SE KHALILZAD'S APRIL 11 MEETING WITH FM ABDULLAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001007

SIPDIS

NOFORN

NSC FOR ZKHALILZAD, JDWORKEN, HMANN, RHANSON, DSEDNEY
DEPT FOR SA/PAB, SA/AR, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER AF PK
SUBJECT: SE KHALILZAD'S APRIL 11 MEETING WITH FM ABDULLAH

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. FINN FOR REASONS
1.5 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: During his April 11 meeting with FM Abdullah,
SE Khalilzad addressed both regional and domestic Afghan
developments. Khalilzad suggested that the renewed activity
of the Taliban and other destabilizing elements in the South
might be addressed through a trilateral
(U.S.-Afghan-Pakistani) working group. Abdullah responded
favorably to this proposal, noting he welcomed improving
relations with Pakistan. Khalilzad also sought Abdullah,s
views on priority domestic issues that demanded immediate
attention. FM Abdullah suggested that the top three priority
issues were ensuring successful results for the
Constitutional Commission, the Election Commission, and
ANA/NDS reform. End Summary.

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SE Khalilzad Offers Trilateral
Working Group Proposal
==============================


2. (C) SE Khalilzad met with Afghan FM Abdullah on April 11
to review conditions in Afghanistan. Accompanying Khalilzad
were the Ambassador, NSC,s Rebecca Hanson, DOD/OSD,s
Mustafa Popal and Econ/Commoff (notetaker). SE Khalilzad
began discussions by noting his concern about the poor state
of Afghan-Pakistan relations. The recent killing of an ICRC
worker in Kandahar and reported Pakistani and Taliban
cross-border incursions were of great concern to Washington.
SE Khalilzad proposed a trilateral arrangement as a means to
address this growing problem. He proposed further that
CJTF-180 commander, General McNeill, could head a high-level
standing committee which would meet monthly. Others could
form a working-level body that could meet more frequently.
The goal of these trilateral arrangements would be to stop
all Taliban activities in Afghanistan. Khalilzad noted he
had not yet proposed this idea to President Karzai and hoped
to get the FM,s views first.


3. (C) Abdullah responded that concern was indeed growing
over Taliban activities in Afghanistan. In Ghazni, for
example, the Taliban had time to establish a network and
launch concerted operations recently. This level of
organization worried Abdullah. Abdullah noted that Pakistan
complained about negative perceptions of Pakistan and poor
Afghan treatment of Pashtuns in Afghanistan. The FM noted it
would take time to reverse such feelings, but that this
process would not be helped by such activities as the Taliban
and Pakistan were reportedly engaged in. Abdullah reported
that security forces in the South were now acting to
destabilize the region.


4. (C) According to Abdullah, President Musharraf had
complained of Indian covert destabilization activities in
southern Afghanistan through the Indian consulate in
Kandahar. Abdullah,s opinion was that India was unlikely to
engage in such activity, and had merely established its
presence to promote its growing (mostly commercial) interests
in Afghanistan. India was active in Afghanistan, Abdullah
noted, including a promised donation of trucks and an offer
of military training to the ANA, building the Zaranj-Delaram
road, and a $70m assistance pledge. Abdullah welcomed
Pakistan balancing this commitment from their side and
Pakistan,s involvement in Afghanistan, but rejected any
notion that Pakistan could &veto8 Indian activities here.
Abdullah concluded that establishing military and
intelligence-led trilateral discussions was the best way to
begin addressing these issues. The diplomatic channel, he
added, obliged parties to &take sides8 on these issues.
Ambassador noted that the diplomatic channel was, however,
useful as a marker of progress.

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A Review f Domestic Conditions
===============================


5. (C) SE Khalilzad, acknowledging that domestic issues were
not the FM,s specific responsibility, then asked FM Abdullah
for his view on current conditions inside Afghanistan.
Khalilzad said that there was not as much progress in some
areas as hoped, including the security sector generally, the
progress of the national army, establishing a clear DDR
policy, Ministry of Defense reform towards becoming a
national organization, and limited progress on NDS (National
Directorate of Security) reform.


6. (S/NF) Abdullah agreed that there had been less progress
than hoped for in these areas. The FM noted that
misunderstandings between OMC and General Baryalai over
organizational models for the ANA had caused some delays.
Abdullah noted that models for ANA organizational
arrangements must be adapted to fit Afghan circumstances.
Further, greater levels of support from the local leadership
was needed to recruit soldiers from Kandahar and Jalalabad,
which was critical to establishing the required ethnic
diversity of the ANA. Turning to DDR, Abdullah noted that
practical and political considerations were involved in the
selection of the first effected regions ) early success was
key to this effort. An apparent misunderstanding over the
appropriate numbers of forces involved and whether NDS
operations would be fully funded by the U.S had also slowed
reform of NDS. These NDS issues were now apparently
resolved, and according to Abdullah, NDS Chief Aref had told
him reform was ready to move forward.


7. (C) Abdullah then turned to the controversy over
appropriate methods of holding the annual celebration
(&jashn8) of the Mujaheddin victory over the Soviets. The
main concern was whether the ANA ) rather than Mujaheddin
fighters exclusively - would march in this event,s parade.
Abdullah recommended that the ANA should participate to
illustrate its role as a national military force. The
Ambassador noted he was aware of this issue and said the
parade should not take place. He had discussed this with
President Karzai twice, and told him that an all-Mujaheddin
event would send the wrong signal at the wrong time ) with
elections coming up and the constitution being drafted.
Further, it was a violation of the Bonn Agreement. The
Ambassador suggested that a celebration of peace, rather than
a military event, might be more appropriate. Abdullah noted
that last year,s celebrations were &too military8, but
added that it was not simply a matter of Kabul,s
celebrations - this event would be celebrated in cities
throughout Afghanistan. Ambassador noted that the character
of the celebration would be a key issue.


8. (C) Abdullah then turned to Taliban activities in the
provinces, reporting that they were very focused on the
provinces. The Taliban knows what,s happening in Zabol, he
added, but we do not. Abdullah also offered his assessment
on the 2004 elections, reflecting pessimism that the work of
the Constitutional Commission was proceeding quickly enough.
SE Khalilzad suggested that the U.S. and Afghan governments
needed to decide on a set of high priority issues to work on
closely together. Khalilzad warned that criticism would grow
unless progress accelerated, and that a mechanism for
addressing these priority issues was needed. Khalilzad asked
Abdullah for his recommendation of the top two or three items
which needed to be brought to closure. Abdullah quickly
suggested the following priorities: 1) the Constitutional
Commission, 2) the Election Commission, and 3) ANA/NDS
reform. SE Khalilzad shared his concern over the level of
cooperation from the MOD, noting that MOD reform was key to
many other areas. The Ambassador added that we needed to
stress continued U.S. commitment to remaining engaged in
Afghanistan and our strong support of reforms. If such
reforms happen, we need to continue our support for the
reformed organizations so that they will not be left
isolated. Ambassador added his view that the NDS reform will
ultimately be successful.
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