Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ISTANBUL760
2003-05-29 04:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

LEADERSHIP IN THE ORTHODOX WORLD: THE ECUMENICAL

Tags:  PGOV PHUM TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000760 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TU
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP IN THE ORTHODOX WORLD: THE ECUMENICAL
PATRIARCH AND RUSSIAN COMPETITION

Classified By: Consul General David L. Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b)
and ( d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000760

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2013
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TU
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP IN THE ORTHODOX WORLD: THE ECUMENICAL
PATRIARCH AND RUSSIAN COMPETITION

Classified By: Consul General David L. Arnett for reasons 1.5 (b)
and ( d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Though divided among many national churches,
all Orthodox leaders except the Russian Orthodox recognize
the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul, Bartholomew II, as
first among equals. Located in "The Second Rome," the
Ecumenical Patriarch traces a line of succession back to St.
Andrew and, later, the conversion of Emperor Constantine.
However, Alexei II, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church,
may be making a play for preeminence within Orthodoxy. In a
recent conversation, Metropolitan Meliton confirmed the
competitive atmosphere and the Ecumenical Patriarchate's
animosity toward more recent Russian machinations. END
SUMMARY.


--------------
How Many Romes Are There?
--------------



2. (C) Being a student of Orthodox power politics is a little
bit like watching a prize fight in slow-motion. Jabs and
swings come only rarely, and there are plenty of breaks. The
prize in question in this case is not a summit of religious
authority, as with the Pope in Roman Catholicism, but a nod
of pre-eminence from other Orthodox leaders. With this nod
comes a certain ability to set the tone of discussions
between Orthodoxy and the outside world, especially Western
Christianity. However, changes come only slowly, and church
concerns revolve around events in the distant future.



3. (C) One of the central pillars of support to the
Ecumenical Patriarch's claim to ecumenical status is
location. As "Patriarch of Constantinople and New Rome," he
can trace authority back to the Apostle Andrew and leadership
of the city where Christianity first became legalized within
the Roman Empire under Constantine, and later the state
religion. Demography and Turkish law are working against the
Ecumenical Patriarch's status in "The Second Rome," however.
The Greek Orthodox citizens of Turkey (from whom a new
Patriarch must be chosen) now number only 3,000. For the
Patriarchate to continue beyond one or two more patriarchs
after Bartholomew II, Turkish law regarding Lausanne Treaty
minorities will have to change, allowing leadership by
non-Turkish citizens. This seems unlikely to happen.




4. (C) There is a Third Rome, though. Moscow claims that,
prior to the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the torch was
passed to it to take up leadership within Orthodoxy, when the
tsar was given the Cap of Monomakh. Tenuous though the claim

SIPDIS
may be, it allowed the Romanov tsars to claim the title of
"Protector of the Orthodox Faith," a position which played
into Russia's involvement in the First World War, and the
Romanov dynasty's demise.


--------------
Don't Write to My Bishop!
--------------



5. (C) The most recent round of maneuvering began with a
letter from Russian Patriarch Alexei II to several Orthodox
leaders in Western Europe. Under Orthodox canon law, a
Patriarchof a national church is confined to communicating
directly on
with bishops and priests under his on
authority. The Ecumenical Patriarchate provided poloff with
a letter from Alexei to, among others, "His Grace, the Right
Reverend Gabriel, Bishop of Komansk, Locum Tenens of the
Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox Parishes in Western Europe,"
and four other church leaders the Ecumenical Patriarch claims
as his own.



6. (C) In the letter, Alexei lays out the reasons that he
does not consider the Russian Orthodox Church in Western
Europe to be subordinate to Constantinople. He cites a 1931
letter from Photius, then Ecumenical Patriarch, who he argues
foresaw only temporary subordination of the Russian Exarchate
in Western Europe to Constantinople "until, God willing,
unity and the unbroken image of the Holy Sister Russian
Church are restored." Alexei now argues that that time has
come.

7. (C) Moreover, Alexei's letter lays out a new proposal for
a single Metropolitan for the Russian Church in Western
Europe. Unlike the current Orthodox leaders in Western
Europe, who are appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarch, he
argues that local leaders should be elected from among local
clergy, and confirmed by Moscow. Thus, Alexei holds out the
prospect of greater autonomy, tied to his own authority.


--------------
More Churches, Please
--------------



8. (C) On a recent trip to Moscow, Metropolitan Meliton of
Philadelphia (Chief Secretary of the Holy Synod) said the
Russians made a further request: four churches in Istanbul.
Currently, the Russian Orthodox Church provides priests to
serve in a church owned by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
However, they argue, their need has grown, and more churches
are required. Rather than just working as guests on
Ecumenical Patriarchate property, they have requested that
ownership be transferred to them. Meliton said he denied
their request, but offered to expand the number of Russian
Orthodox priests allowed to serve the flock in Istanbul.


--------------
"Political, Not Spiritual"
--------------



9. (C) Meliton said that in the wake of the collapse of
communism, the Russian Orthodox Church was badly discredited,
not least among their Orthodox co-religionists. While he
recalls in the past working with Russian prelates who were
focused on spiritual concerns, he feels that picture has
changed. Now, he says, "Alexei and his bishops are all
former KGB informants, who still work closely with the FSB
and are far more political than spiritual in nature."
Meliton says he and the Patriarchate view Russian Orthodoxy
with great suspicion, and believe that it is deeply entangled
in the political needs of the Russian state.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



10. (C) Although not unheard of, it is rare for Turkish
political analysts or commentators to grasp that GOT
acceptance of the ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate in
Istanbul and facilitation of the Patriarchate's ability to
continue would accrue foreign policy benefits to Turkey. In
this regard we will continue to pay close attention to the
attitude toward the Patriarchate of Turkish "Eurasianists" --
i.e., those in the military, MFA, think tanks and business
world who advocate closer ties to Russia as an alternative to
Turkey's U.S/EU orientation.
ARNETT