Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03ISTANBUL1427
2003-09-26 08:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

ISTANBUL VIEWS ON SENDING TURKISH TROOPS TO IRAQ

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001427 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL VIEWS ON SENDING TURKISH TROOPS TO IRAQ


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5 (b&d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001427

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL VIEWS ON SENDING TURKISH TROOPS TO IRAQ


Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5 (b&d)



1. (C) Summary: Istanbul residents from all walks of life
continue to worry about the situation in Iraq and the
prospect of sending troops to Iraq. Whomever we meet with,
and whatever the subject, the conversation inevitably turns
to Iraq. Despite the widespread opposition before the U.S.
intervention, Turks here are now split on the issue of
whether to send troops to Iraq. Many see the March 1
decision and the preceding negotiations as having been
"disastrous" for U.S.-Turkish relations. Nevertheless,
several of our interlocutors insist on the need for a U.N.
Security Council (or at least NATO) mandate. With the
notable exception of the Turkish Industrialists' and
Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD),the business community
has largely come out in support of Turkish participation in
Iraq on the grounds that it would help secure a foothold for
Turkish companies in that market and would ensure the
continuation of good U.S.-Turkish relations. End Summary.



2. (C) The following sample of comments on Iraq provide a
general snapshot of the views that we have been hearing:


-- Istanbul Health Director (and close acquaintance of PM
Erdogan) Erman Tuncer waxed eloquently on the importance of
U.S.-Turkish relations, lamented how difficult (but
democratic and correct) the March 1 decision had been, and
insisted that a UNSCR would be critical to securing the
participation of Turkish peacekeepers (Note: Tuncer somewhat
disingenuously sought to blame this prerequisite on President
Sezer's position. End Note).


-- Former Istanbul CHP Chairman (and recent challenger)
Mehmet Boluk also emphasized the need to maintain the
U.S.-Turkish relationship and said that he would have
supported closer cooperation with the U.S. from the
beginning, including in the March 1 vote. Boluk criticized
the CHP for not behaving like a "real" opposition and for
ignoring Turkey's interests, noting that the British
opposition had provided critical support to British PM Blair.
(Note: Boluk has an axe to grind with CHP Chairman Baykal.
End Note).


-- Istanbul AKP Vice Chairman Murat Yalcintas told us that
the AKP rank and file are opposed to sending Turkish

peacekeepers, seeing it as an American effort to minimize
U.S. casualties. They are suspicious, moreover, as to why
the U.S. has not acted against the PKK terrorists in northern
Iraq. Without some developments on that front, Yalcintas
thinks it will be difficult to persuade the general public
and even AKP parliamentarians to support sending Turkish
troops.


-- CHP parliamentarian Damla Gurel defended her decision to
vote against the March 1 resolution on the grounds that
"inside AKP sources" had told them that the vote would pass
in any case and to do otherwise would have been personal
"political suicide." Both Gurel and fellow CHP
parliamentarian Onur Oymen separately told poloff that CHP is
in close consultation with President Sezer and that the party
remains opposed to any deployment of Turkish forces without a
U.N. (or at least NATO) mandate.


-- The managing director of AK Sigorta (one of the top three
Turkish insurance companies) Ragip Yergin told poloff that
Turkey had made a mistake not approving the March 1
resolution and that PM Erdogan "could not afford" to have
another resolution fail (with or without a UNSCR). If there
is a UNSCR, approval of a Turkish resolution is a
"non-issue."


-- MUSIAD Vice Chairman and Albayrak General Coordinator Omer
Bolat said that he (and most MUSIAD members) supported the
March 1 decision to deny U.S. troops access to Turkey, but
that "now the situation is different." Bolat told us that
the U.S. should move quickly to multilateralize the foreign
presence in Iraq and Turkey should participate (providing
there is a new UNSCR).


-- TUSIAD's position shifted in the other direction, however,
with an equivocal September 19th statement by Chairman Tuncay
Ozilhan. While the press widely reported that Ozilhan called
for a UN resolution as a precondition for any decision to
send troops to Iraq, and argued that it did not appear likely
that Turkish troops could contribute to stability there,
TUSIAD sources stress that his actual statement (which they
concede was "unfortunately worded") simply argued that
because of increasing uncertainty in Iraq, "Turkey must think
more deeply" about whether sending troops will contribute to
stability there.


-- Ulker (food processing giant) CEO Murat Ulker, while
professing ignorance on political issues, said that "Saddam
had to go and only the U.S. could do it." Ulker expressed
regret about the March 1 decision and support for a possible
future deployment of Turkish troops.



3. (C) Comment: The impression we get here is that a decision
to send troops remains deeply unpopular. At the same time,
many of those who supported the March 1 decision acknowledge
that the situation has changed. Most are responsive to the
argument that contributing to a stable, democratic, secular,
and prosperous Iraq is very much in Turkey's own interests,
but, at a minimum, they are looking for a UNSCR to provide
"international legitimacy" and a cover to disassociate a
Turkish troop presence from the unpopular U.S. "occupation."
The most perplexing shift is that of TUSIAD, for despite
arguments by Deputy Chairman Mustafa Koc and others that the
September 19 statement did not represent a change in the
organization's policy, it clearly marks a step back from
TUSIAD's much more unequivocal position in favor of the March
1 resolution. Some argue that TUSIAD sensed the way the wind
was blowing in the government, but former Ambassador and
TUSIAD board member Cem Duna told us on September 24 that in
his view the odds of Turkey's ultimately providing troops are
still "well above 50 percent." He himself noted, however,
that he had felt similarly in March. In any case, though
TUSIAD represents Turkey's largest companies, it is not part
of the AK government's constituency, and so is largely
irrelevant to this government's decision making process.
ARNETT