MDC SECRETARY GENERAL ON CARROTS AND STICKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002225

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, TEITELBAUM
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY
PARIS FOR C. NEARY
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ZI MDC
SUBJECT: MDC SECRETARY GENERAL ON CARROTS AND STICKS

REF: (A) HARARE 1977 (B) HARARE 1971 (C) HARARE 1185

(D) HARARE 1130

Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube on
November 6 told poloff that he intended during his planned
visit to Washington next week to urge the USG to be more
vocal in its criticism of the GOZ. At the same time, he
concluded that the time had come for a more explicit
elaboration by the USG of future assistance, conditioned on
political progress, as a means to induce greater seriousness
by the ruling party. Ncube reported that the MDC's economic
platform, dubbed RESTART, was being revised with particular
attention to land reform details that might offer common
policy ground with the ruling party. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ncube said that his planned visit with MDC National
Coordinator Isaac Maphosa to Washington November 12 was at
the behest of MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai. Their
principal objective was to brief USG officials on the
increasingly difficult operating environment faced by the
MDC, and to stimulate discussion of where collaborative
efforts should go in light of the ruling party's non-movement
on talks. For his part, he thought it was time to review
what he termed the "quieter" approach adopted by the USG
since President Bush's visit to South Africa in July. Ncube
reiterated that President Mbeki's efforts had been wholly
unsuccessful in moving Mugabe and were unlikely to succeed
without ramped up international pressure. In particular, he
asserted that a more vocal effort by the USG would help
fortify the confidence of SADC players who were most likely
to influence the ruling party's posture. Conversely, the
U.K. should keep as low profile as possible, as any public
British actions tended to play into Mugabe's posturing with
SADC.


3. (C) Referencing departing Assistant Secretary
Kansteiner's widely reported comments about the potential
utility of reviewing carrots and sticks vis-a-vis the GOZ,
Ncube expressed interest in exploring potential additional
sticks, although he had none to suggest beyond more forceful
diplomacy. As for carrots, he recognized the potential
utility of an articulation by the USG of what kinds of
assistance could be advanced upon the achievement of
political progress as a means to induce movement by the
ruling party toward talks. Areas for potential assistance
and appropriate indices of political progress would have to
be explored. The MDC was working on a policy paper that
would give greater definition the party's views on carrots,
sticks, and foreign policy generally; Ncube said he hoped to
see a draft before he departed for the Washington but the
product was not due to be finalized until later this month,
at the earliest.


4. (C) Ncube reported that the party's economic policy
paper, dubbed "RESTART", had been sent back to the drawing
boards but was still scheduled for release in late December.
Party leaders had agreed that many sections required greater
specificity, especially the segment on land reform. In
particular, a tenure system needed to be defined that would
establish predictable, reliable, and marketable property
rights in such a way that would restore the agricultural
sector's productivity. Echoing characterizations by
colleagues (ref B),Ncube said that there could be no return
to status quo ante and recognized that the government's
redistrubution was a fait accompli from which any new
government would have to work. He predicted that RESTART's
system for land use and property rights would contain
elements that would converge with the ruling party's
objective to make existing land reform productive.


5. (C) COMMENT: As the second leading figure in the MDC,
Ncube speaks with authority for the party and we recommend
that he be received at a high level. It is the first time
since the indictment of Tsvangirai and Ncube on fabricated
treason charges prior to the March 2002 presidential
elections that a senior MDC official has been free to visit
the United States. The MDC has evidenced some insecurity
over our engagement with Mbeki on Zimbabwe and more
"balanced" public comments on the regime (e.g., qualified
recognition of progress in August municipal elections); the
visitors are hoping for a strong show of support from
Washington interlocutors with which to impress regional
players, domestic constituents, and the ruling party.
Ncube's conclusion about conditioned carrots coincides with
repeated calls from the bishops (ref A). Some explicit
articulation of potential USG support, along the lines set
out in the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act and
contingent on progress on the polical front, might strengthen
the MDC's hand here and stimulate constructive deliberation
within the ruling party. Drawing from the discussion of
options set out in refs C and D, we will explore potential
measures in that regard via septel.
SULLIVAN