RISING ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AND U.S. POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000127

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAO PTER KISL TK
SUBJECT: RISING ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AND U.S. POLICY
TOWARDS IRAQ


REF: A. ISTANBUL 108 AND 114

B. ANKARA 549



1. (C) Summary: Widespread and increasingly vocal opposition
to a possible war against Iraq is on the verge of evolving
into a more general anti-American backlash in Istanbul. Our
observations, Istanbul contacts, and recent polls and surveys
lead us to believe that anti-American sentiment is sharply
rising in Istanbul. "sessiz Although much of this opposition is
directed primarily at our policies in Iraq, the overall
climate provides fertile ground for extremists hostile
towards the United States. Some leftist groups (including
terrorist groups DHKP-C and KADEK) and the populist media
tycoon and would-be politician Cem Uzan are seizing the
opportunity to stir up trouble and rally support to their
causes. U.S. reassurances of its commitment to Iraq's
territorial integrity and support for an economic assistance
package are helping to address Turkish concerns. However,
sustained public diplomacy in Istanbul -- with 15% of the
country's population and key opinion makers in media, higher
education, and business -- remains critical to winning the
Turkish public's support for our goals in Iraq. End Summary.



2. (SBU) We have been following with concern the fervent and
widespread opposition in Istanbul to U.S. policy in Iraq.
Recent polls (E.G., the Pew Global Attitudes Project and
local polls) affirm that up to 90% of Turks oppose U.S.
military action against Iraq and that anti-American sentiment
is on the rise in Turkey. We have observed that Istanbul
reflects those trends. In recent months, ConGen Istanbul has
consistently found Turks to be much more vocal and critical
of U.S. policies towards Iraq and the Middle East. "No to
War" bumper stickers and placards have been plastered across
the city, and the Consulate has received dozens of virulent,
even threatening, anti-war letters.



3. (C) The frequency and attendance of anti-war
demonstrations have been steadily increasing over the last
month. In the largest demonstration so far, over 5000
protesters gathered in Beyazit square on January 26
brandishing placards reading "Damn U.S. Imperialism" and "We
Won't Be The U.S. Soldiers" (ref A) (Note: Press reports
indicate that there was a much larger demonstration in the
southeastern city of Mersin on the same day. End Note). A
meeting of over 2000 organizational representatives on
January 25 was held in Istanbul to plan for even larger
demonstrations in the coming weeks. Demonstrators dumped a
(presumably) American military uniform and boots on the steps
of a prominent Turkish business association last week to
protest the chairman's recent "hawkish" public remarks.
Turkish police sources told us last week that they suspect
that these demonstrations are being secretly sponsored by
various anti-American leftist groups, including DHKP-C, MLKP
(Marxist Leninist Communist Party),and KADEK (formerly the
PKK) terrorist cells.



4. (SBU) Others are also seizing the opportunity to fan the
flames of anti-Americanism and gather personal support.
Recent spurious allegations that the U.S. has had official
contacts with KADEK/PKK in northern Iraq have received
considerable Istanbul-based national press coverage (ref B).
Additionally, media tycoon and Youth Party leader Cem Uzan
has reached out to all of Istanbul (as well as the rest of
Turkey) over the last week with an enormous anti-American
media campaign (Note: Uzan's Youth Party emerged just a few
months before last year's November 3 elections and captured
over 7 percent of the national vote with its anti-American,
anti-Western populist rhetoric. End Note). Using print,
radio, and television, Uzan has put out a well-crafted,
populist, anti-war message under the title "Who is the U.S.
Attacking?" Uzan's message strikes popular chords by
touching on themes like "Turkey should make its own decision
on war," "The U.S. has not kept its promises to compensate
Turkey for $100 billion in damages from the Gulf War," and
"Who will suffer from this anti-Muslim U.S. aggression?" Not
content with using his private media outlets, Uzan has bought
air and radio time as well as entire pages in all of the
major newspapers. Local staff tells us that this campaign is
unprecedented in its coverage and cost.



5. (U) All of this is troubling to Americans who know Turkey
well. Turkish hospitality is unstinting and Turkish-American
friendship runs deep. Additionally, U.S. "soft power" in
Turkey appears alive and well. Turkey sends over 10,000
students to study at American universities every year
(placing it in the top ten countries worldwide). Turkish
television routinely features American programs (current fare
includes Friends, Ally McBeal, Dawson's Creek, and NYPD Blue)
in prime time network slots, and NBC and CNN also have
popular local franchises. American films dominate local
theaters, and American pop music has made significant inroads
in local radio programming. U.S. products, from McDonald's
and Coca-Cola to Ford automobiles and Boeing aircraft, are
commonplace.



6. (SBU) Nonetheless, our sense is that the reservoir of good
will towards the United States is gradually being depleted.
Simple opposition to U.S. policies (i.e. "what we do") among
the large majority of Turks who are generally sympathetic to
the U.S. is spilling over and contributing to the small core
of anti-American Turks who dislike "who we are." The Pew
Project found that only 31 percent of Turks had a positive
view of "Americans" (versus 30 percent of the U.S.),78
percent viewed the spread of U.S. ideas and customs
negatively, and 46 percent disliked American popular culture.
The timing and the discrepancy between the intensely
pro-American mood in late 1999 and early 2000 (following
former President Clinton's November 1999 visit to Turkey) and
the generally pessimistic mood last summer during the waning
months of the unpopular Ecevit government may have
exaggerated these numbers. But this cannot fully account for
the sharp turn in public opinion against the United States
that we observe in Istanbul.



7. (SBU) Most Istanbul Turks continue to value the
U.S.-Turkey strategic alliance and enjoy American products.
Adversely affected by the ongoing economic crisis, however,
many in this group mistakenly blame the IMF (and, by
extension, the U.S.) for the country's crushing debt and the
current strict economic program. Initially sympathetic to
the U.S.'s war on terrorism, most of them have since come to
believe that the operations directed against Afghanistan and,
now, Iraq are heavy-handed personal American vendettas and
perhaps even anti-Islamic in nature. They feel that the U.S.
has its priorities confused (i.e., Iraq before
Israel/Palestine) and is bent on pursuing its goals
unilaterally with little regard for international, and
particularly Turkish, opinion.



8. (SBU) Comment: Our contacts in Istanbul, like embassy
contacts elsewhere in the country, have never been fond of
Saddam Hussein; most recognize that he represents a threat to
regional stability, and many even admit that he probably does
have biological and/or chemical weapons. Nonetheless, there
is a strong, widespread Turkish desire to preserve stability
in the region - critical for Turkey's economic and political
development. Much of the opposition to an operation against
Iraq rests with our contacts' pessimistic predictions of the
duration of hostilities, an unstable post-war power vacuum,
and the possible disintegration of the Iraqi state into
several components, including a Kurdish north. CONGEN
reassurances -- that we would prefer a peaceful solution to
war, that we will continue to seek wide international support
for any necessary military operation, that we are committed
to Iraqi territorial integrity and long-term regional
stability, and that we are prepared to help Turkey weather
the negative economic shocks of a war -- have gone a long way
towards addressing these concerns. Continued multilateral
diplomacy and public diplomacy efforts to address these basic
concerns will be critical to winning the Turkish public's
support for our goals in Iraq. End Comment.
ARNETT