FATAH LEADER HINTS AT PM ABBAS'S DOWNFALL

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 002771


NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2013
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG PGOV IS
SUBJECT: FATAH LEADER HINTS AT PM ABBAS'S DOWNFALL

Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Jeffrey Feltman, Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Fatah Central Committee member and frequent
Arafat ally Sakher Habash, in a conversation with Pol/C in
Ramallah 9/3, said he saw only two ways out of the ongoing
political crisis in the Palestinian Authority: either PM
Abbas makes amends with Arafat and the Fatah leadership, or
he resigns and Arafat appoints another Central Committee
member as PM in his place. Habash said he thought Abbas had
little to gain from seeking support from the Legislative
Council; the PLC may not vote down his government, but it is
also unlikely to give him a new mandate. Habash guessed that
Abbas knows this and wants to use his PLC appearance on 9/4
to presage his resignation from the government. End summary.

"Peackocks Fighting Over a Garbage Dump"
--------------


2. (C) Abu Mazen and Abu Ammar (Arafat) are "two peacocks
fighting over a garbage dump," scoffed Sakher Habash, an
influential member of Fatah's Central Committee who has been
closely involved in the recent shuttle diplomacy between the
PA Prime Minister and the PLO Chairman. Instead of fighting,
they should be working closely together because they need one
another to carry out the difficult steps on reform and
security called for in the roadmap. He laid primary blame
for the failed relationship with Abu Mazen, who in his view
has failed to consult the Chairman sufficiently.


3. (C) Habash also faulted the PM for resigning from Fatah's
governing body, the Central Committee (Note: Abbas resigned
from the Central Committee on July 7 after he was accused by
its members of failing to achieve sufficient results in
roadmap talks with the GOI. The Central Committee has
refused to accept his resignation. End note). "Without the
backing of Fatah and Arafat, who will support him? How can
he be expected to confront Hamas?" he asked, pointing to the
PM's poor faring in recent public opinion polls
(three-percent popularity in a July poll). Abbas added to
his difficulties by delegating Interior Minister authorities
to Mohammed Dahlan, Habash said, thus "circumventing" the
Fatah Central Committee's decree that the Interior Minister
must be one of their own.


4. (C) Finally, Habash concluded, neither Israel nor the U.S.
gave the PM sufficient support. Habash said he did not doubt
that the U.S. wanted Abbas to succeed, as the means of making
the roadmap succeed. But he said that he had serious doubts
that Israel had accepted the roadmap in good faith --
"Otherwise, they would have done much more to strengthen Abu
Mazen."

Cooperate or Resign
--------------


5. (C) So what's the way forward, Pol/C asked? Habash
responded that there are only two options. Under the first,
Abbas makes amends with Arafat, re-joins the Central
Committee, and comes to a mutually acceptable resolution of
who controls the security services (Note: As reported
previously, the plan currently under discussion involves the
PM appointing a Central Committee member such as Nasser Yusif
as Interior Minister with authority over all the security
forces, and agreeing to cooperate with an Arafat-chaired
"national security council" that would provide policy
guidance on security matters. End note).


6. (C) Under the second, PM Abbas resigns and Arafat appoints
a new PM. Habash was quick to emphasize that any new PM
would also need to come from the Central Committee; he
refused to discuss likely names, only noting that "there are
eleven of us here" and ruling out himself. Asked for his
reaction to Salam Fayyad and Munib al-Masri as possible PM
candidates -- Fayyad is a political independent and Masri,
while a Fatah member, has mainly concentrated on his business
activities -- he laughed and offered more colorful metaphors.
While praising the Finance Minister's performance and
personal integrity, he said, "Fayyad is a dentist. Why
appoint a dentist when what we need is a cardiologist?" As
for the businessman Masri, he said, "He is made of wax; he
will melt in the job."


7. (C) As for Abbas's gambit to elicit a new mandate from the
PLC on 9/4, he said he doubted it would help him, as the PLC
would likely neither vote him down nor give him his desired
mandate. "He is probably using the PLC to prepare for his
resignation," Habash mused.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Throughout the meeting, Habash returned to the theme
that no prime minister can succeed without the support of
Arafat and Fatah's leadership. Although there is no
precedent to Abu Mazen's premiership, one could argue that
recent history indicates that he has a point. Beginning with
his quarrels with Arafat over the formation of his government
in April, Abbas became increasingly exasperated with Arafat
and his allies in Fatah, consulted them less frequently, and
finally resigned from the Central Committee in early July
after its members leveled harsh criticism at him for his
handling of roadmap negotiations with Israel. The conflict
with Arafat and the Fatah elders flared up again in August
over who should control the security services. Given the
stakes involved in the security services issue, it was not
surprising therefore that Arafat and his allies fought back
more fiercely, launching a series of demonstrations this week
against Abbas and his government (singling out Fayyad and
Dahlan in particular),raiding Fayyad's offices in Gaza, and
encouraging an Arafat appointee who was dismissed by Abbas to
remain on the job with the assistance of armed gunmen.
Lacking public support, Abbas has turned to the PLC for a
mandate, which he is unlikely to get. Of course, there is
another way that we choose to read this tale: that Abu Mazen
was never really given a fair chance, with or without the
Fatah Central Committee, because Arafat was never going to
allow him to exercise real authority.


FELTMAN