Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
03HARARE2313
2003-11-28 10:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

MASS ACTION IN THE OFFING?

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC ZI MDC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002313 

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MASS ACTION IN THE OFFING?

REF: (A) HARARE 2287 (B) HARARE 2286 (C) HARARE 2279

(D) HARARE 2124 (E) HARARE 1594

Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002313

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MASS ACTION IN THE OFFING?

REF: (A) HARARE 2287 (B) HARARE 2286 (C) HARARE 2279

(D) HARARE 2124 (E) HARARE 1594

Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: MDC Secretary for Presidential Affairs
Gandi Mudzingwa on November 25 advised poloff that the
opposition party was laying the groundwork for another "mass
action" in late January or early February 2004. He predicted
that the bishops would soon publicly declare their mediation
efforts at a dead end, opening the door for the MDC to pursue
mass action without being accused of undermining talks. In
fact, the timing of mass action, imminent or not, likely will
depend on a host of uncertain factors, including ruling party
and international reaction to a withdrawal by the bishops, if
indeed the bishops are yet prepared to declare their efforts
a failure. END SUMMARY.

Civil Society Outreach
--------------


2. (C) Mudzingwa said he and other party leaders recently
had met with senior representatives of the three
organizations headed by the respective members of the
"bishops troika" (ref B),although the bishops themselves
were unavailable. Mudzingwa said that the consensus of
church leaders represented was that the bishops' efforts had
been unable to overcome the ruling party's disingenuousness
about talks and that it was time to take a different tack.
They agreed that the bishops should declare publicly that
their best efforts had come to naught and that they would
suspend further mediation work. Mudzingwa said the MDC
expected the ruling party to respond ambivalently, evincing
its bad faith to domestic and international audiences. That
would permit the MDC to renew plans for mass action without
taking the blame for sinking prospects for talks.


3. (C) According to Mudzingwa, the party already was
engaging a number of players it deemed potentially crucial in
maximizing the mass action's impact. He asserted that the
churches could be counted on to help moblize participants at

the parish level. Various groups within civil society,
including the increasingly restive labor unions would
participate as well.

Problematic Security Forces
--------------


4. (C) Mudzingwa reported that the party also was reaching
out to the police and military. The party had contacts in
the police force, which he maintained could not ultimately be
relied on by the ruling party, were popular action to be
sufficiently massive. Communications with the military
remained problematic but the party had made inroads. He said
that at least one senior officer had indicated that the
support or at least ambivalence of many top brass could be
secured with promises that they could keep farms gained under
land reform -- an approach party leadership was weighing.
Mudzingwa said the party expected Mugabe to sweep away the
entire top brass, replacing it with the next echelon that
ostensibly had better rapport with the rank-and-file. He
said this might appear popular in the short run but the new
brass's allegiances to the ruling party may prove difficult
to sustain. The party was considering public statements to
augment discreet confidential personal approaches to certain
officers, but recognized the risk of fueling ruling party
insecurities and provoking a dangerous backlash. Echoing an
earlier approach, he sought USG assistance in quietly
bolstering the ZDF's confidence in the MDC (ref E).


5. (C) Mudzingwa said the party's next mass action would be
more geographically dispersed than action earlier this year.
A key tactical difference would be to engineer more action in
rural areas, which he asserted would stretch thin GOZ
resources -- especially the principally rural-based "Green
Bombers" -- devoted to suppressing public dissent.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) The party's apparent consideration of renewed mass
action responds to growing impatience among a restive
rank-and-file. It further reflects a recognition that
Mugabe's disingenuousness had been laid bare internationally
by the failure of the bishops, Mbeki, and Obasanjo to find
any purchase for talks. A leading advocate within the
party's more militant wing, Mudzingwa is very close to
Tsvangirai but the extent to which the party leadership

SIPDIS
supports imminent mass action is uncertain. Tsvangirai made
no mention of it when he met with the Ambassador last week
(ref A),although he made clear that convincing the world of
Mugabe's bad faith -- presumably a political condition
precedent to mass action -- is an MDC priority. We question
how soon the bishops, who are engaging regional leaders on
Zimbabwe (ref B),or Mbeki will be prepared to admit failure
publicly. We suspect that a decision to proceed will await
more definitive signals that the international community has
given up on such efforts. We cannot discount the possibility
that the ruling party could manipulate its posture on talks
so as to further string out or rejuvenate mediation efforts.


7. (C) An additional factor constraining a decision to move
forward is continued uncertainty about the MDC's ability to
mobilize sufficient participation in the face of public
apathy, hamstrung communication, severe economic crisis, and
official intimidation. Recent efforts by the Zimbabwe
Conference of Trade Unions (ref C) and the National
Constituent Assembly (ref E) to engineer public
demonstrations have elicited scant public participation.
Anonymous e-mails calling people to the streets at specific
times have provoked no reaction, other than from the GOZ in
arresting several found in possession of such e-mails.


8. (C) Widespread despair and suffering precipitated by the
country's economic implosion remain a wild card to some
extent. Most Zimbabweans continue to respond to their plight
by attending to the daily challenges of scraping by and by
eschewing political action. If the public were to take to
the streets in large number -- a big if, whether by political
plan or in spontaneous reaction to an unforeseen provocation
-- the government's ability to contain events is unclear. To
date, civil disturbances have been fairly centralized affairs
choreographed with plenty of notice. Police have had little
trouble pre-empting or controlling such events and have been,
since the violent reaction to the MDC's June mass action,
relatively restrained in response -- roughing up a few
demonstrators for show and releasing those arrested in short
order. The key question remains: can public discontent be
translated into large demonstrations or can the security
forces continue to prevent any demonstration from gaining
momentum. Confronted with larger and more dispersed crowds,
the insecure and resource-strapped GOZ could be expected to
unleash a wider and significantly more violent crackdown than
Zimbabwe has seen in some time -- with unpredictable results.

SULLIVAN