaders8 into the modern
Afghan state.


7. (C) Karzai was again surprised by this analysis. He
disagreed that Afghanistan had always been so decentralized.
Rather, Karzai maintained, national institutions had enjoyed
strong authority in the provinces before the past two decades
of conflict. Also, provincial tribal chiefs had
traditionally maintained informal ties to the central
government. Karzai acknowledged that the central government
did not interfere with local disputes, and left them to local
councils to solve, limiting their interaction with the
provinces to provision of roads, health and education and
collection of taxes.


8. (C) Rohrabacher told Karzai his challenge was to integrate
the warlords, particularly Dostum, adding that the Afghan
government &needs these people not to be a negative force
but a positive force. 8 Rohrabacher offered the example of
former king Zahir Shah, who had ruled for 40 years through
compromise and co-optation of such figures in the past. By
decentralizing power in a federalist arrangement, the
warlords would have an incentive to cooperate with the
central government.


9. (C) Karzai responded that the principal complaint of the
Afghan people today was the TISA,s association with
warlords. Just a few days ago, Karzai added, a clash between
Dostum and Atta,s forces in Mazar resulted in 17 dead. The
Afghan government, Karzai continued, is criticized because it
allows the warlords to exist. Karzai welcomed the continued
presence of such figures in Afghanistan, but said they had no
right to act outside the law, and must respect life and
property. Such &outlaw8 behavior had to end. Rohrabacher
replied that many of the Wild West,s most famous sheriffs
were former outlaws, (e.g. Wyatt Earp),and that law and
order was maintained in those times primarily by local
militias.

================================
Warlords and Fundamentalism:
Two Sides of the Same False Coin
================================

10. (C) Rohrabacher noted that Afghanistan still faced a
major threat from radical Islam, which Rohrabacher concluded
was allied with Pashtun Nationalism. Therefore, cooperation
with the Northern Alliance was essential as a counterforce,
and the &Northern Alliance is not expendable.8 Karzai
replied that conditions in Afghanistan, to the contrary, were
much the same now as in 1994 before the advent of the
Taliban, with local military commanders abusing and
exploiting the population through force. Rohrabacher noted
that the decision to create the Taliban ) which Rohrabacher
said included the Saudis, the U.S. and Pakistan ) was made
to bring order to such chaos. The decision at that time was
between a return of the former King or the installation of a
&new force.8 This time, Rohrabacher concluded, it is
important to do the right thing.


11. (C) Again, Karzai disagreed. Such warlords, which
Rohrabacher suggested working with, were the very ones who
facilitated the pre-Taliban disorder. It was a fact that
such warlords were able to operate in Afghanistan through
U.S. support. When the Taliban came, the people surrendered,
as they wanted to be rid of the warlords. Karzai warned that
the Afghan government now has a chance to make the country
better, or the Taliban would be back. He added that he &was
not giving the current situation another year.8 The
warlords were killing, raping, looting, and stealing from the
people ) including Ismail Khan and Dostum. Already, the
Taliban are back in Kandahar and the people are welcoming
them. Afghan government officials do not even feel safe
traveling to the rural areas of Kandahar, Karzai reported.
The reason Afghans in the provinces do not want federalism is
expressly because the warlords will rule them in such an
arrangement.


12. (C) Karzai then turned his criticism to Rohrabacher,s
perception that the Taliban were linked to Pashtun
nationalism. On the contrary, Karzai said, Pashtun
nationalists were generally secular. In fact, Karzai added,
Pakistan had created the Taliban to fight against Pashtun
nationalism. When Pakistan was created 50 years ago, Karzai
continued, the area inside Pakistan containing Pashtuns was
divided from the Pashtuns on the Afghan side of the border.
This Pashtun-dominated region was called &Pashtunistan. 8
Fearing secession, Pakistan set out to destroy Pashtun
nationalism by Islamicizing Pakistani Pashtuns and killing
Afghan Pashtun nationalists. Pakistan,s goal was to have
Afghanistan dominated by radical Islam. Pakistan also killed
regional tribal leaders in the Pashtun areas. To further
this policy during the Soviet invasion period, Pakistan
convinced the U.S. that radical Muslims were the ideal force
to fight the Soviets. As a result, the U.S. gave money to
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other radical Muslims to fight the
Soviets, despite the fact that such radical Muslims had no
Afghan following. According to Karzai, &America realized
its mistake in 1988,8 but it was too late.


13. (C) Karzai noted that what the people really want is to
live under law, and people are starting to complain that
under the Taliban at least there was law and order.
Rohrabacher said that whatever the ultimate division of local
and central power in the Constitution, it is important that
it provides for local elections. Karzai reported that he had
just received a report from Barnett Rubin, who had just
completed a tour of the country. This report stated that the
people do not want federalism and that they fear the
warlords. The Hazaras were specifically cited as a community
that fears a regional distribution of power. Karzai
concluded by saying that men like Dostum are not ðnic
leaders8 - they are warlords. They are fighting among and
killing local people of their own ethnic community.
Rohrabacher replied that, in any case, it was important to
allow local people to vote freely in local or national
elections. Karzai agreed. On one condition, he added, that
they vote without having a gun to their heads.


14. (C) Karzai said that the Afghan people have given us (his
government) a chance to change things. The way he saw it,
there were only three ways to guarantee free elections in
2004: 1) to train the ANA and have them disarm the warlords;
2) to expand ISAF and have them disarm the warlords; and 3)
to take all the current leadership ) Karzai here included
himself, the warlords and all others associated with the past
) out of Afghanistan and let the people start fresh with
newly elected leaders. Rohrabacher replied that the second
option was &very doable.8 Karzai concluded that there was
still a chance for Afghanistan to abandon warlordism and
looting. Upon learning that Rohrabacher was scheduled to
visit Dostum in Mazar the following day, Karzai asked
Rohrabacher to be blunt with Dostum ) and stress to him that
Afghanistan had been given a second chance and it had to
change.


15. (U) Congressman Rohrabacher did not have an opportunity
to clear this cable before his departure.
FINN